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What actors, expertise, and models of development are advanced by the ‘new 
Green Revolution in Africa’? This dissertation addresses this question through a 
blend of discourse analysis and ethnographic fieldwork during a period of agricultural 
transition in Northern Ghana. What struggles over authority, knowledge, identity, and 
property define this contemporary political economy of agricultural modernization in 
Ghana? I argue that legal, techno-scientific expertise and agribusiness work together 
to advance a model of agricultural development based on new forms of capital, 
governance structures, and technology. This model of agricultural development is 
mobilized and legitimated through discourses of emergency, salvation, 
entrepreneurship, and humanitarianism. In this new Green Revolution in Africa, 
regions like Northern Ghana are seen by development planners as ‘backwards,’ with 
growing ‘yield gaps’ that undermine food security. What is needed, from this 
perspective, is capital investment, entrepreneurship, and access to yield-enhancing 
technologies, such as ‘pro-poor biotechnology.’ Deficiency frames, the combined use 
of hype and science, and donations become critical mechanisms to facilitate—or 
resist—the entry of contested agricultural technologies and models of agricultural 
development. At the center of these discursive strategies is the figure of the farmer, 
who is seen as an agent and object of salvation by proponents and opponents alike. I 
complement discourse analysis with ethnography to show that these grand plans to 
transform farming from a way of life to a business are constantly challenged by the 
existing complexity of Africans’ multiple, coexisting roles, risk reduction practices, 











SEEDS OF CONTESTATION: GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS AND THE 













Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 













Associate Professor Virginia Haufler, Chair 
Professor Ken Conca 
Assistant Professor John McCauley 
Assistant Professor Isabella Alcañiz 






















© Copyright by 









I am very grateful for the years of support I have received in developing this project. I 
thank Ken Conca for consistently asking tough questions that helped me to develop 
my ideas and for encouraging me to do fieldwork. My independent study with Ken 
was a critical turning point for me and many of the books we read together have now 
figured prominently in this dissertation. I thank Virginia Haufler for asking me to 
consider whether some of the phenomena I had identified as new really was. The 
dissertation benefited from this attention to history, as well as Virginia’s insights into 
the work of the private sector in contemporary politics. Additionally, I am thankful to 
have been able to work with Karol Soltan, John McCauley, Isabella Alcañiz, Patricio 
Korzeniewicz, Mary Kate Schneider, Mark Shirk, Daniel Owens, Jennifer Wallace, 
Michael Beevers, Rodrigo Pinto, Marty Kobren, and Jonathan Hensley at the 
University of Maryland, many of whom provided me with feedback on earlier 
versions of this project. 
 
This project also benefited from the support provided at the Institute for Qualitative 
and Multi-Method Research (IQMR) in Syracuse, the Johns Hopkins graduate student 
colloquium, the University of Maryland Program for Society and the Environment, 
the African Seminar at Johns Hopkins University, Margaret Keck’s Research and 
Writing Seminar, feedback from panels at the International Studies Association, and 
my writing group colleagues at the University of South Florida. In particular, I am 
grateful for the feedback of Margaret Keck, Sara Berry, Alice Wiemers, Jennifer 
Clapp, Garrett Graddy, Nora McKeon, Casey McNeill, Elizabeth Bennett, Sinem 
Adar, Jane Bennett, Simon Nicholson, Biko Koenig, Lori Leonard, Siba Grovogui, 
Pier Larson, Beth Mendenhall, Noah Zerbe, and Chad Shomura. 
 
This project would not have been what it is without the guidance of my friends in 
Ghana, the financial support of the Fulbright fellowship (grant #34122686), and the 
words of encouragement from my family as they followed my travel from afar. I 
thank Alice Wiemers and John McCauley for helping me find great contacts that 
assisted with my research in Tamale. I will always be grateful for Dr. Salifu Mahama 
and his wonderful family for hosting us. I learned so much from Bakari Nyari and 
appreciate tremendously his constant support. I also would like to thank Christopher 
Azaare, Faiza and Kaka Taimako, Bonaba, Uncle Musa, Ishmael Salifu, Daniel Olad, 
Miles Adongo, Bern Guri, Lansah Alhassan, Issahaku Alhassan, the Banashek family, 
Stephen Perry, Nii Sarpei, and my friends at the Tamale Institute for Cross-Cultural 
Studies. I also thank the Program for Society and the Environment as well as the 
UMD Department of Government and Politics for travel support. 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank my best friend, partner, travel companion, and editor 
extraordinaire Anatoli Ignatov, who has been so supportive throughout this process. I 
am so grateful for the countless hours of conversations and ideas exchanged that 
made this project what it is today. 
  
 iii 





Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………..iii 
List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………iv 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Politicizing Agricultural Development: Contesting 
Discourses of Authority, Expertise, and Identity in Ghana…………………………...1 
Chapter 2: Technological Savior or Terminator Gene? Hype, Science and Law in the 
GMO Debate…………………………………………………………………………43 
Chapter 3: What is New About the ‘New Green Revolution’? Philanthrocapital, 
Biocapital, and Public-Private Partnerships………………………………………….84 
Chapter Four: Experts and Entrepreneurs: From Farming as a Way of Life to Farming 
as a Business………………………………………………………………………..129 





List of Abbreviations 
 
3ADI  African Accelerated Agribusiness and Agro-Industries Development Initiative 
AATF  African Agricultural Technology Foundation  
ABNE  African Biosafety Network of Expertise 
ABS  Africa Biofortified Sorghum 
ABSP  Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project 
ACDI/VOCA  Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in 
Overseas Cooperative Assistance 
ADB  Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana 
ADVANCE  Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement 
AfDB  African Development Bank 
AFSTA  African Seed Traders Association 
AGOA  African Growth and Opportunity Act 
AGRA  Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
ARC  Institute for Agricultural Research (South Africa) 
ASTI  Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators 
AU  African Union 
BMGF  Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
BNARI  Biotechnology and Nuclear Agriculture Research Institute 
Bt  Bacillus thuringiensis 
BUSAC  Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund 
CAADP  Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
CARGS  Competitive agricultural grant system 
CEDO  Community Enterprise Development Organization 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFT  Confined field trial 
CGIAR  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
CIAT  International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
CIMMYT  International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
CIP  International Potato Center  
COFAM  Coalition for Farmers’ Rights and Advocacy Against GMOs 
CORAF  West and Central African Council for Agricultural Research and 
Development 
CRI  Crops Research Institute (Ghana) 
CSIR  Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Ghana) 
CSIRO  Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (Australia) 
DFID  Department for International Development (UK) 
DONATA  Dissemination of New Agricultural Technologies in Africa 
EDAIF  Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund 
FARA  Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa 
FAO  United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
FAS  Foreign Agricultural Service (US) 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FSG  Food Sovereignty Ghana 
G8  Group of Eight 
 v 
GAIN  Global Agricultural Information Network 
GAPs  Good agricultural practices 
GCAP  Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project 
GE  Genetically engineered 
GIIN  Global Impact Investing Network 
GM  Genetically modified 
GMO  Genetically modified organism 
HYVs  High yield varieties 
IAASTD  International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and 
Technology for Development 
IAR  Institute for Agricultural Research (Nigeria) 
IARCs  International Agricultural Research Centres 
ICRISAT  International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics 
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development 
IFDC  International Fertilizer Development Center 
IFPRI  International Food Policy Research Institute 
IITA  International Institute for Tropical Agriculture 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INERA Institute of Environment and Agricultural Research (Burkina Faso) 
IP  Intellectual property 
IPRs  Intellectual property rights 
IRRI  International Rice Research Institute 
ISAAA  International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 
KARI  Kenya Agricultural Research Institute  
KNUST  Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
MDGs  United Nations Millennium Development Goals 
MoFA  Ministry of Food and Agriculture (Ghana) 
MVP  Millennium Villages Project 
NARI  National Agricultural Research Institute 
NARO  National Agricultural Research Organization (Uganda) 
NCOS  National Centre of Specialization 
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
NEWEST  Nitrogen-use efficiency, water-use efficiency, and salt tolerance rice 
project 
NGO  Nongovernmental organization 
NRCRI  National Root Crops Research Institute (Nigeria) 
OFAB  Open Forum for Agricultural Biotechnology in Africa 
PABRA  Pan-African Bean Research Alliance 
PASS  Program for Africa’s Seed Systems 
PBS  Program for Biosafety Systems 
PBR  Pod-borer Resistant 
PIPRA  Public Intellectual Property Resource for Africa 
PPP  Public-private partnership 
PRI  Program-related investment 
RAINS  Regional Advisory Information and Network Systems (Ghana) 
 vi 
SABIMA  Strengthening Capacity for Safe Biotechnology Management in sub-
Saharan Africa 
SADA  Savannah Accelerated Development Authority  
SADC  Southern Africa Development Community 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Program 
SARI  Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (Ghana) 
TRIPS  Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNIDO  United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture 
WAAPP  West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program 
WACCI  West African Center for Crop Improvement 
WARDA  Africa Rice Center/West Africa Rice Development Association 
WB  World Bank 
WEF  World Economic Forum 
WEMA  Water-Efficient Maize for Africa 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Politicizing Agricultural Development: 
Contesting Discourses of Authority, Expertise, and Identity in Ghana 
 
I. Overview  
In 2011, without much public fanfare, Ghana passed Biosafety Act 831, which 
allows for the cultivation of genetically modified (GM) crops.1 More than three years 
later, activists from Food Sovereignty Ghana sued the Ghana National Biosafety 
Committee and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in order to ban the 
commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Ghana National 
Association of Farmers and Fishermen joined the case in defense of the introduction 
of GM crops. The political party of Kwame Nkrumah, the Convention Peoples’ Party, 
joined the plaintiffs in order to reject the “imposition” of GMOs; GMOs represented 
the “neocolonization” that Kwame Nkrumah had warned about in his writings.2 The 
current court case is generating a growing public debate about GMOs in Ghana, as 
well as attracting a larger audience. As one member of Food Sovereignty Ghana told 
me in the context of the court case, “the world is watching Ghana.” 3   
Ghana’s agricultural future is at a critical juncture. Ghana’s developmental 
success in West Africa suggests that if Ghana chooses to adopt genetically modified 
(GM) seeds, others will likely follow suit. The genetic manipulation of seeds has been 
both a source of global contention, and heralded as a technology with great potential 
                                                
1 Author interview with anti-GMO activist and organizer Bern Guri of CIKOD, Accra, February 14, 
2014. Other informants involved in mobilizing against GMOs confirmed this account that there was 
little public awareness within Ghana at the time of the passage of the Biosafety Act 831. That being 2 Author interview with Yawiah Ev ns, a spok sman and National Communications member of the 
Convention Peoples’ Party, Accra, May 4, 2015. 
3 This group was quite elusive to get in touch with. Once I did finally meet with three of the core 
members of the organization and mentioned that I had called and sent multiple emails, they explained 
that they received dozens of emails from foreigners interested in the case. Conversation with members 
of Food Sovereignty Ghana, Accra, May 5, 2015. 
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to improve livelihoods. Proponents of GM seed like the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and USAID endorse biotechnology as a means to improve crop yields and 
mitigate the effects of drought. Opponents like La Via Campesina and the African 
Biodiversity Network cast this new technology as threatening to cultural and 
biological diversity and small farmers’ self-sufficiency. The debate is further 
intensified by aid agencies, foundations, and the media that portray Africa as a 
‘deficient’ continent in need of intervention. Increased population pressures, the 
effects of climate change, and the impact of the food price crisis of 2007-8 have 
placed African agriculture on the international agenda. The introduction of GM seed 
as part of the “new Green Revolution” of agricultural transformation has been cast, on 
the one hand, as the technological savior to address Africa’s food insecurity, and, on 
the other hand, as the Trojan horse of corporate neocolonialism.4  
My dissertation examines a set of interrelated questions about this debate: 
What actors, expertise, and models of development are advanced by the ‘new Green 
Revolution in Africa’? What struggles over authority, knowledge, identity, and 
property define the contemporary political economy of agricultural modernization 
in Ghana? 
I argue that legal, techno-scientific expertise and agribusiness work together 
to advance a model of agricultural development based on new forms of capital, 
governance structures, and technologies. This model of agricultural development is 
                                                
4 For an example of the framing of the introduction of genetically modified seed as a technological 
savior, see Robert Paarlberg’s book Starved for Science. Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How 
Biotechnology Is Being Kept Out of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). For an 
example of the framing of GM seed as a Trojan Horse see the work of African Centre for Biosafety, 
such as Elenita C. Daño, Unmasking the New Green Revolution in Africa: Motives, Players and 
Dynamics (Penang, Malaysia; Bonn, Germany; and Richmond, South Africa: joint publication by 
Third World Network, Church Development Service, and the African Centre for Biosafety, 2007). 
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legitimated through discourses of emergency, salvation, entrepreneurship, and 
humanitarianism. I view the debates over GM seed and agricultural modernization as 
contestations between multiple stakeholders over competing imaginaries of 
development—what it should look like, who should guide it, and whether success 
means integration into the global market economy. I contend that the polarized nature 
of debates over genetically modified seed that frames African agriculture as a system 
in crisis makes way for exclusionary forms of agricultural development dominated by 
both experts and entrepreneurs. Opponents view GM seed as a technology that poses 
unique risks thereby requiring moratoriums, extensive study, and regulation of 
genetically modified seed; proponents view biotechnology5 outreach, training, 
philanthropy, and stewardship over GM seed as necessary in order to realize the 
benefits of this essential technology. This emergency framing makes piecemeal 
approaches, compromises, and deliberation appear irresponsible in the face of such 
urgency.  
 
II. Theoretical Contributions and Foundations  
 In order to understand this contested period of agricultural transformation, I 
utilize both discursive and materialist explanations, drawing upon scholarship within 
global environmental politics, critical international political economy, post-
development studies, and food politics. My study intends to make three main 
contributions to political science. First, I build upon the literature on political 
                                                
5 The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment considers biotechnology to include any technique that 
uses living organisms to improve plants, to make or modify products, or to develop microorganisms 
for particular uses. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments in 
Biotechnology: U.S. Investment in Biotechnology-Special Report, OTA-BA-360. (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), 3. 
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authority by examining how public-private partnerships, experts, and activists each 
make bids to exercise authority that can be in tension with that of the state and each 
other. Second, I contribute to political economy and studies of the global commons 
by enlisting the concept of enclosure to analyze processes of commodification of seed 
and land, a defining feature of the new Green Revolution in Africa. Third, I fill a gap 
in the literature on the GMO debate through my analysis of the shared strategies 
between proponents and opponents of genetically modified crops. I discuss each of 
these contributions and their theoretical foundations through an exploration of four 
key themes: authority, knowledge and expertise, enclosure, and resistance.  
 
Authority 
 In her seminal work, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the 
World Economy (1996), Strange asserts that it is imperative to look at the power 
exercised by authorities other than states. She argues that there has been a growing 
diffusion of authority as “now it is markets which, on many crucial issues, are the 
masters over the governments of states.”6 The paradox is that whereas there has been 
an overall decline in the authority of states, there has been an increase in government 
intervention.7 That is to say that there has been not a retreat in the quantity of 
authority exercised by states, but the quality of that authority.8 Applying Strange’s 
ideas about shifting authority9 from states to markets helps us to understand the 
changing role of the state from the first Green Revolution to the new Green 
                                                
6 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Strange, Retreat of the State, xii. 
9 I define authority as the marriage of power with legitimacy.  
 5 
Revolution. Strange states that the expansion of the private authority of transnational 
corporations happened in large part due to state policies and also for “‘reasons of 
state.’”10 Yet privatization went too far, as even the World Bank acknowledged in 
their mea culpa, Reforming Infrastructure.11 This is where we see the emergence of a 
new institutional arrangement—and development buzzword—public-private 
partnerships (PPPs).  
Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan (2003) characterize transnational public-private 
partnerships as a hybrid type of governance “in which nonstate actors co-govern 
along with state actors for the provision of collective goods, and adopt governance 
functions that have formerly been the sole authority of sovereign nation-states.”12 
Reynaers and De Graaf (2014) state that public-private partnerships are “in line with 
the suggestion that the public sector should no longer provide services but should 
rather supervise private firms taking over this responsibility.”13 These governance 
                                                
10 Strange, Retreat of the State, 45. This is what Harvey refers to as the “neoliberal state.” David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Other authors 
that speak about private authority include those within the edited volumes by Deborah A. Avant, 
Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, Who Governs the Globe?, Miles Kahler and David Lake, 
Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition, and A. Claire Cutler, Tony Porter, 
and Virginia Haufler, Private Authority and International Affairs. Deborah A. Avant, Martha 
Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, eds. Who Governs the Globe? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds. Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority 
in Transition. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). A. Claire Cutler, Tony Porter, and 
Virginia Haufler, eds. Private Authority and International Affairs (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). 
11 The 2004 report Reforming Infrastructure can be understood as the World Bank’s mea culpa for 
overselling the merits of privatization. As stated in the report, “As with all economic elixirs, 
privatization has been oversimplified, oversold, and ultimately disappointing—delivering less than 
promised.” (Kessides, Ioannis N. Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and 
Competition. Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2004), 24. 
12 Marco Schäferhoff, Sabine Campe and Christopher Kaan, “Transnational Public-Private 
Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and 
Results,” International Studies Review 11, no.3 (2003): 451-52. 
13 The authors cite Osborne and Gaebler’s 1992 influential bestseller Reinventing Government: How 
the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Bill Clinton has a blurb running along the 
top of the cover of Reinventing Government: “Should be read by every elected official in America. 
This book gives the blueprint.” The Washington Post writes “A landmark in the debate on the future of 
public policy.” The lead author, David Osborne, was an advisor to Vice President Al Gore. See David 
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structures transfer the responsibility for the design and delivery of public service to 
the private sector through long-term contracting. Akintoye, Beck, and Hardcastle 
(2003) explain that public-private partnerships involve “…private companies in the 
design, financing, construction, ownership and/or operation of a public sector utility 
or service… Arguably, the joint approach allows the public sector client and the 
private sector supplier to blend their special skills and to achieve an outcome, which 
neither party could achieve alone.”14  
However, in the African context, it is not just the private sector that has 
encroached upon some of the functions of the nation-state. Rather, nongovernmental 
organizations and external development agencies have provided many of the services 
associated with the public sector—what Harvey (2005) refers to as “privatization by 
NGO.”15 James Ferguson (2006) makes the point that in the shift in donor policies 
away from funding to African bureaucracies and towards NGOs as more “‘grassroots’ 
channels of implementation,” many functions of the state “have been effectively 
‘outsourced’ to NGOs” with the consequence of the deterioration in state capacity.16 
This outsourcing of the provision of public services to NGOs that is common within 
African states warrants attention to the role in which NGOs may play as part of 
public-private partnerships. Taking this into account, I define public-private 
                                                                                                                                      
Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming 
the Public Sector (Reading, MA: Adison Wesley, 1993). Referenced in Anne-Marie Reynaers and 
Gjalt De Graaf, “Public Values in Public-Private Partnerships,” International Journal of Public 
Administration 37, no.2 (2014): 120-28. 
14 Akintola Akintoye, Matthias Beck, and Cliff Hardcastle, Public-private partnerships: Managing 
risks and opportunities (Oxford: Blackwell Science, 2003), xix. 
15 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 177.  
16 One key explanation for the deterioration in state capacity as a result of the increased prominence of 
NGOs in the provision of public services can be attributed to the departure of qualified staff from 
poorly paid government positions to much higher paid positions within nongovernmental 
organizations. James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006), 38. 
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partnerships as the public sector provision of an enabling policy environment for the 
involvement of private companies, NGOs, foundations, and foreign aid agencies in 
the financing, design, construction, operation, and ownership of a public sector utility 
or service. Whereas the literature on PPPs is attentive to the growing authority of the 
private sector, I highlight the role of philanthropy in legitimating such forms of 
authority. 
Public-private partnerships have become a widely accepted institutional 
alternative to the public sector’s provision of services and facilities and to complete 
privatization.17 The idea of PPPs fits within a neoliberal discourse that promotes 
smaller government and a growing role for the private sector, but also emerges in the 
wake of realizations that privatization has been “oversold.”18 The state provides the 
“enabling environment” for private sector investment through neoliberal legislative 
changes and good governance. These partnerships diffuse responsibility among 
agents, socializing risks taken by the private sector. Through such partnerships with 
the public sector, global agribusiness corporations gain greater access to African 
policymakers and legislative tools. This is what Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs 
(2009) refer to as “corporate agrifood governance” where corporations play a key role 
in influencing the rules to regulate their own behavior.19 Furthermore, these 
partnerships have a dual legitimating function: the public component of these 
partnerships can mitigate negative perceptions about corporate activity; the private 
                                                
17 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 177. 
18 Kessides, Reforming Infrastructure, 24. 
19 Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs, eds. Corporate Power in Global Agrifood Governance (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2009), 1. For more literature on food governance see Nora McKeon, Food Security 
Governance: Empowering Communities, Regulating Corporations (New York: Routledge, 2015); 
Robert Faulkner, ed. The International Politics of Genetically Modified Food: Diplomacy, Trade and 
Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Andrée, Genetically Modified Diplomacy: The Global 
Politics of Agricultural Biotechnology and the Environment. 
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component can lend greater legitimacy to governments criticized as being inefficient 
or corrupt. The combination of the financial power of corporations and foundations 
with state legitimacy is linked to another form of political authority in the African 
Green Revolution: the “rule of experts.”20  
 
Knowledge and Expertise 
Experts have emerged as key actors within public-private partnerships in 
African agricultural development, though the political authority of experts in Africa 
dates back to colonial rule. In Helen Tilly’s (2011) historical monograph Africa as a 
Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 
1870-1950 (2011) one essential element to the effective governance of the British 
Empire on the continent is the production and dissemination of knowledge.21 
Scientific knowledge was both developed and applied in colonial Africa; Africans 
became active agents in the appropriation, production, and application of scientific 
knowledge.22 Scientific knowledge dominated over vernacular knowledge in 
development decisions made by technical experts supported with funds from the 
Empire, as knowledge and expertise became an expression of colonial rule.23 The 
work of experts that could claim to know Africa and would support ‘development’ on 
the continent became a crucial element in the rationalization of a continuation of 
                                                
20 See Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). 
21 Helen Tilly, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific 
Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 70. 
22 Tilly, Africa as a Living Laboratory, 14. 
23 Tilly, Africa as a Living Laboratory, referencing Frederick Cooper, and D.A. Low and John 
Lonsdale, 71. Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). D. Anthony Low and John Lonsdale, “Introduction: Towards the New Order, 
1945-1963,” in History of East Africa, Volume III, eds. D.A. Low and Alison Smith (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1976), 1-63. 
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Empire in the post-World War II period.24 This knowledge of Africa developed 
through years of research and social engineering enabled the British colonial officials 
to acquire an authority grounded in expertise on African affairs.  
Timothy Mitchell (2002) describes the politics of such technical expertise and 
the ways in which development planners have sought to disengage themselves from 
the political realities that they have helped shape. In his study of 20th-century techno-
politics in Egypt, Mitchell looks at the ways in which problems in the developing 
world have been presented as problems of mismanagement or nature rather than 
political issues. Such a framing of the problem as one that is technical or managerial 
gives experts political authority to determine the solutions.25 James Scott (1998) 
concurs with Mitchell and explains how this problem definition grants authority and 
power to experts: “If the environment can be simplified down to the point where the 
rules do explain a great deal, those who formulate the rules and techniques have also 
greatly expanded their power. They have, correspondingly, diminished the power of 
those who do not.”26 This “rule of experts” can have important exclusionary effects. 
Knowledge, rather than being neutral, is a way by which power operates; scientific 
knowledge, for example, can suppress local forms of knowledge due to its privileged 
position within modern institutions. As my research indicates, the power of scientific 
knowledge is reflected in the ways in which farmers’ experimentation is labeled “trial 
and error” whereas the plant biotechnology is presented by industry as offering 
precise means of achieving agricultural advancement. In reality, both farmers’ 
                                                
24 Cooper, Africa Since 1940. 
25 Mitchell, Rule of Experts.  
26 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 303. 
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experimentation and plant biotechnology research and development involve trial and 
error.27  
Crisis frames encourage and legitimate the entry of experts to address the 
problem. Roe (1995) makes the following provocative claim about the role of crisis 
narratives enabling a ‘rule of experts’:  
…crisis narratives are the primary means whereby development experts and 
the institutions for which they work claim rights to stewardship over land and 
resources they do not own. By generating and appealing to crisis narratives, 
technical experts and managers assert rights as ‘stakeholders’ in the land and 
resources they say are under crisis.28 
While experts can play critical roles in providing much needed assistance during a 
crisis, crisis itself can accelerate processes of enclosure, which I turn to next. 
 
Enclosure 
The global food crisis of 2007-8 became a catalyst for discussions about how 
to improve food security. One angle of interpretation for the crisis that gained ground 
within the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, the World Bank, and the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) was the idea that what was 
standing in the way of food security was insecure property rights.29 Securing land 
                                                
27 This became apparent after multiple conversations at SARI regarding Bt cowpea—it was unclear 
which cowpea gene would accept the transgene and such results were found after trial and error. The 
difference, of course, is that biotechnology can speed up certain processes through the identification of 
marker genes. 
28 Emery M. Roe, “Except Africa: postscript to a special section on development narratives,” World 
Development 23, no.9 (1995): 1066. 
29 The G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition Cooperation Framework identifies the 
Ghanaian government’s commitment to “taking actions to facilitate inclusive access to and productive 
use of land” as a means to achieve food security in Ghana. G8 New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition, G8 Cooperation Framework to Support the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” 
in Ghana, accessed July 1, 2015, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/190626.pdf , 3. The 
World Bank’s 2014 progress report, Enabling the Business of Agriculture, identified registering land as 
a core objective and links this objective to improved economic and food security of women: “With 
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rights through formal land titles, the argument goes, would improve food security, 
particularly for women. Better intellectual property right protection for plant breeders 
would bring greater investment to the seed sector, improving crop productivity. 
Access to proprietary resources would enable the development of ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology30 that could address both crop loss as well as malnutrition. Each of 
these strategies to address food insecurity in Africa can be understood as a form of 
enclosure, and has been resisted by food sovereignty activists. Before I discuss this 
resistance, I describe what I mean by “enclosure.” 
The term has its historical roots in the enclosing of common pastureland that 
began in 16th century-England. Historian J.M. Neeson (1993) identifies enclosure as 
the “extinction of common right,” which led to the decline of small farms and the 
creation of a class of landless laborers.31 The legal process of enclosure allowed 
landholders to acquire other parcels of land, which created large farms and enabled 
landholders to claim private ownership. By the 18th century, the law itself becomes a 
mechanism of the expropriation of common land from the peasantry.32  
                                                                                                                                      
insecure property rights, the female farmers tend to produce less than their asset base could otherwise 
support because they fear that if they are more productive, men in the community would probably take 
control of their land.” World Bank Group, Enabling the Business of Agriculture: 2015 Progress Report 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group, 2014), 15. See also The World Bank, World Development 
Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007). The Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in particular highlights the importance of land security for women’s food 
security in their report AGRA in 2012: Moving from Strength to Strength. Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa, AGRA in 2012: Moving from Strength to Strength (Nairobi, Kenya: Alliance for 
a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), 2013), 12. 
30 ‘Pro-poor’ biotechnology refers to the development of transgenic crops to suit the needs of the 
smallholder farmer as well as the diets of the local people. That is, the technology is intended to be 
well suited for the local context and may offer benefits such as drought-tolerance or micronutrient 
enhancement. For more on the history of framing GM crops as a ‘pro-poor’ technology, see Dominic 
Glover, “The corporate shaping of GM crops as a technology for the poor,” The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 37, no.1 (2010): 67-90. 
31 J.M. Neeson, Commoners: Common Rights, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 15. 
32 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, translated by Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Classics, 1976), 885. 
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This concept of enclosure can be used to describe the politics of contemporary 
acquisition of fundamental bases for life processes—land and seed—through 
dispossession.33 On the African continent, there has been growing concern34 about the 
practice of “land grabbing” defined by Matondi, Havnevik, and Beyene (2011) as the 
“exploration, negotiations, acquisitions or leasing, settlement and exploitation of the 
land resource, specifically to attain energy and food security through export to 
investors’ countries and other markets.”35 Within the domain of seed there are parallel 
enclosures. The development of proprietary seed, which is seed that is protected by a 
patent, has raised alarms regarding the ways in which farmers’ experimentation and 
knowledge can be used to develop seed that later cannot be freely saved or shared. 
This form of enclosure has been deemed ‘biopiracy,’ that is, “the unauthorized 
commercial use of biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, or 
the patenting of spurious inventions based on such knowledge, without 
compensation.”36 These new enclosures of seed and land are what David Harvey calls 
‘accumulation by dispossession,’ a term he substitutes for Marx’s concept of 
                                                
33 See for example White, Ben, Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, and Wendy Wolford. 
“The New Enclosures: Critical Perspectives on Corporate Land Deals,” Journal of Peasant Studies 39, 
nos. 3-4 (2012): 619-47. 
34 This concern was institutionalized in 2010 through the Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment (PRAI) sponsored by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Jennifer Clapp, 
“Responsibility to the Rescue? Governing Private Investment in Global Agriculture” (paper presented 
at the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 26, 2014).  
35 Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene, “Introduction: biofuels, food security and 
land grabbing in Africa,” Biofuels, food security and land grabbing in Africa, edited by Prosper B. 
Matondi, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene (London: Zed Books, 2011), 1. For more on the land 
grab see Philip McMichael, “The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring,” Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39, no.4 (2012): 681-701; and the work of the transnational activist network La Via 
Campesina that characterizes the ‘land grab’ as an “Old phenomenon, new appearance.” La Via 
Campesina, “International Conference of Peasants and Farmers: Stop land grabbing!” Report and 
Conclusions of the International Conference of Peasants and Farmers, Mali, November 17-19, 2011, 
(2012) accessed July 2nd, 2015, http://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/mali-report-2012-en1.pdf . 
36 Ikechi Mbeoji, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants, and Indigenous Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 13. 
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primitive accumulation in order to highlight the ongoing process of accumulation.37 
Such accumulation originates from the moment in which agricultural producers are 
severed from their means of subsistence, the land, and now more recently, the seed.38  
The enclosure of seed occurs through legal regimes such as the 1994 WTO’s 
TRIPS agreement that allows the patenting of seeds. This legal maneuver is used to 
protect genetically modified seed, now understood by law as an information 
technology.39 Patents on seeds are significant for four reasons: first, it is now possible 
to assert private ownership over life in the form of a seed; second, a consequence of 
this private ownership is the disruption of the traditional practice of seed-saving;  
third, this proprietary regime disregards the local and traditional knowledge of the use 
of plants that serve as a foundation for plant biotechnology and other research 
developments; and fourth, there is no compensation for prior development of the 
seeds. In his examination of the historical origins of the political economy of plant 
biotechnology, Kloppenburg (2004) details how germplasm derived from the Third 
World was appropriated for crop improvement in the “gene-poor” industrialized 
world at little cost and required no compensation to these “gene-rich” sources. This 
transfer of genetic material institutionalized by the Consultative Group on 
                                                
37 See Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism; David Harvey, “The ‘New Imperialism: 
Accumulation by Dispossession,” Socialist Register, 40 (2004): 63-87. 
38 On land see Marx, Capital, Vol.1, Chapter 26 “The Secret of Primitive Accumulation.” On seed see 
Vandana Shiva, Tomorrow’s Biodiversity (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2000). The dissertation’s 
primary focus is on the enclosures on seeds, though I will continue to identify parallels in the domain 
of land. 
39 For references to plant biotechnology as information technology see Plant Biotechnology Research 
and Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Research Committee on Science House of Representatives, 108th Cong., p.65 (June 12, 2003) 
(statement by Dr. Robert B. Horsch of Monsanto Corporation); Simon Walker, “The TRIPS 
Agreement, Sustainable Development and the Public Interest,” IUCN Environmental Policy and Law 
41 (2001): vii-60. 
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International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) used indigenous landraces40 as raw 
materials for the subsequent breeding of hybrid high-yield varieties used during the 
first Green Revolution.41 The patenting of transgenic seeds based off of generations 
of farmers’ experimentation raises important questions about the valorization of 
knowledge—that is, whose knowledge is privileged, why, and how. In Chapter Three, 
I discuss how this enclosure has led to the emergence of new forms of capital: 
“biocapital” and “philanthrocapital.”42 
Enclosure is characteristic of what McMichael terms the “corporate food 
regime.”43 That is to say, corporations, by working closely with the public sector, 
have increased influence in shaping the rules governing trade, intellectual property, 
and food production, particularly within the World Trade Organization.44 Food 
sovereignty and anti-globalization activists have responded to this enclosure of land 
and seed in the form of global protests, sustained online campaigns, and the 
development of alternative forums, such as the World Social Forum, to mobilize 
around these issues. These mobilizations against the corporate food regime represent 
                                                
40 A locally adapted, domesticated variety. 
41 Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: the Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology. 2nd ed. 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 161. Hybrids are one of the first means to 
commodify seed as they have reduced fertility when replanted. This loss of hybrid vigor made it so that 
farmers would need to return to the market to buy seeds with greater frequency. 
42 I build off of Rajan (2006) to develop the concept of biocapital: Rajan, Kashik Sunder, Biocapital: 
The Constitution of Postgenomic Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). The idea of 
philanthrocapital is both used popularly within philanthropic circles (Bishop and Green 2009) and the 
subject of scholarly inquiry (Thompson 2014). See Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, 
Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World  (New York: Bloomsbury Press, originally 
published in 2008 with a new foreword by Bill Clinton in 2009); Carol B. Thompson,  
“Philanthrocapitalism: Appropriation of Africa’s Genetic Wealth,” Review of African Political 
Economy 41, no. 141 (2014): 389-405. 
43 Philip McMichael, “Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime,” New Directions in the 
Sociology of Global Development 11 (2005): 269-303. Harriett Friedmann coined the term “food 
regime,” defining it as an emergent in the post-war period “the rule-governed structure of production 
and consumption of food on a world scale.” Friedmann, Harriett. “The Political Economy of Food: A 
Global Crisis,” New Left Review 197, no.1 (1993): 30-31. 
44 Korten, David C., When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd ed. (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 
2001). 
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a classic case of what Polanyi terms “double movement.”45 That is, the expansion and 
domination of the market sparks a countermovement from within society—calls for 
government intervention and regulation—in order for society to protect itself from the 
perils inherent in the self-regulating market system.46 Polanyi (1944) argues that this 
countermovement is a pragmatic response to the dislocation that attacks the fabric of 
society when the market is disembedded from nature and society.47 Rather than the 
economic order embedded within the social order as it had been prior to the 18th 
century, society was made subordinate to the market economy.48 At the turn of the 
21st century, the designation of a seed as a proprietary commodity, rather than a 
foundational element of life, reflects this disembeddedness of the market from nature 
and society.49 The mobilization of the activist organization, Food Sovereignty Ghana, 
in response to the Plant Breeders’ Bill currently before Ghanaian Parliament, is an 
illustration of this double movement. Food Sovereignty Ghana perceived this 
expansion of plant breeders’ rights as an infringement on farmers’ right to save seeds 
and has used protests, information dissemination, and a lawsuit to respond to this new 
enclosure. As I show in Chapter Three, agribusiness and philanthropy respond to such 
activists’ pressures by advancing ideas of donation and giving through the 
                                                
45 Nora McKeon and Philip McMichael, “Land grabbing, investments in agriculture, and questions of 
governance,” (paper presented at the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 27, 
2014). 
46 Karl Polanyi. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 80.  
47 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 136, 60.  
48 Polanyi, Great Transformation, 74. Polanyi on the market economy: “Ultimately, that is why the 
control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole 
organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. 
Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic 
system... For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives 
and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to 
function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion that a market economy 
can function only in a market society.” Polanyi, Great Transformation, 60. 
49 See Polanyi on “fictitious commodities,” Great Transformation, 75-6. 
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development of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology. Such practices serve to both normalize the 
perception of seed as property and present capitalism as a beneficiary of the poor. 
One way to facilitate enclosure is through divorcing the target of enclosure 
(seed, land) from its larger ecological and social context. James Scott speaks of the 
deployment of tunnel vision to simplify complex reality50; Timothy Mitchell 
describes the rendering of Egypt into an object of development through the distancing 
view from above.51 Both techniques—the constriction of vision and the 
cartographer’s view—radically simplify the object of focus, making it easier for the 
state or capital to act upon it. Scott describes this as “legibility”: the simplification, 
standardization, and formalization of nature and space in order to support state- and 
economy-making. The normalization of industrial agriculture can be understood as 
part of the modern state project of legibility.52 Industrial agricultural systems—due to 
mechanization, standardization, production of monocultures, and formulaic use of 
inputs (pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers)—are highly legible systems designed for 
high agricultural productivity. Yet, in the narrowed focus on agricultural productivity, 
these systems have also had to face chemical-resistant ‘superweeds,’ soil nutrient 
depletion, and reduced biodiversity—consequences that emerge from outside of this 
constricted field of vision. This shift towards industrial agriculture on the African 
continent entails both the formalization of land rights and seed law harmonization. 
Through legislative changes, the complex plurality of land tenure systems and 
                                                
50 Scott, Seeing like a State, 11. 
51 Mitchell analyzes how USAID in particular rendered Egyptian agriculture as an object of study to be 
managed by its experts. The cartographer’s view is a metaphor for the way in which USAID removed 
its influence on Egyptian development, framing Egyptian agricultural challenges as problems of nature 
or demography, rather than a problem of politics that they helped shape. Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 
209. 
52 Scott, Seeing like a State. 
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traditional practices of seed saving and sharing are rendered legible, facilitating land 
transactions enticing investment in the agricultural sector.53  
I find that this tunneling of vision entails a corollary narrowing down of the 
range of identities farmers can take in this new Green Revolution.54 In Chapter Four, I 
describe such shifts as the move from farming as a way of life to farming as a 
business. As the modern state exercises the power of regularization, a sub-set, a 
“random” element, the outliers of the state’s population, can be sacrificed.55 In the 
case of agriculture, those populations outside of the food system, the undesired plants 
and animals deemed “weeds” and “pests” get assigned as “deviant” and targeted for 
technological intervention in order to achieve more regular, mechanized crop 
cultivation.56 Biological diversity is dramatically reduced through the application of 
pesticides and the production of monocultures. Cultural diversity as manifest through 
traditional agricultural practices is also sacrificed through the power of regularization. 
Certain populations of farmers are encouraged to “exit” agriculture in order to 
enhance overall agricultural productivity.57 This is akin to what Escobar (2010) terms 
“‘produce (for the market) or perish.’”58  
                                                
53 See Sara Berry, “Debating the Land Question in Africa,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 44, no.4 (2002): 638-68. 
54 Escobar (2010) describes this as the reduction of people’s lives to a single trait, such as ‘small 
farmer’, by development professionals that renders a person a case to be reformed or treated. Arturo 
Escobar, “Planning,” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd ed., edited 
by Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed Books, 2010), 154.  
55 This is what is meant by Foucault’s idea that the modern state exercises a right to make live and let 
die. See for example, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1: “One might say that the ancient right to take life 
or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.” Michel Foucault, 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 138. Original italics. 
56 See Scott, Seeing like a State. 
57 I discuss this idea of exit encouraged by actors like the World Bank and IFPRI in Chapter Four.  
58 Escobar, “Planning,” 155. 
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The cultivation of genetically modified crops is an agricultural practice that is 
not for all farmers: it is both capital- and knowledge-intensive requiring costly 
investment and training by experts in the use of this new agricultural technology. 
Drawing upon literature on environmental learning and agricultural knowledge, I 
describe the avenues of technology and information diffusion designed or anticipated 
by experts involved in agricultural research and biosafety.59 Training, demonstration 
farms, elite farmers, and biotechnology outreach are used to encourage the emulation 
of successful farmers and thereby the widespread adoption of genetically modified 
crops. Yet, as studies have shown, the profitability of transgenic crops is not 
guaranteed; large-scale farmers and other more risk-tolerant farmers have been some 
of the main beneficiaries of this new technology.60 
 
Resistance 
The political analysis on the GMO debate—both popular and scholarly—
tends to reflect the polarity of the debate itself in its examination of either 
biotechnology proponents or anti-GMO activists (Herring 2010; Shiva 2000; 
Paarlberg 2008; Andrée 2007).61 The scholarly literature on the politics of GMOs has 
                                                
59 Glenn Davis Stone, “Agricultural Deskilling and the Spread of Genetically Modified Cotton in 
Warangal,” Current Anthropology 48, no.1 (2007): 67-103; Paul Richards, “Cultivation: Knowledge or 
Performance?” In An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance, ed. Mark 
Hoban, 61-78. (London: Routledge, 1993); Ian Scoones and John Thompson, eds. Beyond Farmer 
First: Rural People’s Knowledge, Agricultural Research, and Extension Practice. (London: 
Intermediate Technology Publications, 1994); Ann M. Vandeman, “Management in a Bottle: 
Pesticides and the Deskilling of Agriculture,” Review of Radical Political Economics 27, no.3 (1995): 
49-55; Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 5th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 2003). 
60 Stone, “Agricultural Deskilling”; William G. Moseley and Leslie C. Gray, Hanging by a Thread: 
Cotton, Globalization and Poverty in Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008).  
61 Ronald Herring, “Framing the GMO: Epistemic Brokers, Authoritative Knowledge, and Diffusion of 
Opposition to Biotechnology,” in The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and 
Political Effects, eds. Rebecca Givan, Kenneth Roberts, and Sarah Soule. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Vandana Shiva, Tomorrow’s Biodiversity; Robert Paarlberg, Starved for 
 19 
highlighted the ways in which claims about the risks posed by GMOs diffuse through 
transnational advocacy networks with implications for biosafety regulation (Herring 
2010; Paarlberg 2008), the emergence of a discourse of precaution and the 
development of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Andrée 2007), the divergence 
of US and EU biosafety regulatory policies (Jasanoff 2005; Lynch and Vogel 2001), 
attitudes towards GMOs (e.g. Jasanoff 2005; Stone 2010), the impact of framing on 
social mobilization (Heller 2013; Bonnuiel, Joly and Marris 2008), the potential 
benefits and costs of GM crops in the developing world (Pinstrup-Andersen and 
Schiøler 2001; Wu and Butz 2004; Fitting 2011; Moseley and Gray 2008; Stone 
2007), and the conditions of production of plant biotechnology (Bingen 2008; Zerbe 
2005; Kinchy 2012; Shiva 1999, 2000).62  
Though there are differences in terms of access to material and institutional 
resources, I find that both proponents and opponents of the introduction of GM crops 
                                                                                                                                      
Science: How Biotechnology Is Being Kept Out of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2008); Peter Andrée, Genetically Modified Diplomacy: The Global Politics of Agricultural 
Biotechnology and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007).  
62 See Herring, “Framing the GMO,”; Paarlberg, Starved for Science; Andrée, Genetically Modified 
Diplomacy; Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Diahanna Lynch and David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United States (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001); Glenn Davis Stone, “The Anthropology of GM Crops,” 
Annual Review of Anthropology, 39 (2010): 381-400; Heller, Chaia. Food, Farms, and Solidarity. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2013; Christophe Bonneuil, Pierre-Benoit Joly, and Claire Marris, 
“Disentrenching Experiment: The Construction of GM-Crop Field Trials As a Social Problem,” 
Science, Technology, and Values 33, no. 2 (2008): 201-29; Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Ebbe Schiøler, 
Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global Controversy over GM Crops (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Felicia Wu and William Butz, The Future of Genetically 
Modified Crops: Lessons from the Green Revolution (Santa Monica: Rand Publishing, 2004); 
Elizabeth Fitting, The Struggle for Maize: Campesinos, Workers, and Transgenic Corn in the Mexican 
Countryside (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Moseley and Gray, Hanging by a Thread; Glenn 
Davis Stone, “Agricultural Deskilling and the Spread of Genetically Modified Cotton in Warangal,” 
Current Anthropology 48, no.1 (2007): 67-103; Jim Bingen, “Genetically Engineered Cotton: Politics, 
Science, and Power in West Africa,” in Hanging by a thread: Cotton, globalization, and poverty in 
Africa, William G. Moseley and Leslie C. Gray, eds. (Uppsala: Ohio University Press, 2008); Noah 
Zerbe, Agricultural Biotechnology Reconsidered: Western Narratives and African Alternatives 
(Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005); Abby Kinchy, Seeds, Science, and Struggle: The Global 
Politics of Transgenic Crops. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012); Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder 
of Nature and Knowledge (London: South End Press, 1999); Shiva, Tomorrow’s Biodiversity. 
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use a combination of hype and science to attract attention and to establish 
authoritative claims.63 I define hype as the deployment of simplistic, exaggerated 
claims to stimulate activity such as consumption, investment, philanthropy, or to 
mobilize activism. In this respect, this study contributes to the existing research in 
contentious politics by critically examining the commonalities between industry and 
social movement organizations in this heated debate. In particular, framing the debate 
as a matter of urgency and offering clear solutions—either adopting GM seed or 
banning it completely—helps to mobilize resources.64 Furthermore, both GM 
proponents and opponents use law to advance or impede the introduction of 
genetically modified crops.65 Stone’s (2002) article “Both Sides Now: Fallacies in the 
Genetic-Modification Wars, Implications for Developing Countries, and 
Anthropological Perspectives,”66 acknowledges the use of hype on both sides of the 
debate—labeling the terrain of the debate the “Golden Age of Misinformation”—but 
does not provide a thorough account of the strategic commonalities between GMO 
adversaries. The production, dissemination, and uptake of information in this 
                                                
63 On the importance of science to environmental activists I look to Epstein’s study of the anti-whaling 
movement where she identifies science as “a key weapon in the arsenal of environmental activism.” 
Charlotte Epstein, “Knowledge and Power in Global Environmental Activism,” International Journal 
of Peace Studies 10, no.1 (2005): 47. See also Ken Conca, Governing Water: Contentious 
Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). The 
concept of hype builds upon Rajan’s work in Biocapital, which I discuss in Chapter Two. 
64 See Tarrow (2006) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) on framing: Sidney Tarrow, The New 
Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 61-64; Margaret Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
65 Sheila Jasanoff’s edited volume, Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age calls to 
attention the way in which law has been used to redefine life alongside technological developments in 
the life sciences. The authors are less attentive, however, to the use of law by activists to challenge 
these new conceptions of biological life. Jasanoff, Sheila, ed, Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism 
in the Genetic Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). 
66 Glenn Davis Stone, “Both Sides Now: Fallacies in the Genetic-Modification Wars, Implications for 
Developing Countries, and Anthropological Perspectives,” Current Anthropology 43, no.4 (2002): 
611-630. 
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debate—whether in the form of hype or of scientific knowledge—is critical for both 
sides of the debate to achieve their aims.  
 
III. Methods 
My methodological approach is situated within interpretive social science 
which views knowledge, including scientific knowledge, as historically-situated in 
power relations. Interpretivism is best suited for studying meaning-making processes 
and how social and political identities crystallize or change over time.67 The project 
uses a blend of discourse68 analysis, participant observation, and interviews in order 
to analyze debates about food security and the cultivation of genetically modified 
crops in Ghana. I complement the rich locally specific observations gained by both 
participant observation of farming communities and extensive interviews with a wide-
range of knowledge-holders in Ghana with that of discourse analysis. This 
combination of methods is well suited for analysis of the power struggles that 
influence the trajectory of this agricultural transition. I follow an emerging tradition 
of scholars who use discourse analysis to analyze environmental and food politics.69 
Epstein argues that the study of discursive power, the power to make meaning, has 
been neglected in international relations. Escobar (2008) articulates why this power to 
                                                
67 For more on the interpretive turn in political science see Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-
Shea, eds., Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn (New 
York: ME Sharpe, 2006); Wedeen, Lisa. “Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science.” 
Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 255-72. 
68 Escobar (1995) defines discourse as “the process through which social reality comes into being…the 
articulation of knowledge and power, of the visible and the expressible.” Arturo Escobar, Encountering 
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 39. 
69 See for example Karen T. Litfin, Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in 
International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Andrée, 
Genetically Modified Diplomacy. 
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make meaning is significant: “Power inhabits meaning, and meanings are a main 
source of social power; struggles over meaning are thus central to the structuring of 
the social and physical world itself.”70 Lukes’ idea of the third of dimension of 
power—that is, the power to shape perceptions, cognitions, and preferences—also 
speaks to the power of discourse. This ability can prevent people from forming 
grievances and can allow for greater acceptance of the status quo. This power to 
shape perceptions can prevent individuals from becoming aware of their true interests 
due to repression, mystification, or the unavailability of alternative ideological 
frames.71 A Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis recognizes that discourse 
itself exhibits agency: discourse makes certain things easier to imagine, and other 
things harder to question.72 This becomes acutely evident in cases such as processes 
of development and modernization. 
In order to analyze the struggles over knowledge, authority, identity, and 
property within the new Green Revolution in Africa, I employ a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis that is influenced by the post-development literature (Escobar 
1995, 2008; Sachs 2010; Rahnema and Bawtree 2008).73 This literature works to 
denaturalize notions of progress and development, and conceives of modernity as a 
culturally particular construction that reflects Western values and assumptions. This 
critique of modernity includes an approach to science and technology that treats them 
                                                
70 Arturo Escobar, Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008), 14. 
71 Steven Lukes referencing Charles Tilly. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10. 
72 According to Foucault, discourse should not be treated as “groups of signs...but as practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak.” Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1972), 49. 
73 For an exemplar edited volume that illustrates this approach see Sachs, Wolfgang, ed., The 
Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2010). 
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as historical and cultural productions.74 Post-development scholars consider 
development as a particular worldview and ask how we have come to accept Western 
notions of development as the universal ideal. I build on post-development 
scholarship to both reveal how the debate over GMOs constitutes a debate about 
development and to provide insights into the discursive maneuvers that assist the 
diffusion of this controversial technology. Discourse analysis allows me to explore 
key concepts that make up the conceptual repertoire of modernization and 
development, namely shifting notions of authority, knowledge, property, identity, and 
resistance.75 The idea is to expose some of the underlying assumptions that set 
boundaries on the thinking about change in Africa.  
Discourse analysis is concerned with the study of sets of articulated practices 
that unite around a common set of meanings, values, and perspectives. Discourse 
analysis is useful for studying assumptions regarding cause and effect, what actors are 
considered legitimate stakeholders, what kinds of knowledge and values are 
privileged, and how key contested terms like ‘sustainability’ are framed. Discourse 
analysis of the GM debate allows me to situate my research in Ghana within global 
dynamics that identify certain populations and places as deficient76 and in need of 
intervention. Discourse analysis also reveals how both proponents and opponents of 
GM alike place life at the center of the debate—albeit vastly different conceptions of 
life. Discourses prescribe certain practices that work to shape social reality. For 
                                                
74 See for example Rajan, Biocapital; Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 
75 Sachs, Wolfgang, ed. “Preface,” The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd 
ed., edited by Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed Books, 2010), xii. 
76 This idea of “deficiency” within development discourse refers to a lack of income, technology, 
market access, or education. Deficiency is conceived of a problem of the poor catching up with the 
rich; deficiency is in this sense a relative concept. See Sachs, “Preface.”  
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example, the discourse of progress places great value on science-based solutions, and 
articulates a vision of the future in terms of consistent improvement.  When genetic 
modification is framed as part of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, the adoption of such 
technology produces corollary subjects that are ‘modern.’ Likewise, the rejection of 
such technologies can render those that are averse to these technologies as 
‘backwards.’  
This approach allows me to study how identities such as the entrepreneur are 
shaped through language and produced and re-produced through agricultural 
practices. Because the expansion of plant biotechnology is conditional on information 
flows, information regarding GM crops must be disseminated in order to both 
ameliorate anxieties of the public regarding this new technology and to train farmers 
and researchers on how to use it.77 The way in which this information is distributed, 
framed, and positioned in the Ghanaian context is critical to my analysis. I pay 
attention to how issues are linked, how means and ends are defined, and what 
identities are being promoted (e.g. agrarian entrepreneur v. self-sufficient farmer). 
This analysis of the debate over the cultivation of genetically modified crops allows 
me to understand how language affects both development practice and how risk is 
conceived. The framing of food production in African countries as a system in crisis 
has made technologies like GM seed that promise higher yields increasingly attractive 
and more likely to be adopted. Yet activists’ counter-frames of GM seed as 
threatening motivate calls for outright bans of this new technology. 
Some of the texts analyzed on this study include annual reports of foundations 
and agribusiness corporations, the policy plans of bilateral aid agencies, 
                                                
77 For a discussion of biotechnology as information technology see Rajan, Biocapital, 41-47. 
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intergovernmental organizations or NGOs, congressional hearings on plant 
biotechnology in Africa, interview transcripts, public statements, and websites 
featuring advertisement and political campaigns by seed corporations and activist 
organizations. I examine key texts that have been enlisted by major actors in the 
GMO debate78 or in development planning that are anticipated to reach a wide 
audience (such as World Bank reports, protest statements by social movement 
organizations, or annual reports of foundations). More specifically, the data for the 
analysis of the debate over the cultivation of GM crops in Africa has been collected 
by: tapping into online advocacy networks via social media such as Greenpeace, La 
Via Campesina, African Centre for Biosafety, Slow Food International; tracking new 
developments in the agricultural biotech industry via the listservs of the International 
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), Monsanto, World 
Poultry, All About Feed; establishing a Google Alert of “GMO”, “biotech outreach”, 
and the “African food crisis”; LexisNexis searches on food security and 
biotechnology; monitoring the Convention on Biological Diversity Biosafety 
Clearinghouse; following Ghanaian news sources such as Ghana News Agency, Daily 
Graphic, All Ghana News, and My Joy Online; and analyzing the reports of major 
actors in agricultural development such as the World Bank, USAID, USDA GRAIN 
reports, the annual reports of the Bill and Melinda Gates and Rockefeller foundations, 
Feed the Future reports, and the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition 
progress reports.  
                                                
78 I have been following the GMO debate since 2004 while in my master’s program at San Francisco 
State University, which has given me a strong background in the major players involved in the debate. 
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In order to prepare my analysis, I sift through the material to identify certain 
patterns of framing, content, and tone (the latter is why I prefer the painstaking task 
of reading and studying the visual presentation rather than automating this process via 
content analysis). I pay attention to not only to the language that is stressed (bolded, 
enlarged or highlighted text, use of buzzwords), but also to the images that are used 
as an accompaniment. For example, the use of images of women and children 
juxtaposed against text is commonplace in documents produced by international and 
bilateral aid agencies and foundations. The use of hungry children conveys a certain 
meaning (need for assistance), as does the use of a single woman smiling on her 
thriving farm (the suggestion that these interventions are successful). I approach the 
analysis of these texts as a two-step process: each text is read once to read for tone, 
refine theoretical categories79 or generate new ones; and second, the text is re-read to 
identify patterns and linkages between concepts. I consider the author and audience 
that will receive the text, where detail is placed, and who is the actor and who is being 
acted upon. For example, I would consider what role is identified for development 
planners, for governments, for NGOs, for individual farmers, for communities. Is the 
receiving population given agency? How are they described? Regarding the level of 
detail, if a document provides general information about Ghana but a lot of specific 
detail about the budget and financial trends, this can reveal that the receiving 
audience is more concerned with finances than locale. Hank Johnston (2002) notes 
the strengths and limitations of this technique: “because textual data come 
                                                
79 Categories include hype (exaggerations, overstatements, misinformation), emergency (urgency, 
crisis, “do or die” framing), salvation (sweeping solutions, recognition of past sins), science (to make a 
political point, to advance a policy, as part of a “science fight”), entrepreneurship (the self-made man 
or woman, innovation), expertise (particularly where it is identified as lacking, actors to address 
deficiency).  
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contextually embedded and are often gathered in ways that offer insights into their 
interpretation that are lost in survey techniques, qualitative analysis offers higher 
validity of the findings but less reliability.”80 Working with and analyzing the texts 
directly, rather than imputing them into content analysis, allows me to achieve a kind 
of “‘discursive embeddedness’” that can enable me to better identify conceptual 
linkages and thematic patterns across texts and statements. This discursive 
embeddedness also enables me to more readily identify shifts in the ways in which 
concepts and themes are linked. Shifts in conceptual linkages may alternately 
strengthen or challenge my argument. 
My fieldwork consists of eleven months of extensive, on-the-ground 
Fulbright-funded field research in Northern Ghana conducted during three trips 
January 2012, July 2012-March 2013 (supported by a Fulbright fellowship), and May 
2015 (supported by a Program for Society and the Environment grant). While in the 
field, I participated in farming and post-harvest activities in rural communities in the 
Upper East and Northern regions of Ghana. I spoke to a range of actors across 
Northern Ghana and in Accra (farmers, farmer organizations, traditional leaders, 
policymakers, actors working for aid agencies and NGOs, scientists, academics, 
bureaucrats, and actors within agribusiness) about how they perceive agricultural 
challenges in Ghana, and what roles the state, private actors, new technologies, and 
local communities can play in addressing them. I conducted repeated interviews of 
agricultural research scientists involved in the development of transgenic crops over a 
period of three years. I interviewed both advocates and opponents of biotechnology, 
                                                
80 Hank Johnston, “Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis,” in Methods of Social 
Movement Research, eds. Beth Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2002), 69. 
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discussed their informational strategies, and obtained samples of the materials they 
circulate to advance their positions. I interviewed the main actors involved in the 
recent court case brought by Food Sovereignty Ghana against the Ghanaian 
government to halt the commercialization of genetically modified crops.  
I use an ethnographic approach81 because of the unique ability of ethnography 
to contextualize and complicate discourse. In policy documents and reports people in 
places such as Northern Ghana are turned into abstract elements of statistical 
measurements and are rarely given voice. Ethnography allows me to gain insight into 
farmers’ perceptions of such interventions and transitional moments that are 
ordinarily invisible within these policy spaces. This approach renders visible 
“subjugated knowledges” excluded when scientific expertise dominates.82 
Ethnography allows me to expose some of the hype: both the exaggerated promise of 
biotechnology and the activists’ accounts of the total erosion and takeover of 
traditional practices. My ethnographic research reveals the multiple, coexistent roles, 
differing notions of entrepreneurship, feeding family first, and other local risk-
reduction strategies that coexist with agricultural modernization programs, as they 
have during previous iterations. It also shows the long, complex, and uncertain—
                                                
81 As Bayard de Volo and Schatz state, ethnographic methods typically include some combination of 
the following: “living in the community being examined; learning a local language or dialect; 
participating in the daily life of the community through ordinary conversation and interaction; 
observing events (meetings, ceremonies, rituals, elections, protests); examining gossip, jokes, and 
other informal speech-acts for their underlying assumptions; recording data in field notes that attempt 
to produce daily accounts of social and political life; in other ways letting trust and emotional 
engagement be of benefit to the research project.” Lorraine Bayard de Volo and Edward Schatz, “From 
the Inside Out: Ethnographic Methods in Political Research,” Political Science and Politics 37, no.2 
(2004): 267. 
82 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, 
translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003). 
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rather than sweeping and transformative—path of plant biotechnology development. 
Discourse analysis lends these ethnographic insights an explanatory efficacy. 
I approached ethnography as a method of immersing in everyday life: I 
immersed myself in the field through learning basic phrases and key words related to 
my research in local languages (Dagbani and Gurene), participating in festivals and 
other local activities, eating and learning to cook local food, living with a Ghanaian 
family in the peri-urban part of Tamale83, and engaging in informal conversation 
while using local methods of travel. I recorded daily field notes and maintained 
contact with my informants in between research trips. As Bayard de Volo and Schatz 
(2004) highlight, ethnographic research means “letting trust and emotional 
engagement be of benefit to the research project.”84 Through repeated travel to 
Ghana, I was able to gain greater access to a wide-range of stakeholders (including 
elites that would be otherwise difficult to reach) and get richer, and likely more 
honest, accounts of the politics of agricultural development in Ghana. 
                                                
83 One manner by which I was able to engage in participant observation was the choice of residences I 
made during the 10-months of research. On the first three months of my research in Ghana trip, I 
resided at the Tamale Institute of Cross-Cultural Studies (known as TICCS). In this place, 
simultaneously a place of tourist encounter, development projects (both led by the NGOs and faith-
based organizations), and knowledge exchange (the Institute ran the only courses on the language, 
culture, and development of Northern Ghana and the library had rare books on the region), I had many 
conversations with those that passed through the guesthouse and café regarding the perceptions they 
had and the possibilities they saw with development in Ghana. During most of the remaining eight 
months when I was conducting research in the Northern Region, I lived with a family at the interface 
of the rural-urban divide, once a village and now absorbed by the ever-expanding Tamale metropolitan 
area. While I was living in a “modern” home with electricity and Westernized building construction, 
my neighbors across the dirt road lived in a traditional complex of the grid with earthen walls and a 
thatch roof, cows led by Fulani herdsman traversed the neighborhood, and chickens, goats, sheep, and 
guinea fowl populated the ditches and served as a source of food, “landscaping,”, and soil fertility. 
Small plots of maize and vegetable gardens are interspersed among the homes. Small shops provided 
staple non-perishable items and families sold the surplus of the tomatoes, groundnut, pepe, and okra on 
stands alongside the roads that fed into the center of town. While in Accra, I stayed with U.S. foreign 
service officers adjacent to the U.S. Embassy that gave me insider perspectives on U.S. involvement 
and development assistance in Ghana. 
84 Bayard de Volo Edward Schatz, “From the Inside Out,” 267. 
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By combining field observations with discourse analysis, I situate my analysis 
simultaneously at the local and the global levels. Such an approach can be 
characterized as an “ethnography of global connection.”85 It should be stressed that I 
am studying an active period of agricultural transition as actors within Ghana begin, 
resist, and/or consider the adoption of genetically modified crops. At this stage, my 
primary concern is the kinds of discourses that animate, enable, or justify agricultural 
change in Ghana. By studying a transition, the dissertation benefits from the 
relevance and ability to study closely the micro practices of development change.86 
The drawback to studying a transition is that information is inherently incomplete and 
the motivations of development may be obscured. However, I am less interested in 
the truth of the information that I analyze, and more interested in the posturing, the 
framing, and the blocking out of alternative truths that is a part of this information 
production.87 Truthful or not, such narrowing of vision produces potent political 
effects and shapes peoples’ livelihoods and local ecologies. By combining 
ethnographic and interpretive methods, I render visible competing modes of 
knowledge, authority, and legitimacy within debates over food security and 
sustainable development. 
                                                
85 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005). 
86 In Encountering Development, Escobar explains the importance of micro practices of development 
change: “The overall goal was dictated by development economics: to promote growth through certain 
types of investment projects…This goal required the rationalization of the productive apparatus, 
according to the methods developed in the industrialized nations…This could be done only through 
new practices concerning the everyday actions of an ever larger number of development technicians 
and institutions. The importance of these micro practices—replicated by hundreds of technicians at all 
levels—cannot be overemphasized, because it is through them that development is constituted and 
advanced. The new practices concerned many activities and domains, including, among others, 
technical assessments; institutional arrangements; forms of advice; the generation, transmission, and 
diffusion of knowledge; the training of personnel; the routine preparation of reports; and the 
structuring of bureaucracies.” Escobar, Encountering Development, 88-89. 
87 Tsing, Friction. 
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IV. Case Selection  
Most studies on the politics of GMOs focus on Europe, the Americas, and 
South Asia, with considerably less attention to the African continent. I have followed 
the global GMO debate since 2004 and have been interested in the competing 
accounts of genetically modified seeds as a technology in support of, or detrimental 
to, the livelihoods of the poor. I also have a longstanding interest in environmental 
and social justice and, in particular, the ways in which calls for justice are articulated 
in the developing world—what Joan Martinez-Alier calls an “environmentalism of 
the poor.”88 Southern African states such as Zambia rejected American GM food aid 
out of concerns regarding public health. South Africa is by far Africa’s largest 
producer of genetically modified crops and is hailed as a model for African states, yet 
it is also home to the African Centre for Biodiversity, a very dynamic activist 
organization that disseminates information about the negative effects of transgenic 
crops.89 I became interested in whether Ghana, as an exemplar state for West Africa, 
would exhibit some of the same patterns in the commercialization of and contestation 
over genetically modified seed. Ghana was chosen for my research both because it is 
a country that has attracted agricultural investment and development assistance as 
part of the new Green Revolution in Africa, and because it is in many ways a typical 
case of uneven agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also a country 
that reflects contention over genetically modified crops and agricultural 
modernization: at the time that I chose Ghana as a site for research, the Ghanaian 
Parliament had ended a seven-year deliberation over the biosafety bill.  
                                                
88 Joan Martinez-Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor: A Study of Ecological Conflicts and 
Valuation (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002). 
89 Previously African Centre for Biosafety. 
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Currently, farming on much of the African continent can be characterized as 
labor-intensive, small-scale, rainfed agriculture with minimal use of inputs and 
mechanization. Saving seeds as well as the use of manure to fertilize the fields by 
farmers wealthy enough to own livestock continue to be thriving traditional 
agricultural practices. African farmers use the least amount of fertilizer worldwide 
and hybrid seeds are still a novelty in places like Northern Ghana.90 Ghana, like many 
other sub-Saharan countries, faces warming temperatures and erratic rains as well as 
increasing population density. The average age of farmers is increasing as senior high 
school students move from rural areas to study in cities, and think less about returning 
to work on the family farms. Urbanization and the expansion of cities compete with 
farming land. These conditions have prompted calls for a new Green Revolution in 
Africa, the topic of Chapter Three. 
The inequality between the North, primarily a rural and peri-urban space, and 
the South, where industry is concentrated, has deepened. Northern Ghana is framed 
by Southerners and foreigners alike as ‘backwards,’ ‘deficient’ and in need of 
intervention.91 The three regions that make up Northern Ghana (Northern Region, 
Upper East Region, and Upper West Region) account for approximately 13.4% of the 
                                                
90 Morris et.al., Fertilizer Use in African Agriculture: Lessons Learned and Good Practice Guidelines 
(Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007); author interviews at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
Upper East Regional Office March 4, 2013 and with Dr. Kojo Amanor at the University of Ghana, 
Legon, March 26, 2013.  
91 The common perception by Southerners was that the North was backwards, hot, and had nothing 
going on. This sentiment was widely shared among people that had never been there. Part of this 
denigration of the North likely has ties to the history of North-South relations whereby Northerners 
made up the pool of slaves for the centralized Southern kingdoms and the trans-Atlantic slave trade. 
For a discussion of internal colonization in Ghana see Akosua Adoma Perbi, A History of Indigenous 
Slavery in Ghana (Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, 2004). 
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total population and 44.9% of the landmass of the country.92 In comparison with the 
rest of the country, it has low levels of literacy and formal education93, low levels of 
productivity as measured by crop yields, high levels of micronutrient deficiency 
among women and children, and low rates of agricultural technology adoption (such 
as fertilizers, ‘improved seed,’94 pesticides, tractors, and irrigation). Northern Ghana 
is a part of the savannah agro-ecological zone with distinct short rainy (4-6 months) 
and long dry seasons (6-8 months).  
Ghana has had a history of attracting development assistance with a 
longstanding goal of developing commercial agriculture.95 Recent support from 
entities such as USAID, the World Bank, and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA) has focused on increasing agricultural productivity in Northern 
Ghana, especially in the seed sector. Current president John Mahama, of the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) political party, won support through a series of promises 
to devote greater attention to economic growth in the North via the commercialization 
of Northern agriculture. This plan to modernize agriculture has been initiated through 
a public-private partnership termed the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority 
(SADA) and the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program (GCAP), which I discuss in 
                                                
92 The Northern Region is the largest of the three regions that make up Northern Ghana, accounting for 
29.5% of the total landmass with a population size of 1,820,806. The Upper East is one of the most 
densely populated areas of the country with a population size of 964,500 but only 2.7% of the 
country’s total landmass. The Upper West has a population size of 576,583 and 12.7% of the country’s 
landmass. See “About Ghana: Regions,” Government of Ghana, accessed July 2nd, 2015, 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh.   
93 In many conversations during my fieldwork in Northern Ghana I was told that during the British 
indirect rule of the Northern Territories the British educational policy in Ghana was intended to 
maintain Northerners as an uneducated labor force.  
94 Improved seed refers to seed that is certified by agronomists and produced through foundation seed. 
95 This is reflected in the themes of Ghana’s Farmers’ Day, a day to celebrate farmers’ achievements, 
typically recognizing large- to medium-scale farmers or those that adopt modern agricultural 
technologies. For a review of recent Farmers’ Day themes see “Farmers’ Day FAQs,” Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, Republic of Ghana, accessed July 2nd, 2015, 
http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?page_id=6843. 
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Chapter Four. The passage of the Biosafety Act 831 in December 2011, has allowed a 
series of transgenic confined field trials to commence, two of which (Bt cotton and Bt 
cowpea) are based in the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute in Northern 
Ghana. Chapter Three takes a closer look at the public-private partnership that 
supports the research and development of transgenic cowpea undergoing a confined 
field trial at SARI.  
My field sites were divided among participant observation in farming 
communities in Northern Ghana and more formal interviews with actors involved in 
initiatives to modernize agriculture in Accra, Tamale, and Bolgatanga. I conducted 
research in the regional capitals of Tamale (Northern Region) and Bolgatanga (Upper 
East), the villages of Kukuo Yapalsi and Bongo that have direct access to state 
resources,96 and the villages of Kpegu Bugurugu and Vea that lack such access. These 
villages were selected following my pilot research trip in January 2012. In order to 
gain community access, I used snowball sampling, linking up initially with an opinion 
leader, who then was able to introduce me to elders and traditional leaders. I asked 
how farmers perceive the agricultural challenges they face, what forms of knowledge 
and expertise do farmers rely on to respond to these challenges, and what they 
conceive are the roles of technology, local and scientific expertise in responding to 
these challenged in Northern Ghana.  
In the cities of Tamale, Bolgatanga, and Accra I interviewed a wide-range of 
actors that work to shape understandings of how food should be produced and 
distributed in Ghana. I conducted repeated interviews with agricultural research 
                                                
96 Kukuo Yapalsi has an assemblyman who was a National Farmer that resides in the village. The 
resident chief of Bongo is a Paramount Chief. 
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scientists at SARI, bureaucrats in the regional and national offices of the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, actors (particularly those employed by USAID) involved with 
the implementation of the Obama Administration’s Feed the Future initiative, U.S. 
foreign service officers, actors involved and impacted by the SADA initiative, faculty 
at the Integrated Community Development program at the University of Development 
Studies (UDS), actors involved with biotechnology outreach programs (particularly 
those that are a part of the Program for Biosafety Systems), farmers associations, and 
activists in opposition to genetically modified crops. I also asked these actors to 
characterize the agricultural challenges that farmers face and how these challenges 
should be addressed, but was more direct in asking whether they see a role for 
genetically modified crops in responding to these challenges.97 
I approach my dissertation research as part of a larger study of a period of 
transition in Ghana’s agricultural development trajectory. Ghana currently has a 
number of public-private partnerships that have been mobilized to modernize Ghana’s 
agricultural system. At the time that I commenced fieldwork in January 2012 and July 
2012-March 2013, the four core public-private partnership initiatives98 that I had 
identified to study—the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority’s work on 
land rights and commercial agriculture, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa’s work on seeds and policy advocacy, the Ghana Commercial Agriculture 
Program’s development of nucleus-outgrower schemes and land facilitation 
mechanisms to expand commercial agriculture, and the introduction of genetically 
                                                
97 At the time I conducting most of my fieldwork (2012-13), there was little widespread knowledge of 
genetically modified crops. Awareness about the debate was concentrated among elites, and not among 
farmers. 
98 The fourth public-private partnership is the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program (GCAP). 
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modified seeds—were in various stages of their implementation. During this time, a 
private auditor for SADA was still conducting baseline surveys on agriculture, though 
the afforestation project began in a hurry before the run-up to the December 2012 
general elections. AGRA had been active in Ghana for a longer period of time and 
was involved in an expansive array of projects related to agriculture. In 2007, AGRA 
supported the development of the West African Center for Crop Improvement that 
trains students from across West Africa in biotechnology and plant breeding at the 
University of Ghana, Legon. (It now has two cohorts of PhD alumni). AGRA’s Policy 
and Advocacy Program for the seed sector worked with the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture and has influenced seed and fertilizer legislation in Ghana such as the 
Plant and Fertilizer Act, 2010 (Act 803) that laid the foundations for the highly 
contested Plant Breeders’ Bill currently before Parliament. 
Confined field trials of three genetically modified crops (an early step on the 
road to commercial release) began in 2013: GM rice was planted at the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) Kumasi in March 2013, Bt cotton was 
planted at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) Nyankpala in June 
2013, and Bt cowpea was planted at the SARI Nyankpala in September 2013. In May 
2015, I conducted follow-up interviews with a number of contacts at SARI, as well as 
actors affiliated with GCAP and SADA. As of May 2015, there are two different 
applications for additional transgenic crop field trials before the National Biosafety 
Authority.99 In spring 2015, the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program completed 
                                                
99 The Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) has applied for approval of multi-locational 
field trials of Bt cowpea, but this approval may be delayed as a result of the lawsuit against the 
National Biosafety Committee. Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple, SARI, Nyankpala, May 7, 
2015. Monsanto has applied for approval of a field trial of Bt cotton with a stacked trait, herbicide-
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the concept development for the land facilitation mechanism, but as of May 2015 has 
not yet developed a database to catalogue available land. GCAP has begun to select 
nucleus farmers to develop commercial agriculture in Northern Ghana.100 During this 
third trip, I was also able to interview some of the key actors involved in the ongoing 
lawsuit against the National Biosafety Committee and the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture brought by Food Sovereignty Ghana in order to halt the 
commercialization of genetically modified foods. In particular, I spoke to members of 
Food Sovereignty Ghana and a spokesperson of the Convention Peoples’ Party, a 
senior advisor and the Country Coordinator of the Program for Biosafety Systems, a 
high-ranking official of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the acting CEO of 
the National Biosafety Authority. 
 
V. Key Findings 
The effort to promote a new Green Revolution in Africa triggers and renews 
struggles over authority, knowledge, identity, and property. For instance, there is a 
widespread recognition within both popular discourse and scholarly literature of the 
highly polarized nature of the debate over GM seeds. However, this focus on the 
polarity of the debate obscures from view the similar sets of strategies utilized to both 
advance and impede biotechnology-based Green Revolution programs. First, I find 
that both proponents and opponents of GM seeds use a blend of two discursive 
strategies—hype and expertise—to facilitate the entry, or to resist, the cultivation of 
                                                                                                                                      
tolerance. Author interview with the acting CEO of the National Biosafety Authority, Accra, May 20, 
2015. 
100 Author interview with a bureaucrat working on the land facilitation mechanism from the National 
Lands Commission, Accra, May 20, 2015. I discuss “nucleus-outgrower” farming arrangements in 
Chapter Four. 
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genetically modified crops. I define hype as the deployment of simplistic, 
exaggerated claims to stimulate activity such as consumption, investment, 
philanthropy, or to mobilize activism. The use of hype garners attention and support, 
whereas the use of scientific knowledge is used to legitimate their respective 
positions. The emergency framing collectively constructed through the discursive 
strategy of hype makes incremental approaches, compromises, and deliberation 
appear careless in the face of such urgency.  
Adversaries have also taken the fight over this controversial technology to the 
legal domain: both proponents and opponents alike have employed legal expertise to 
advance, or impede, the introduction of GM crops. An international assemblage of 
biotechnology proponents have lobbied and offered legal and biosafety expertise to 
shape biosafety legislation in African countries such as Ghana. A result of these 
efforts is the passage of Ghana’s Biosafety Act in 2011 that provides the framework 
for the management of biotechnology in the country. The recent lawsuit by Food 
Sovereignty Ghana against the Government of Ghana to ban the commercialization of 
GMOs bases its case upon this biosafety legislation, thereby legitimating the law that 
allowed GMOs into Ghana in the first place. Second, another key finding of the 
project is that this blend of hype and expertise works in tandem with the law to 
generate a ‘rule of experts.’101 This political shift gives scientists, biosafety experts, 
and lawyers greater power in shaping food and agriculture policy. Hype about GMOs 
as ‘Frankenfoods’ and ‘terminator seeds’ creates a perception of genetic modification 
as a uniquely “risky” technology that needs to be managed by biosafety expertise and 
legislation. In the speculative economy of the life sciences industry, hype about the 
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promise of biotechnology to deliver both economic and humanitarian benefits also 
solicits the authority of legal experts and intellectual property protection to safeguard 
investments and handle liability issues. In the courtroom and in Parliament, 
professional advocates navigate and shape legislation to advance their case. This 
proliferation and elevation of expertise can marginalize the majority of Africans who 
lack such expertise, and may ultimately lead to less democratic decision-making on 
food and agriculture policy.  
Third, in the face of this contestation, I find that the promotion of ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology in Africa is being used to reframe biotechnology as a humanitarian 
enterprise. Using the concept of “philanthrocapitalism”102—that is, the merging of 
philanthropy with the logic of venture capital—I demonstrate how the “donation” of 
‘pro-poor’ biotechnology serves to advance new markets in Africa under the pretext 
of providing a philanthropic response to the perceived food security needs of 
smallholder farmers and local communities. This “donation” mechanism produces an 
additional effect: the “gift” of a proprietary gene by an agribusiness corporation for 
the development of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology reflects a conception of genes and seed 
as something that can be privately owned first, and then given away. This normalizes 
the seed as a commodity—rendering it “biocapital,” that is, a new phase of capital 
whereby biological life becomes a key source of market and informational value.103 It 
                                                
102 Carol B. Thompson,  “Philanthrocapitalism: Appropriation of Africa’s Genetic Wealth,” Review of 
African Political Economy 41, no. 141 (2014): 389-405. 
103 Rajan, Biocapital. 
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advances a “genecentric” view of biological life that locates biodiversity in the stock 
of genetic material that divorces the seed from its social and ecological context.104 
Fourth, at the center of these discursive strategies is the figure of the farmer, 
who is seen as an agent and object of salvation by GM proponents and opponents 
alike. The farmer entrepreneur, in the view of the World Bank and the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa, can save Africans from poverty and is even capable of 
‘feeding the world,’ if only s/he were to access scientific knowledge and modern 
agricultural technologies. By contrast, food sovereignty activists see the farmer’s 
rejection of GM seed as the means to save livelihoods endangered by the threat of 
GMOs and corporate domination. My ethnographic findings in Northern Ghana—a 
space that has been identified by both sides of this debate as deficient and in need of 
assistance—indicate that farmers are unlikely to buy into much of this hype. Rather, I 
find that farmers in Northern Ghana are “mixers”: they pragmatically use a range of 
traditional and modern agricultural technologies and do not see traditional, organic 
farming and the use of modern inputs as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, 
ethnography allows me to show that these grand plans to transform farming from a 
way of life to a business are constantly challenged by existing complexity: multiple, 
coexisting roles, risk reduction practices, and local notions of entrepreneurship. This 
suggests that efforts to construct new farmer identities as part of the new Green 
Revolution in Africa will be frustrated, and likely incomplete.    
 
 
                                                
104 Arturo Escobar, Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2008).  
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VI. Chapter Outline 
In Chapter Two, “Technological Savior or Terminator Gene? Hype, Science, 
and Law in the GMO Debate,” I argue that the food crisis frame is used to advance—
or impede—the adoption of this controversial technology, genetically modified crops. 
I contend that scholarly focus on the polarity of the debate obscures the common 
strategies deployed by adversaries. I provide examples of how both proponents and 
opponents use hype, as a bid for attention, and science, as a bid for authority, to 
attract supporters to their cause. The debate has also moved into the legal domain as 
both sides use law to regulate or ban GMOs. In bringing GMOs to the courtroom, 
activists have sometimes invoked and reinforced the same legal regime that enabled 
the introduction of GMOs in the first place. 
 The crisis frame that has been used by GM proponents to introduce 
genetically modified crops has also been employed to assert the need for a new Green 
Revolution in Africa. In Chapter Three, “What is New About the ‘New Green 
Revolution’? Philanthrocapital, Biocapital, and Public-Private Partnerships,” I 
critically analyze the “newness” of the Green Revolution in Africa. I examine 
whether and in what ways the introduction of genetically modified crops, as part of 
this program of agricultural transformation, constitute a radically new departure from 
the first Green Revolution. I offer three defining features that distinguish this new 
Green Revolution in Africa from previous agricultural modernization efforts. First, I 
look at the changing role of the nation-state in agricultural research and development 
from a state that “enables” rather than leads. These changes become evident in the 
proliferation of public-private partnerships. I focus my attention on the public-private 
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partnership that has supported the research and development of genetically modified 
cowpea in Ghana. Second, I look at the peculiar interface between legal and techno-
scientific expertise, philanthropy, and new forms of capital that distinguish this new 
Green Revolution. I introduce the concept of philanthrocapitalism as a mechanism 
that facilitates the commodification of seed. Third, I consider the role of 
philanthrocapitalism and legislative changes that facilitate the normalization of a new 
form of capital, biocapital.  
Whereas Chapter Three emphasizes what is new about this Green Revolution 
in Africa, Chapter Four, “Experts and Entrepreneurs: From Farming as a Way of Life 
to Farming as a Business,” highlights the extent to which these initiatives focus on the 
farmer, a continuity between these two periods of agricultural transformation. I turn 
to my ethnographic observations in Northern Ghana to examine development 
strategies that attempt to transform farming through the promotion of 
entrepreneurship. I look at the ways in which discourses of entrepreneurship are 
promoted through education, training, and emulation. The use of new technologies, as 
well as agricultural education and training, challenge traditional roles as techno-
scientific knowledge and business skills become privileged over experiential 
knowledge. In the final section of the chapter, I bring to light existing complexity on 
the ground that will likely frustrate these attempts to transform farming from a way of 
life to a business.  
In the Conclusion, “Seed Politics and the Question of Democracy,” I discuss 
further the significance of my work and future directions for research. A particularly 
promising avenue for further analysis are the issues of democracy and accountability 
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that have been raised by a wide range of actors in the GMO debate in Ghana. I 
consider the way in which actors ranging from activists within the food sovereignty 
movement to members of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Board of Directors 
are using this debate over GMOs as an opportunity to call for the democratization of 
food policy. In this sense, the debate about GMOs can be understood as a proxy for 







Technological Savior or Terminator Gene? 
Hype, Science, and Law in the GMO Debate 
 
I. Introduction 
The challenge of feeding a growing population during an age of declining 
arable land and natural resources has generated an intense debate over the adoption of 
new agricultural technologies, particularly genetically modified (GM) seeds. 
Genetically modified (GM) crops are framed alternately as a means to improve the 
lives of a growing population in the face of climate change and as undermining the 
capacity for life—in the form of a seed—to reproduce itself. As such, this genetic 
manipulation has been both heralded as a technology with great potential, and 
condemned as a source of worldwide contention: the “golden rice” that will save 
children from blindness and early death, or the “terminator seed” that will lead to the 
poisoning of our food supply and the collapse of biodiversity.  
Despite the controversial nature of this technology, GM crop cultivation on 
the whole is rising: between 1996 and 2013 the land devoted to GM crops has 
increased 100-fold, making it among the fastest adopted crop technologies in the 
history of modern agriculture. However, GM crop cultivation is also geographically 
concentrated, as 76% of this cultivation takes place within the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina.1 In order to understand the uptake of this technology, it is important to 
recognize not only the dualistic nature of these framings, but also the commonalities 
between adversaries. This chapter explores how both proponents and opponents of the 
                                                
1 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), “Executive 
Summary: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2013,” ISAAA Brief 46-2013: 




genetic modification of seeds deploy discourses of emergency and salvation to usher 
in, or to resist, biotechnology’s reach in the developing world. Fervent proponents of 
GM seed make inflated claims about the promise of biotechnology to address the 
plight of the starving to both encourage investment in new agricultural technologies 
as well as to mitigate fears. Ardent opponents of GM seed, though motivated by 
genuine concerns about the socio-ecological implications of this technology, make a 
parallel move: they frame GM seed as a catastrophe-in-waiting and use this sense of 
urgency to catalyze support. Thus, both poles of this debate collectively construct 
emergency. 
What is at stake in the framing of genetically modified crops as responding to, 
or creating the conditions for, emergency is the narrowing of the range of options 
considered for future food production. More specifically, I argue that this 
construction of emergency may foreclose deliberation over the full range of options 
on how to address global food insecurity, thereby favoring ready-made, “off-the-
shelf” technical solutions controlled by experts. Both poles of the GM debate, in 
dramatizing future food scenarios, construct conditions whereby small steps, 
compromises, or piecemeal approaches appear deficient and inappropriate in the face 
of such urgency. Because emergencies are conceived of as large in scale, responses 
are expected to match this scale; as such, global networks of trade and aid seem well 
suited for a task of this magnitude. This suggests that preoccupations with ‘feeding 
the world’ can have the unintended consequence of disregarding incremental and 
inclusive approaches to food security that may be less resource-intensive and 
environmentally damaging.  
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In this chapter I outline how the dynamics of the GM crop debate construct 
dualities that generate emergencies of scale. The adoption of GM crops gets posed as 
an “all or nothing” economic game: the uptake of this technology opens a door to 
either economic prosperity or indebtedness. This is seen in the expansion of farmer 
input-support programs, total packages that provide all necessary technological 
inputs2 to transform the smallholder farmer into the ‘serious’ businessmen that feeds 
the world, or, by contrast, accounts of Bt cotton farmers’ suicides in India as a result 
of deepening indebtedness from the high costs of genetically modified seed.3  
The literature on the GM debate emphasizes its polarized character, but 
ignores the extent to which both the biotechnology industry and anti-GM activists 
employ similar tactics to shape public opinion and policy regarding genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs).4 Despite the divergent framings of how to address 
                                                
2 Inputs refer to fertilizers, agrochemicals, irrigation systems, and tractors that are characteristic of 
capital-intensive agriculture. 
3 Glenn Davis Stone, “The anthropology of GM crops,” Annual Review of Anthropology 39 (2010): 
381-400. 
4 The political analysis on the GMO debate—both popular and scholarly—tends to reflect the polarity 
of the debate itself in its examination of either biotechnology proponents or anti-GMO activists (see 
for example Ronald Herring, “Framing the GMO: Epistemic Brokers, Authoritative Knowledge, and 
Diffusion of Opposition to Biotechnology,” in The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, 
Mechanisms, and Political Effects, eds. Rebecca Givan, Kenneth Roberts, and Sarah Soule. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Vandana Shiva, Tomorrow’s Biodiversity (New 
York: Thames & Hudson, 2000); Robert Paarlberg, Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is Being 
Kept Out of Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Peter Andrée, Genetically Modified 
Diplomacy: The Global Politics of Agricultural Biotechnology and the Environment (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2007). The scholarly literature on GMOs has highlighted the ways in which claims about the 
risks posed by GMOs diffuse through transnational advocacy networks with implications for biosafety 
regulation (Herring 2010; Paarlberg 2008), the emergence of a discourse of precaution and the 
development of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Andrée 2007), the divergence of US and EU 
biosafety regulatory policies (Jasanoff 2005; Lynch and Vogel 2001), attitudes towards GMOs (e.g. 
Jasanoff 2005; Stone 2010), the impact of framing on social mobilization (Heller 2013; Bonnuiel, Joly 
and Marris 2008), the potential benefits and costs of GM crops in the developing world (Pinstrup-
Andersen and Schiøler 2001; Wu and Butz 2004; Fitting 2011; Moseley and Gray 2008; Stone 2007), 
and the conditions of production of plant biotechnology (Bingen 2008; Zerbe 2005; Kinchy 2012; 
Shiva 1999, 2000). See Herring, “Framing the GMO,”; Paarlberg, Starved for Science; Andrée, 
Genetically Modified Diplomacy; Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2005); Diahanna Lynch and David Vogel, The Regulation of GMOs in Europe and the United 
States (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001); Glenn Davis Stone, “The Anthropology of 
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current and future agricultural challenges, both proponents and opponents of 
transgenic seeds5 employ a combination of hype, science, and law in order to 
facilitate or impede the adoption of genetically modified crops. I define hype as the 
deployment of simplistic, exaggerated claims to stimulate activity such as 
consumption, investment, philanthropy, or to mobilize activism. Hype in this context 
is a bid for attention that overstates and simplifies the benefits or detriments of GM 
seeds.  An unanticipated consequence of this framing of GM seeds as “risky” is the 
subsequent demand for an industry of experts to monitor biosafety.6 An additional 
outcome of anti-GMO campaigns is the greater frequency of biotechnology outreach 
events, those efforts to educate, train and mitigate against negative perceptions of 
biotechnology and GMOs that are organized by industry-influenced public-private 
                                                                                                                                      
GM Crops,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 39 (2010): 381-400; Heller, Chaia. Food, Farms, and 
Solidarity. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013; Christophe Bonneuil, Pierre-Benoit Joly, and Claire 
Marris, “Disentrenching Experiment: The Construction of GM-Crop Field Trials As a Social 
Problem,” Science, Technology, and Values 33, no. 2 (2008): 201-29; Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Ebbe 
Schiøler, Seeds of Contention: World Hunger and the Global Controversy over GM Crops (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Felicia Wu and William Butz, The Future of Genetically 
Modified Crops: Lessons from the Green Revolution (Santa Monica: Rand Publishing, 2004); 
Elizabeth Fitting, The Struggle for Maize: Campesinos, Workers, and Transgenic Corn in the Mexican 
Countryside (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Moseley and Gray, Hanging by a Thread; Glenn 
Davis Stone, “Agricultural Deskilling and the Spread of Genetically Modified Cotton in Warangal,” 
Current Anthropology 48, no.1 (2007): 67-103; Jim Bingen, “Genetically Engineered Cotton: Politics, 
Science, and Power in West Africa,” in Hanging by a thread: Cotton, globalization, and poverty in 
Africa, William G. Moseley and Leslie C. Gray, eds. (Uppsala: Ohio University Press, 2008); Noah 
Zerbe, Agricultural Biotechnology Reconsidered: Western Narratives and African Alternatives 
(Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005); Abby Kinchy, Seeds, Science, and Struggle: The Global 
Politics of Transgenic Crops. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012); Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder 
of Nature and Knowledge (London: South End Press, 1999); Shiva, Tomorrow’s Biodiversity. 
5 “Genetically modified,” “genetically engineered,” and “transgenic” seeds are fairly synonymous 
terms and will be used interchangeably throughout the paper. Activists tend to use the term 
“genetically modified” seed more frequently, and scientists and industry tend to prefer “genetically 
engineered” or “transgenic” seeds. Biotechnology, on the other hand, is a larger category that includes 
genetic modification/engineering. Genetic modification occurs through the transferring of a gene from 
one organism to another. One of the most common genetic modifications in plant biotechnology is the 
introduction of a gene from a bacterium into a plant genome in order to confer insect resistance. 
6 Andrée (2005) points out that the perception of genetically modified organisms as posing unique 
risks means that “those without technical expertise have limited power in both policy fora and the 
wider public sphere, even though they may have strong opinions on the matter and strong interests in 
the outcome of deliberation.” Peter Andrée, “The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and Shifts in the 
Discourse of Precaution,” Global Environmental Politics 5, no.4 (2005): 28. pp.25-46. 
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partnerships. This debate has increasingly been drawn into the legal arena as biotech 
advocates work to shape biosafety law (thereby allowing the introduction of GMOs) 
and opponents take them to courts to call for labeling or bans of GMOs.  
In the following section, I discuss the way in which discourses of emergency and 
salvation circulate in conversations about global food security and delimit responses to 
food and agricultural challenges. Framing threats to future food production (like climate 
change, land pressures, and biodiversity loss) as an emergency necessitates an immediate 
response. Biotech proponents, that include industry, government officials and other 
development planners, offer technological salvation from this state of emergency through 
the transgenic seed. GM seed is presented as holding the potential to be adaptive to 
climatic change, allow for sustainable intensification7 of farming, and tackle nutritional 
deficiencies. Environmental anti-GMO activists push for bans and moratoria of GMOs in 
order to save the planet from the perceived threats to human and ecological health. Yet 
not all opponents of GMOs would be satisfied with merely a ban on this technology. For 
instance, some of the recent opposition to GMOs in Ghana belongs to the global food 
sovereignty movement. This movement differs from many mainstream environmental 
movements as food sovereignty constitutes a form of radical mobilization that appeals to 
larger aspirations of independence, democracy, and solidarity. Hype is revealed as a 
technique that may enable campaign mobilization and affect policy changes like a 
moratorium on GM crops, but that is unlikely to support farther-reaching goals of public 
participation and influence in agriculture and food policy design.  
In the third section, I examine how science is used alongside hype in the 
debate over the cultivation of GM crops. Biotechnology outreach has emerged as a 
                                                
7 This refers to growing more intensively on existing arable land.  
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strategy by industry and related public-private partnerships to combat ‘GM myths’ 
and improve the public’s perception of biotechnology. However, it is not only the 
proponents of GM seeds that use science-based informational campaigns to influence 
public opinion and policy. Anti-GMO activists critique the science of genetic 
modification as reductionist and imprecise, and wage a parallel campaign that draws 
upon experts in toxicology, biology, and ecology to support their claims. Both 
opponents and proponents make use of hype as a bid for attention and utilize science 
as a bid for authority. This simultaneous generation of hype and science creates static: 
it becomes difficult to tease out credible scientific and experiential information from 
an oversupply of hype-filled, web-based content on GMOs. Furthermore, the use of 
science as a means to legitimate critique of GMOs has exclusionary effects, creating 
barriers to public participation in this debate over how food should be produced and 
consumed. 
In the final section, I turn towards the deployment of law in this heated debate. 
Because of the identification of genetically modified crops as uniquely risky, the 
development of new legislation to manage these risks precedes the introduction of 
genetically modified crops.8 The international legal regime that guides the 
development of biosafety law is specified under the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, the Convention on Biological Diversity’s international agreement on 
biosafety.9 The Protocol takes a precautionary approach to biotechnology.10 Fulfilling 
                                                
8 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, of which Ghana is a signatory, requires biosafety legislation in 
order to manage the risks and allow for the safe introduction of genetically modified organisms.  
9 Currently there are 170 parties to the Protocol, the U.S. is not one. “The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety,” Convention on Biological Diversity, accessed July 3, 2015, https://bch.cbd.int/protocol.  
10 Principle 15 of 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development articulates the meaning of 
the precautionary principle: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
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the biosafety requirements of the Protocol entails training, advising, and outreach to 
policymakers, scientists, the media, farmers, students, and the public at large about 
genetically modified crops by a new set of experts, many of which are trained in 
Western countries. Drawing upon my fieldwork in Ghana, I examine the use of law in 
two ways: first, I look at the actions taken to develop legislation to accompany the 
introduction of this new technology; and second, I analyze the use of law by a food 
sovereignty activist organization to halt the commercialization of GMOs. In 
particular, I examine a current court case brought against the Ghanaian government 
by Food Sovereignty Ghana that seeks to ban the commercial introduction of GMOs. 
I consider how the legalization of this debate has generated two contradictory effects: 
it attracts more attention to the activists’ cause and potentially expands the number of 
interested parties in court, yet, at the same time, it also serves to legitimate biosafety 
law and the exclusionary domains of juridical and techno-scientific expertise. 
 
II. Emergency and Salvation: GM Seeds and the Political Economy of Hype 
GM foods are safe, healthy, and essential if we ever want to achieve decent living 
standards for the world's growing population. Misplaced moralizing about them is 
costing millions of lives in poor countries… GM crops should now be growing in 
areas where no crops can grow, and plant-based oral vaccines should now be saving 
millions of deaths. –U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural Service11 
 
Monsanto's GM seeds create a suicide economy by transforming seed from a 
renewable resource to a non-renewable input which must be bought every year at 
high prices… The suicide economy of industrialized, globalised agriculture is suicidal 
                                                                                                                                      
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Principle 15 is reaffirmed in the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety. United Nations General Assembly, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janiero, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992. 
11 “Agricultural news for Italy EU and World July 2012,” USDA Global Agricultural Information 





at 3 levels - it is suicidal for farmers, it is suicidal for the poor who are deprived food, 
and it is suicidal at the level of the human species as we destroy the natural capital of 
seed, biodiversity, soil and water on which our biological survival depends. –Vandana 
Shiva, leading anti-GMO activist12 
 
Emergency 
After the world’s population reached 7 billion people in 2011, a wave of 
reports and commentary framed the global food production and distribution system as 
one in crisis.13 Widespread food riots as a result of dramatic surges in the price for 
staple foods in 2007-8 and another famine in the Horn of Africa were highlighted to 
convey the urgency and necessity of dealing with issues of chronic food insecurity.14 
Companies like Monsanto and Syngenta, industry leaders in the production of 
genetically modified and hybrid seeds, seized and exploited this sense of emergency. 
According to Monsanto’s website, in order to “to keep up with population growth 
more food will have to be produced in the next 50 years as the past 10,000 years 
combined.”15 Syngenta also calls upon this discourse of emergency: “To feed this 
growing population, farmers will need to achieve at least a 70 percent increase in 
food production by 2050. Achieving food security won’t be easy considering the 
                                                
12 Vandana Shiva, “From Seeds of Suicide to Seeds of Hope: Why Are Indian Farmers Committing 
Suicide and How Can We Stop This Strategy?” Huffington Post, April 28, 2009, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vandana-shiva/from-seeds-of-suicide-to_b_192419.html.  
13 For an example of the kind of the Malthusian-style reporting that emerged as the population 
approached 7 billion see “Special Series: 7 Billion,” National Geographic, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/01/seven-billion/kunzig-text.  
14 For example, a LexisNexis search of “food” and “crisis” between 2007-2011 yielded over 1,000 
relevant hits, most of which identified the role of the 2007-8 food price crisis in creating food 
insecurity.  




megatrends of growing population, greater affluence, and increasing urbanization.”16 
Implicit in these statements is uncertainty: how will we be able to produce this food? 
This discourse of emergency is also reproduced by GM opponents through 
framing the diffusion of GM seeds as leading to the poisoning and corporate takeover 
of the world’s food supply.17 Dying bees, lab rats with huge cancerous tumors, and 
cross-species mutant fruits become the symbols of the food emergency to which 
activists respond. I identify the key characteristics of this discourse of emergency: 1) 
temporal compression, 2) scale, and 3) perceived threat.  Identifying a situation as an 
emergency impacts the way in which the problem is processed: emergency connotes a 
large-scale threat that necessitates immediate action.18 One of the consequences of 
conceptualizing food insecurity and hunger as an emergency is that solutions are 
‘rendered technical’, skirting complex and deeply rooted socio-political issues.19 In 
discussing famine, Edkins (2000) argues that famine  
…has been removed from the realm of the ethical and the political and 
brought under the sway of experts and technologists of nutrition, food 
distribution, and development. Its position there, as an appropriate subject for 
expert knowledge, remains a political position, but one can lay claim to a 
political neutrality because of the specific way that science is construed as 
‘truth’ in modernity.20 
The significance of the categorization of food crises as emergencies is that this 
classification constrains alternative agricultural imaginaries by changing the speed of 
                                                
16 “Grow more from less,” Syngenta, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/grow-more-from-less/Pages/grow-more-from-less.aspx.  
17 Visual media has been influential in drawing attention, and generating fear, around GMOs. A few 
examples include: Genetic Roulette; Poison on the Platter; Seeds of Death; Transgenic Wars; Seeds of 
Freedom. For more examples see “Movies to Watch—GMO and More,” GMO Awareness, accessed 
July 3, 2015, http://gmo-awareness.com/resources/movies-to-watch-gmo-and-more/.  
18 See Michael Lipsky and Steven Rathgeb Smith, “When Social Problems Are Treated as 
Emergencies,” Social Science Review 63, no.1 (1989): 5-25. 
19 Tania Murray Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics 
(Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2007), 7-10. 
20 Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), 1. 
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the response. As Calhoun (2004) observes, “emergency is thus a category that shapes 
the way we understand and respond to specific events, and the limits to what we think 
are possible actions and implications.”21 If immediate action is a mandated response 
to emergency, than this eliminates the possibility of taking slow, incremental steps to 
addressing the identified threat. 
This “evental” character obscures the visibility of the structural processes of 
capital accumulation that might contribute to exacerbating the likelihood of future 
‘emergencies.’ Unlike addressing patterns and processes that may require political 
action and social change, an isolated event is likely to be more responsive to 
technological interventions. Furthermore, global funding structures of development 
projects incentivize this framing of emergency; routine upkeep and project 
maintenance are rarely attractive needs to support.22 The prioritization and 
designation of emergencies within these funding structures can be considered ways of 
minimizing institutional commitments to address underlying structural issues.23 
Within this logic of emergency, rich nations can afford to be very risk-averse, “but 
the vast majority of humankind does not have such a luxury, and certainly not the 
hungry victims of wars, natural disasters, and economic crises.”24 In this way, the 
discourse of emergency forecloses meaningful debate regarding how food should be 
                                                
21 Craig Calhoun, “A World of Emergencies: Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of a Cosmopolitan 
Order,” Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 41, no. 4 (2004): 376. 
22 According to the film The Price of Aid, 80% of the UN World Food Program’s resources are 
dedicated to “emergencies”—“emergencies” that must be identified four months in advance. That is to 
say that countries like the United States (which provides up to 80% of the total resources for the UN 
WFP) identify critical regions many months in advance and ship them in-kind to the countries 
identified as in need. Often times this means that countries that receive such aid may not, in fact, be 
facing an acute food shortage, which has very negative effects on the local prices that farmers can 
obtain for foodstuffs like maize. Jihan el-Tahiri, The Price of Aid (55 minutes, released in 2004). 
23 Lipsky and Smith, “When Social Problems Are Treated as Emergencies.” 
24 Norman Borlaug and Jimmy Carter, “Foreword,” in Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is 
Being Kept Out of Africa, by Robert Paarlberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), ix. 
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produced and distributed and may render additional scientific testing of GM seed 
“unnecessary,” thereby reducing the time that activists have to respond.  
 
Salvation 
The invocation of a food emergency discourse prompts a demand for 
solutions. How can we feed the world with climate change threatening to wreak 
havoc and population continuing to grow exponentially? How may humankind be 
protected from the threat of toxic GMOs and corporate domination? In this 
constructed condition of emergency, a discourse of salvation is likely to have greater 
resonance. This discourse works in tandem with the emergency discourse to facilitate 
or impede openings for the entry of GM seed.  Biotechnology is presented as a means 
to ‘save’ ‘poor Africans’ from hunger.25 The discourse of salvation has three key 
characteristics: it is transformative, faith-based, and it is dependent on the 
identification of a population ‘in need.’ Salvationary discourse is transformative 
because it promises alleviation from the current condition of crisis and emergency.  
Claims about the ‘miracles of modern science’ reflect this aspect of the discourse.  
The discourse of salvation deployed by proponents of GM seed reveals great faith in 
the promise and potential of science to solve problems of food production. This faith 
in science is not contingent on proof. Salvation also requires a population in need of 
being ‘saved.’ Hunger and malnutrition are linked to accounts of the world’s poor as 
                                                
25 For more on the history of framing GM crops as a ‘pro-poor’ technology, see Dominic Glover, “The 




“starved for science.”26 Diverse livelihoods become converted into the “misery”27 of 
the underdeveloped, a monolithic population that needs to be ‘saved’ through 
technological interventions.   
 I borrow this notion of salvationary discourse from Kaushik Sunder Rajan’s 
book Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life. Rajan finds that in the 
domain of genomic research the “therapeutic molecule” can be used to invoke the 
future possibility of life-saving treatment “which of course need never actually be 
realized, but…whose existence as a future goal is vital to the dynamics of the 
present.”28 Rajan argues that supporting the promises of the life sciences industry is 
an underlying belief structure of salvation.29 The narrative of drug development is one 
of a “miraculous enterprise” whereby the drugs themselves are the instruments of 
salvation.30 The belief in the promise and potential of science to offer life-improving 
technologies, both in the domains of human genomic research and agricultural 
biotechnology, is the driving force of this discourse of salvation. In a parallel fashion, 
high-yield varieties of seeds during the Green Revolution have been portrayed as the 
miraculous means by which India avoided famine.31 Proponents of GM seed have 
drawn upon this narrative to promote a “new Green Revolution for Africa,” most 
notably through the creation of the influential Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
                                                
26 Reference to Robert Paarlberg’s text, Starved for Science. 
27 I am referencing here a statement made by President Kennedy: “‘The world is very different now. 
For man [sic] holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms 
of human life… To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds 
of mass misery… we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words in good deeds—in a new 
alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.’” 
Quoted by Arturo Escobar, “Planning,” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as 
Power, 2nd ed., ed. Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed Books, 2010), 136.  
28 Kashik Sunder Rajan, Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2006), 48. 
29 Rajan, Biocapital, 35. 
30 Rajan, Biocapital, 186-7. 
31 Paarlberg, Starved for Science, 8. 
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Africa (AGRA), funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. GM seeds and the technologies that support them (pesticides, 
fertilizers, irrigation, tractors) are seen as the way by which ‘the poor’ can be ‘saved 
from poverty.’ 
  Rajan also argues that the expansion of the life sciences industry is driven by 
speculative capital. “Speculation and innovation both involve the articulation of 
vision.  But it is articulation that takes a certain form, that of hype. Vision and hype 
are both types of discourse that look toward the future.”32 Hype is common in the 
information age; constant access to nearly boundless quantities of information 
encourages overstatements and inflationary claims to gain the attention of a busy and 
distracted audience. In order to generate support to fund anti-GMO campaigns, 
opponents may make hyperbolic claims about the impact of this new technology. 
Rather than presenting this technology as part of a trajectory of environmentally 
damaging technologies, GM seed is presented as radically “new” in order to solicit 
donations and other forms of support. Hype, therefore, is not only a bid for attention 
but also a funding mechanism. 
Both opponents and proponents of GM seed rely on hype to raise capital and 
generate concern regarding this new technology. This political economy of hype 
operates at two levels. First, hype is deployed as an attention-seeking mechanism to 
attract an audience, maintain relevance, or to counter adversaries’ claims; second, 
hype is used both as a way to generate excitement and solicit funds for future research 
and development as well as for advocacy campaigns. This use of hype to attract 
                                                
32 Rajan, Biocapital, 111. Original emphasis. 
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financial support is akin to what Anna Tsing (2005) describes as the “economy of 
appearances”:  
Performance here is simultaneously economic performance and dramatic  
performance. The ‘economy of appearances’ I describe depends on the 
relevance of this pun; the self-conscious making of a spectacle is a necessary 
aid to gathering investment funds. The dependence on spectacle…is a regular 
feature of the search for financial capital.33   
Pioneering industries and campaigns are more inclined to use hype, or in Tsing’s 
terms spectacle, during critical times when support is most needed. Biotech 
proponents use hype at the research and development stage of new products, or when 
products are criticized. Activists use hype during critical political economic shifts like 
impending legislative changes on GMOs or prior to the introduction of new 
transgenic products into commercial markets. Hype can be an important tool in 
garnering the support necessary to successfully ban GMOs, or, by contrast, in 
generating the capital for new expansions in biotechnology research. 
An example of this is a 2009 Monsanto press release that states: “Monsanto Is 
on the Verge of a Technology Explosion.” In an animated address to investors, 
Monsanto’s CEO and president Hugh Grant promised that on the horizon are value-
added products with improved yield for growers. Yet at the end of the press release is 
the following: 
Cautionary Statements Regarding Forward-Looking Information: Certain 
statements contained in this release are ‘forward-looking statements,’ such as 
statements concerning the company’s anticipated financial results, current and 
future product performance, regulatory approvals, business and financial plans 
and other non-historical facts. These statements are based on current 
expectations and currently available information. However, since these 
statements are based on factors that involve risks and uncertainties, the 
                                                
33 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 57. Original italics. 
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company’s actual performance and results may differ materially from those 
described or implied by such forward-looking statements.34 
It should be noted that such a disclosure is required by law and is common to all 
Monsanto correspondence to investors. Yet what is interesting about this is that 
investors know this, and perpetuate this economy of hype. Speculative investment 
offers the possibility of huge returns when investors get in early on products that may 
later become successes. Expanded investment in agricultural technologies such as this 
can create a false understanding that these technologies are ‘tried and true’ and 
constitute appropriate responses to food emergencies. For other examples of salvation 
and the political economy of hype, I turn to the two of the most publicized ‘success’ 
stories, GM sweet potatoes and Golden Rice.  
 
‘Pro-poor’ Biotechnology: The Technological Savior 
Sometimes the ones responsible for the perpetuation of hype are scientists 
themselves. Jennifer Thomson, the former chair of the African Agricultural 
Technology Foundation and the current chair of the South African National Biosafety 
Advisory Committee, argues that the media has been biased in its accounts of 
biotechnology. This bias has led to the neglect of the ways in which GM crops have 
‘saved’ people from hunger and malnutrition.  According to Thomson, the media 
focuses their attention exclusively on biosafety fears: “We don’t, however, often read 
headlines such as ‘GM rice saves million of Asian children from blindness’ or ‘GM 
                                                
34 “Monsanto Is on the Verge of a Technology Explosion, Executives Tell Investors at Annual Field 
Event,” PR newswire, August 13, 2009, accessed February 12, 2012, 
http://news.prnewswire.com/ViewContent.aspx?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/08-13-
2009/0005076914. My emphasis. 
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sweet potatoes save African crop from virus plague’…”35 What is interesting about 
these statements concerning GM rice and GM sweet potato is that Thomson is 
invoking the “therapeutic seed” despite the fact the therapy has yet to be realized.36 
Neither GM rice nor GM sweet potato is commercially cultivated and therefore is not 
available for consumption. Furthermore, after three years of field trials at the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute, results demonstrated that GM virus-resistant sweet 
potatoes were no less vulnerable than ordinary varieties, and sometimes their yield 
was lower.37   
Another illustration of the interplay between the discourses of emergency and 
salvation is the use of “Golden Rice” to demonstrate the saving force and 
benevolence of biotechnology. In 2000, TIME magazine declared, “This rice could 
save a million kids a year” because of the transgenic crop’s promise to address 
vitamin A deficiency.38 Over a decade later, this transgenic vitamin-A enriched 
“Golden Rice” is still not commercially cultivated, in part due to the destruction of 
field trials and the slow development of a regulatory infrastructure in the wake of the 
                                                
35 Jennifer A. Thomson, Genes for Africa: Genetically Modified Crops in the Developing World 
(Landsdowne, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, 2002), 3.  
36 International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), “Press Release: 
Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2010,” ISAAA Brief 42-2010, 2/22/11, 2010, 
accessed July 3, 2015, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/42/pressrelease/default.asp. 
The “therapeutic seed” is a reference to Rajan’s “therapeutic molecule,” in Biocapital. 
37 New Scientist, “Monsanto failure,” New Scientist 181, no. 2433 (2004): 7. See also Gatonye 
Gathura, “GM technology fails local potatoes,” The Daily Nation, Kenya. January 29, 2004. Despite 
the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute’s centrality in the development of transgenic crops on the 
African continent, the Kenyan government banned GMOs out of concern regarding food safety in 
November 2012. This ban has received criticism for hindering research on genetically modified crops 
that could address some of the country’s agricultural challenges. On Kenya’s ban on GMOs see 
AgroNews, “Kenya Banned Importation of All GMO Foods,” AgroNews, November 22, 2012, 
accessed July 3, 2015, http://news.agropages.com/News/NewsDetail---8425.htm; Hillary Hueler, “In 
Kenya, Calls Grow to Lift Controversial GMO Ban,” Voice of America, November 20, 2014, accessed 
July 3, 2015, http://www.voanews.com/content/in-kenya-calls-grow-to-lift-controversial-gmo-
ban/2527833.html. 
38 TIME magazine, “This Rice Could Save a Million Kids a Year,” TIME magazine. July 31, 2000. 
Front cover of magazine. 
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controversy surrounding GM crops.39 Despite the fact that Golden Rice is still years 
away from being accessible to markets, the myth that this product is on the market 
and saving children has been perpetuated. Activists that impede the development of 
micronutrient-enhanced GM foods are framed as selfishly imposing their food 
choices onto people who have unfulfilled dietary needs, or in the extreme as having 
“the blood of…millions of children on their hands.”40 A February 2012 report by the 
USDA Foreign Agriculture Service agonizes that “misplaced moralizing about [GM 
foods] is costing millions of lives in poor countries;”41 a U.S. Congressional 
Representative at a Congressional hearing on plant biotechnology in Africa likened 
the barring of genetically modified crops as “border[ing] on genocide”.42 Such claims 
reveal important slippages: the potential of a technology to address micronutrient 
deficiency is equated with the cure for blindness and early death.43 
                                                
39 In August 2013, 400 protestors destroyed a Golden Rice experimental site in the Bicol region of the 
Philippines that had nearly run its field trial completion. Matt McGrath, “‘Golden rice’ GM trial 
vandalized in the Philippines,” BBC News, August 9, 2013, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-23632042.  
40 Patrick Moore, “Has Greenpeace Lost Its Moral Compass?” Allow Golden Rice Now!, accessed 
March 2, 2014, http://www.allowgoldenricenow.org/moral-compass. Dr. Patrick Moore was a co-
founder of Greenpeace. 
41 “Agricultural news,” USDA GAIN report 2012.  
42 The statement by Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, Representative of the 14th District of Illinois, at a 
congressional hearing: “Today, when we see starvation, especially in some of our African countries, 
we see people who are artificially putting barriers or threats to us being able to move good healthy 
food products into those countries. In my view, that borders on genocide. It is wrong, it shouldn’t 
happen, and we need to use our science, we need to use our technology, and we need to fight these 
folks who are trying to stop this good, healthy, nourishing food from going to countries that need it.” 
Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Research Committee on Science House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 
p.11 (June 12, 2003) (statement by Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, Representative of the 14th District of 
Illinois). 
43 A recent New York Times article on June 8, 2015 by well-known health columnist Jane E. Brody, 
“Fears, Not Facts, Support G.M.O. Labeling,” makes similar assertions regarding the health effects of 
Golden Rice: “Thus, Golden Rice, genetically enhanced to be rich in beta-carotene, the precursor of 
vitamin A, may help counter vitamin A deficiency, which can cause blindness, in rice-dependent 
populations.” This claim, as well as another regarding the stringency of testing of GMOs by 
government agencies, was corrected on June 11th in the online version: “An earlier version of this 
article referred incorrectly to the effects eating Golden Rice, which is genetically enhanced to be rich 
in beta-carotene, can have. While the rice is being developed with the aim of providing a new source of 
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The discursive effect produced is that agricultural biotech companies can 
position themselves as doing therapeutic, humanitarian work that de-emphasizes the 
profit-generating elements of their enterprise. Biotech proponents level charges 
against Greenpeace as having committed “crimes against humanity” for their 
campaign against Golden Rice, and, in doing so, place the development of Golden 
Rice and other transgenic crops as significant technological contributions to 
humanity. This belief in the ability of biotechnology to improve the human 
experience may be genuine, and in the early years of plant biotechnology many 
scientists shared the hope that such developments could address some of the 
agricultural and dietary needs of the developing world.44 Yet besides the promise of 
‘salvation’ that Golden Rice holds for small-scale farmers in the future, virtually all 
GM crops currently cultivated are those developed for industrial farming and 
dominated by a few transnational agribusiness corporations. The crops that are 
planted in the developing world are by and large insect-resistant Bt cotton and maize 




                                                                                                                                      
vitamin A to people who depend on rice for much of their nutrition, it has not yet been shown to 
counter blindness in those populations.” Jane A. Brody, “Fears, Not Facts, Support G.M.O. Labeling,” 
The New York Times, June 8, 2015. The online corrected version, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/fears-not-facts-support-gmo-free-
food/?alg=&_r=1#3be9d5072ccb3327e6eab5a2182fdac&CAMPAIGN_CODE=4LXWL . 
44 Glover, “The corporate shaping of GM crops as a technology for the poor.”  
45 See Christine M. Du Bois and Ivan Sergio Freire de Sousa, “Genetically engineered soy,” in The 
World of Soy, ed. Christine M. DuBois, Chee-Beng Tan, and Sidney Mintz, (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2008), 74-96; Smale et al., “Measuring the economic impacts of transgenic crops in 
developing agriculture during the first decade: approaches, findings, and future directions,” IFPRI 
Food Policy Review No. 10 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
2009). Bt refers to Bacillus thuringiensis, the introduction of a bacterium into the plant genome to 
confer an insect-resistance trait. 
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Biotechnology as ‘FrankenFoods’  
Whereas proponents of GM seed invoke the promise and potential of science 
to save poor Africans from hunger, opponents use hype of a different kind. Anti-GM 
activists label GM foods ‘FrankenFoods’ and compare the unwilling introduction of 
GMOs into the food system as like being a “human lab rat.”46 Activists that include 
Vandana Shiva attributed genetically modified seeds to farmers’ suicides even before 
the seeds had been adopted in India. Hence the label “suicide seeds,” though it is 
likely that these seeds may have exacerbated existing problems once they were 
adopted.47 Anti-GM activists have perpetuated the idea of an infertile transgenic 
‘terminator gene,’ although this technology has not been developed for commercial 
markets. 48 The film, Genetic Roulette, claims that the introduction of GMOs is 
“…the most dangerous thing facing human beings in our generation.”49 Activists used 
a recent groundbreaking study on the effects of Roundup-Ready Resistant maize feed 
on rats to claim that this was unequivocal proof that GM foods are hazardous to 
human health. Images of the laboratory rats with grotesque tumors went “viral” 
online and were used as a visual representation of the dangers of GMOs, despite the 
fact that the most robust findings were that of the negative health effects of the 
herbicide, rather than the genetic modifications of the plants themselves.50 
                                                
46 Jason Burke, “India to rule on future of aubergine as country’s first genetically modified food,” The 
Guardian, February 8, 2010. 
47 Stone, “The Anthropology of GM Crops,” 340. 
48 Commercial varieties of GM crops pose quite a different problem—biopollution from when fertile 
transgenic varieties of crops cross-pollinate with native varieties of the same crop. The mechanism that 
prevents the saving of GM seeds is through patents and “technology use agreements,” contracts that 
forbid farmers who purchase their seeds to save them for future use. 
49 Film by Jeffrey M. Smith, Genetic Roulette: The Gamble of Our Lives, 2012, movie trailer accessed 
February 1, 2013, http://www.examiner.com/video/video-genetic-roulette-movie-trailer. 
50 This study has been discredited and subsequently retracted, although arguably to serve political 
purposes. See the next section for a discussion of the politicization of research. Séralini, et.al. “Long-
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What is visible is that both sides of this debate use hype, but for different 
purposes. Industry encourages investment in technologies like new transgenic seeds 
through hype and projections that are, by their nature, uncertain. Advocacy 
organizations like Greenpeace that oppose genetically modified crops utilize hype 
that invokes dystopian futures to catalyze support and attract donations. Ironically, 
this suggests that activists begin to act according to the rules of the speculative 
marketplace—both sides need to dramatize danger in order to attract funds, capital, 
and resources to operate. Through the dynamics of this political economy of hype, 
life itself is placed at the center of these contestations and increasingly reframed in 
economic terms.  
 
The Global Food Sovereignty Movement: Saving Endangered Livelihoods  
Environmental organizations such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
have led successful campaigns to ban GMOs in countries like France, Poland, Kenya, 
and Bulgaria.51 Visual hype in the form of images of dead bees,52 GMO-fed rats with 
tumors53, threatening stalks of corn, and gravestones, has been used to promote the 
idea of GM crops as hazardous to human and ecological health. Food and Water 
                                                                                                                                      
term toxicity of a Roundup herbicide and a Roundup-tolerant genetically modified maize,” Food and 
Chemical Toxicology 50, no.11 (2012): 4221-31. For examples of how anti-GM activists used the 
report see “South Africans call for immediate ban on GM maize after shocking cancer study,” African 
Centre for Biosafety, 2012, accessed July 3, 2015, http://www.acbio.org.za/index.php/media/64-media-
releases/401--south-africans-call-for-immediate-ban-on-gm-maize-after-shocking-cancer-study. 
51 “Greenpeace Media Briefing: EU Parliament to Adopt New GM Crop National Opt-Out Law,” 
Greenpeace, January 12, 2015, accessed July 3, 2015, http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-
unit/reports-briefings/2015/GMOs%20briefing%2012012015%20%20FINAL.pdf; AgroNews. “Kenya 
Banned Importation of All GMO Foods.” 
52 Dead bees are a reference to the problem of colony collapse disorder, of which many anti-GM 
activists have suggested that genetically modified crops are responsible. There is little consensus on 
the cause of widespread bee deaths.  
53 This is a reference to the Seralini et.al. 2012 study ““Long-Term Toxicity of a Roundup Herbicide 
and a Roundup-Tolerant Genetically Modified Maize” that has since been retracted by the journal 
Food and Chemical Toxicology. 
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Watch, LabelGMOs.org, and the NON GMO Project have led campaigns to push for 
GMO labeling. A ban of GMOs may be a shared goal of food sovereignty and 
environmental movements, but food sovereignty activists draw greater attention to the 
political context that allow for dramatic shifts in modes of food production. The 
global food sovereignty movement addresses larger questions of agency and power 
through a strategy that seeks to affirm and assert the right to food sovereignty, that is, 
the right of people to control what and how food is produced and distributed. The 
leading food sovereignty organizational networks, La Via Campesina and Alliance 
for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), are heterogeneous, decentralized and with a 
large base of support in the Third World.54 
Activists from the food sovereignty movement have more radical and 
expansive goals, viewing the GM seed as a symbol of a larger structure of existing 
global inequalities. In particular, criticisms emerging out of the food sovereignty 
movement highlight the disproportionate influence of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) in shaping free trade agreements, national agricultural research, and 
regulation in the developing world. Corporate influence is attributed to the 
importation of cheap subsidized imports, the sale of large tracts of land to private 
investors (referred to by activists as ‘land grabs’), and legislative changes to seed 
laws, property rights, and biosafety. GM seed represents a form of domination, 
corporate control, which endangers livelihoods. Such a frame is politically powerful 
because genetically modified seed is both developed by large agribusiness 
                                                
54 “What is La Via Campesina?” La Via Campesina, accessed July 3, 2015, 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44/what-is-la-via-campesina-mainmenu-




corporations that have dominated seed markets, and cultivated as industrial-scale 
monocroppings that may displace small farms and biodiversity.55  
Food sovereignty activists in Ghana led a campaign against GMOs that has 
culminated in protests in Accra in January 2014 and May 2015, as well as a delay in 
the passage of a contested Plant Breeders’ Bill. Although the Biosafety Act that 
allowed the introduction of genetically modified organisms and the cultivation of GM 
crops passed quietly in 2011,56 a Plant Breeders’ Bill that would strengthen the 
intellectual property rights of foreign plant breeders has been the focus of protest. 
Hundreds of petitions were received and thousands demonstrated in the streets of the 
capital city of Accra. Members of Parliament decided to postpone deliberations on the 
legislation after criticism circulated on the airwaves that the Bill would impoverish 
Ghanaian farmers and the decision-making process did not involve public 
participation or consultation. The mobilization was organized by the Coalition for 
Farmers Rights and Advocacy Against GMOs (COFAM), with a significant vocal 
presence by Food Sovereignty Ghana. Whereas placards used the kind of visual hype 
common to anti-GMO demonstrations—images of apples with teeth and tongues—
they also played on framing the seed companies as being malevolent manipulators of 
nature. “No to Man-Satan!” and “AWAY Sin-Genta!” were among some of the 
popular signs. The rhetoric of the organizers emphasized values of democracy, 
independence, and equity, suggesting that the entry of GMOs and the passing of the 
Plant Breeders Bill would allow foreign interests to dominate the agricultural sector, 
                                                
55 The dominance of biotech seeds across the Americas is a powerful suggestion that the globalization 
of this new agricultural technology can lead to the homogenization of food production practices. 




at the expense of smallholder farmers in Ghana. In the words of one organizer, if the 
Bill passed, “We are doomed if this bill is passed…we will be under colonialism if 
the bill is passed.”57 
This corporate control constitutes the emergency to which food sovereignty 
activists respond: the salvation of diverse livelihoods can only be achieved through 
the ‘global struggle’ to protect cultural and biological diversity. The salvation 
discourse deployed by the global food sovereignty movement stands in contrast to the 
depoliticized technological fix offered by biotech proponents. It also differs in terms 
of agency—within food sovereignty discourse the political empowerment of peasants 
is the route to salvation, whereas biotech proponents identify salvation with the seed 
as a product of a marriage of techno-science and agribusiness. It can be argued that 
perhaps the potential here for corporations to endanger the livelihoods of peasant 
farmers is not overstated, and therefore not an example of hype. India has 
experienced a significant wave of farmers who have committed suicide following the 
liberalization of agriculture and the commercial cultivation of GM crops.58 Yet such a 
portrayal also ignores the choices that farmers do have—farmers are not forced to 
adopt GM seeds, nor are there any practical means by which farmers could be 
prevented from saving their own native seeds. In short, while corporations acting 
alongside neoliberal economic policy reform (supported by institutions like the WTO) 
                                                
57 MyJoyOnline, “Angry farmers hit the streets over GMO,” MyJoyOnline (Ghana), January 28, 2014, 
accessed July 3, 2015, http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/January-28th/angry-farmers-hit-the-
streets-over-gmo.php. 
58 See Stone, “The Anthropology of GM Crops.” 
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may be able to powerfully influence the agendas and policies of developing countries, 
this falls short of an exertion of total control over peasant livelihoods.59 
  
III. Science Fights: Myth-making, Science, and Biotechnology Outreach 
…the fear that surrounds GMOs all over the world including Ghana calls for a forum 
such as this with the aim of educating the relevant stakeholders and the public…not 
forgetting the heavily funded anti-GMO groups which are misleading the public with 
very little evidence and in ignorance.60 –Director General of CSIR Ghana at a 
sensitizing seminar of the Bt cowpea project  
 
…if you give the impression that a genetically modified sweet potato can work 
because it is the poor person’s crop, there will be more willingness to accept GMOs. 
So it is not philanthropy. It’s a form of investment, a corporatized agenda for resource 
extraction from Africa.61 –Mariam Mayet, director of the African Centre for 
Biosafety 
 
In the global debate over the role of transgenic crops, the field experiment 
itself has become a political object: GM field trials have become the target of 
destruction in global protests in countries like France, the Philippines, India, 
Australia, Germany, and Spain.62 Signaling major distrust both in state regulation to 
protect human and environmental health and in the intentions of multinational 
agribusiness corporations, global vandalism of these field trials has been frequently 
performed as a rejection of a ‘lab rat’ status. In August 2013, 400 Filipino protestors 
destroyed field trials of Golden Rice near completion—a symbolic action that 
                                                
59 A major caveat here is in the case whereby land reform leads to the displacement of peasants off of 
their land. In such cases, this does amount to an exertion of total control. 
60 Director General of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) Ghana keynote 
address at the one day “sensitization seminar of agricultural biotechnology and the Bt cowpea project,” 
September 18, 2013, at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, Nyankpala, Ghana. Transcript 
provided by an agricultural research scientist at SARI. 
61 Pambazuka News, “AGRA, bio-piracy and food as social justice,” Pambazuka News, October 4, 
2008, accessed July 3, 2015, http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47258.  
62 Germany actually abandoned field trials in 2013 owing to persistent vandalism. “Restrictions on 




proponents viewed as tragic because of the potential of the vitamin A-enriched rice to 
combat blindness.63 Protestors, on the other hand, perceived the transgenic crop 
plantings as an unnecessary experiment with ominous consequences. Mark Lynas, a 
former Greenpeace activist who had publicly apologized for his past leadership of 
anti-GMO campaigns in Europe, asserted in his report “The True Story About Who 
Destroyed a Genetically Modified Rice Crop,” that such individuals were from the 
city and not farmers. He condemned the destruction of this vital research and 
questioned the legitimacy of the action.64 New York Times reporter Amy Harmon 
countered that the Philippine government and Golden Rice developers—whom Mark 
Lynas had relied upon in his report—had incentives to discredit these protestors.65  
These divergent accounts of responsibility for the vandalism of the Golden 
Rice field trial are reflective of the kind of competing claims to legitimacy found 
throughout the debate over GMOs. Biotech proponents such as Mark Lynas 
frequently frame social movements in opposition to GM crops as ‘anti-science.’ In 
order to be taken seriously within these heightened global debates over food security, 
many anti-GM activists engage in “science fights,” utilizing scientific knowledge to 
undergird their critique of GMOs. They employ scientific arguments that critique the 
                                                
63 McGrath, “‘Golden rice’ GM trial vandalized in the Philippines.”  
64 The legitimacy of the action seems to hinge in part on whether or not these were city kids, rather 
than farmers. Mark Lynas, “The True Story About Who Destroyed a Genetically Modified Rice Crop,” 
Slate, August 26, 2013, accessed July 3, 2015, 
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and Golden Rice developers have an incentive to discredit protestors. Amy Harmon, “Golden Rice: 
Lifesaver?” The New York Times, August 24, 2013. 
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reductionist nature of the science used to develop it66 as well as claims of farmers’ 
deepening indebtedness as a result of reliance on costly seeds and inputs.67 The 
prompt dissemination of scientific research via transnational advocacy networks that 
demonstrates the harmful effects of transgenic crops has had policy ramifications and 
sparked greater industry scrutiny. It has led to, for example, France’s regulatory 
decision to ban a variety of Monsanto’s Bt maize, as well as to the US EPA’s 
decision to require seed companies to submit data to the EPA about the toxicity of Bt 
maize pollen in butterflies or else lose the right to sell the product in the US.68  
 Incidences like these can be used to explain an emerging pattern of rapid, 
aggressive critique of papers unfavorable to biotech crops within the scientific 
community. As Emily Waltz reports in Nature,  
Those who develop [GM] crops face the wrath of anti-biotech activists who 
vandalize field trials and send hate mail. But those who…suggest that biotech 
crops might have harmful environmental effects are learning to expect attacks 
of a different kind. These strikes are launched from within the scientific 
community and can sometimes be emotional and personal; heated rhetoric that 
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67 Stone, “The Anthropology of GM Crops.” 
68 A paper by Rosi-Marshall et.al. published in 2007 in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences was cited as evidence in France’s regulatory decision to ban MON810, a variety of 
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Headwater Stream Ecosystems,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no.41 (2007): 
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) on the topic concluded that the most widely 
cultivated types of Bt maize pollen are not toxic to monarch larvae at concentrations the insects would 
encounter in the fields. (Losey’s experimental design had used higher concentrations). The chain of 
events that unfolded in response to Losey’s preliminary research unsettled scientists who recognized 
the power a single scientific paper could have in the hands of anti-GMO activists. See Emily Waltz, 
“Battlefield,” Nature 461, No. 3 (2009): 27-32. 
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dismisses papers and can even…accuse scientists of misconduct.69 
When a problematic paper comes out, pro-biotech scientists react quickly, criticize 
the work in public forums, write rebuttal letters, and send them to journal editors, 
policymakers, and funding agencies. Waltz does not find that the scientists’ financial 
or professional ties to the biotech industry are the source of motivation for this 
forceful response.70 Rather, she states that many of them do feel that GM crops are 
safe and have great potential to deliver important societal benefits. Waltz mentions 
that many of the scientists that have been active in responding to these problematic 
studies have been researching transgenic crops since the late 1980s and some have 
been closely involved with the regulatory approval of the first GM crops. However, in 
the midst of these scientific controversies, industry and industry-supported scientists 
have become vocal participants in discussions scrutinizing scientific studies critical of 
GM crops.71  
This is not the only way that scientists have experienced difficulty conducting 
research on GM crops. The ability of agribusiness corporations to patent seed, as well 
                                                
69 Waltz, “Battlefield,” 27. 
70 Waltz, “Battlefield,” 30. 
71 Emma Rosi-Marshall, a stream ecologist, and her colleagues conducted a study at the University of 
Notre Dame on the effects of Bt maize on caddis flies. They found that the flies fed only Bt maize 
detritus grew at half the rate of flies fed conventional non-Bt maize detritus. Those flies fed high 
concentrations of Bt maize pollen had fatality rates twice that of the caddis flies fed non-Bt pollen. 
While they were criticized for their experimental design (including not conducting a dose-response and 
not choosing the correct maize as a control), the biggest point of contention of their critics was the 
conclusion that the transgenic crops has unexpected ecosystem-scale effects. Following Rosi-Marshall 
et.al.’s publication in PNAS, Monsanto sent the EPA a six-page critical response to the publication and 
posted the letter online. On the “Viewpoints” section of Monsanto’s website, Monsanto has attacked 
recent publications that claim that GM foods are unsafe. Rosi-Marshall, who received harsh criticism 
of her study on the effects of Bt maize on caddis flies, stated in an interview that attacks such as those 
made against her study appear to be orchestrated. Accounts of researchers like Bruce Tabashnik reveal 
the plausibility of this claim. Tabashnik was warned by an etymologist, William Moar (who later took 
a position at Monsanto), that his yet-to-be-published paper—showing evidence of insect resistance to 
Bt cotton—would have “‘devastating’” consequences and was warned not to publish it. Tabashnik 
published the paper, which was subsequently criticized by Moar at conferences and within the journal 
in which it was published. See Waltz, “Battlefield,” 27-30. 
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as the desire of companies to protect intellectual property in a competitive 
marketplace, has created significant barriers for academic research on GM crops. 
Technology use agreements, company-required contracts that establish the permitted 
use of patented seed, forbid saving seed as well as conducting research on it. 
Scientists have complained that research on GM seed was ultimately up to company 
approval, as they would have to seek approval to both access the seed for research 
(negotiated on an onerous case-by-case basis) and to publish the findings.72 As of 
2009, Monsanto began issuing Academic Research Licenses that supersede the 
restrictions on research specified through Technology Use Agreements. This allows 
research on certain aspects of commercialized genetically engineered products, such 
as agronomic and yield comparisons, oil seed content, interactions of introduced traits 
with the environment, the effects of GM feed, and research on pest management and 
resistance. What is excluded from these agreements is research on breeding with 
plants produced from the transgenic seed, development of commercial and non-
commercial methods for detecting the presence or absence of patent-protected traits 
in seed, research on modifications or improvements to the patent-protected traits, and 
research on new products prior to their commercialization.73 So whereas this signals a 
step towards greater transparency and the potential for improved research on certain 
aspects of GM crops, academic researchers will continue to struggle to understand the 
extent of cross-pollination of GM seeds with other crop varieties, the vigor of plants 
                                                
72 Bruce Stutz, “Companies put restrictions on research into GM crops,” Yale Environment 360, May 
13, 2010, accessed July 3, 2015,  
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/companies_put_restrictions_on_research_into_gm_crops/2273/. 




produced with GM seed, and the potential for non-target genetic alterations resulting 
from plant biotechnology.  
 The dynamics of these “science fights” reveal processes of exclusion at work 
at two levels: first, the need to use science in order for the critique to be considered 
legitimate, thereby creating barriers to entry on the basis of knowledge; and second, 
as a byproduct of patent protections that makes the free study, assessment, and 
regulation of GMOs difficult. Herring (2008) highlights these processes in his 
analysis of the precautionary approach of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety that 
guides many countries’ approach to biosafety: 
Cartagena logic created niches for salaried employees and consultants in 
global regulation, education, and testing activities. These are material 
consequences of framing; beneficiaries are sharply differentiated by class and 
cultural capital from average citizens.74 
These dynamics of exclusion create realms of inclusion for the proliferation of 
experts: expertise is not only needed to develop the products (agricultural research 
scientists and plant biotechnologists), determine their nutritional benefits 
(nutritionists), monitor their safety (biosafety experts), create the legal regimes to 
protect the intellectual property (legislators and administrators), set up programs to 
maximize economic benefits (development planners and economists), and 
demonstrate their effectiveness (expert farmers in demonstration fields), but also to 




                                                
74 Herring, “Framing the GMO,” 85. 
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Countering the ‘Myths’: Information and Persuasion in the GM Debate 
Activists on both sides of the GM debate use formalized rebuttals in the form 
of fact sheets, letters published in public online forums, and other publications to 
undermine the legitimacy of opponents’ claims. Activist organizations such as 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the African Centre for Biodiversity produce fact 
sheets and videos that aim to counter GM ‘myths.’ Food Sovereignty Ghana, in 
drawing attention to the Plant Breeders Bill as an entry-point for the increased 
presence of GMOs in Ghana, organized a ‘capacity-building’ workshop to explain 
how this impending legislation may negatively affect “the interests of millions of 
smallholder farmers in Ghana.”75 The African Centre for Biodiversity, a South 
African-based advocacy NGO, circulates documents and presentations that critique 
the science of genetic engineering using Powerpoint presentations with detailed 
technical information about the processes of genetic modification. This is done so in 
order to attempt to block the approval of new transgenic varieties. The Pan-African 
organization African Biodiversity Network supports advocacy workshops of local 
organizations that provide the public with extensive information not only about the 
socio-ethical issues, but criticize the imprecision of genetic modification on scientific 
grounds. Studies of the impact of GM crops and feed on rats, butterflies, and other 
insects have also been used for anti-GM and labeling advocacy. Scientists believed to 
be pro-biotech have been identified as ‘myth makers’ online as activists challenge the 
reputation and legitimacy of work of these scientists.76 
                                                
75 “Communiqué: FSG Workshop on GMOs, Seed Laws, and Biosafety,” Food Sovereignty Ghana, 
accessed July 3, 2015, http://foodsovereigntyghana.org/page/6/.  
76 The use of the term “myth” to disparage the work of the opposition is used by both proponents and 
opponents. GM Watch lists “myth makers”—those individual scientists and consultants as well as 
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A common narrative of biotech proponents in Ghana was that the “anti” 
groups—often referencing groups such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth—had 
been very influential in promoting myths and fear about GMOs. This had made 
drafting a biosafety bill a drawn-out process. There was a need to counter the “spread 
of the gospel of anti,” and one mechanism to do so was through biotechnology 
outreach.77 One of the most prominent entities on the African continent that conducts 
biotechnology outreach, the Open Forum on Agricultural Biotechnology in Africa 
(OFAB), is intended to facilitate the “the flow of information from the scientific 
community to policy makers and the general public.”78 Biotechnology outreach 
campaigns such as OFAB have identified GM crop ‘awareness creation’ for farmers 
and the public at large as critical to the widespread adoption of this technology and 
                                                                                                                                      
organizations—that promote the “myth” that GM foods are safe and desirable. In contrast, Monsanto 
also has a dedicated page on its website “Myths about Monsanto” where it addresses and “corrects” 
these “myths.” One scientist that has been a target in recent anti-GMO protests in Ghana has been Dr. 
Walter Alhassan of the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) who has been challenged 
by Food Sovereignty Ghana on their Facebook page. His image and name has been circulated along 
with the caption “THIS MAN is not a Scientist, is a consultant of US GMO industries.” See 
https://www.facebook.com/FoodSovereigntyGhana?fref=ts. Original emphasis. 
77 Author interview with agricultural research scientist at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, 
Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. Another agricultural research scientist at SARI made a very similar 
comment: “The idea is that we want the media to understand what are the facts [stress on this word] 
because we know, we recognize the fact that the ‘anti-groups’ are out there and most of them have 
contact with those groups.” Author interview with agricultural research scientist Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at 
SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
78 The purpose of the OFAB is described as the following: “Most African countries have been reluctant 
to adopt biotechnology-derived products as policy makers are confronted with contradictory sources of 
information. Scientific facts are often mixed with social, ethical and political considerations. In the 
face of a rapidly growing population, declining agricultural productivity and reduced resources 
available for agricultural research, policy makers are pressed to make the right decisions and are 
looking for guidance…AATF helped to establish a platform that aims at facilitating the flow of 
information from the scientific community to policy makers and the general public. The platform, 
known as the Open Forum on Agricultural Biotechnology in Africa (OFAB), was launched in Nairobi 
in September 2006. It brings together stakeholders in agriculture and enables interactions between 
scientists, journalists, the civil society, industrialists, lawmakers and policy makers.” The OFAB is 
managed by scientists and policymakers from Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture, KARI, CIMMYT, 
ICRISAT, Kenyatta University, and the AATF and is chaired by the ISAAA. See “Open Forum on 
Agricultural Biotechnology in Africa (OFAB),” African Agricultural Technology Foundation, 
accessed July 5, 2015, http://www.aatf-africa.org/projects-programmes/programmes/open-forum-
agricultural-biotechnology-africa-ofab. My emphasis. 
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have sought to correct the ‘myths’ about GMOs. Biotechnology outreach entails the 
advocacy regarding the benefits of biotechnology among African legislators, media, 
academics, farmers, traditional leaders, and even high school students.79 There is 
recognition that in order for GM crops to be widely cultivated, farmers and the public 
at large have to be willing to participate in the cultivation and purchase of such crops.  
The keynote address of the Director General of the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR) Ghana at the “sensitization seminar” for Bt cowpea and 
agricultural biotechnology iterates the key role of biotechnology outreach as a necessary 
response to the purported misinformation of powerful oppositional groups.80 
“Sensitization seminar” is a term used by actors within institutions that include Ghanaian 
bureaucracies and the World Bank to describe seminars designed to make local 
communities “sensitive” to upcoming changes that may impact them. Sensitization 
seminars have been developed around such issues as land registration and sale, gender, 
and transgenic seeds. These seminars are led by experts in plant biotechnology and 
biosafety and are designed for a public audience with the purpose of both informing local 
communities about an issue and creating a space for the public to ask questions.  
The Bt cowpea sensitization seminar in Ghana is an example of both 
biotechnology outreach and the discursive positioning of GM crops as a ‘pro-poor’ 
technology.81 Confined field trials of the transgenic crop Bt cowpea, a staple food in 
West Africa, commenced in September 2013. As a requirement under the Biosafety Act 
831, 2011, communities and relevant stakeholders adjacent to the project have been 
                                                
79 Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013; phone interview 
with Dr. Walter Alhassan of Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, March 6, 2013.  
80 Herring, “Framing the GMO.”  
81 Glover, “The corporate shaping of GM crops as a technology for the poor.”  
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invited to attend an informational seminar on the Bt cowpea that rationalizes why this 
new technology is necessary and beneficial for the local farming community. The 
Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI), where some of the confined field trials 
have commenced, hosted this seminar that involved over 200 participants, including the 
regional director of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the district assembly, the local 
chief, farmers, scientists, a representative of the National Biosafety Committee, and a 
representative of the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF).82 The AATF 
has been successful at negotiating with seed corporations like Monsanto to get 
proprietary release of patented genetic material for African countries. In Chapter Three I 
examine the AATF’s effort to acquire Monsanto’s Bt gene for the development of 
transgenic cowpea.83  
In addition to awareness creation and advocacy, these biotechnology outreach 
programs84 also train scientists and bureaucrats in biotechnology stewardship. The 
language of ‘biotechnology stewardship’ is a favorite of industry, implying that 
problematic outcomes of the technology are due to a lack of care, rather than inherent 
problems of the technology itself. Biotechnology outreach programs and biosafety 
advising by experts has served to promote the adoption of GM crops in the 
developing world, as has the shared experiences of farmers at international and 
domestic field visits. Industry has shown enthusiasm for donating transgenes to 
                                                
82 Phone interview with agricultural research scientist of the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, 
September 30, 2013.  
83 Author interview with an agricultural research scientist at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
84 Other biotechnology outreach programs include the Program for Biosafety Systems, funded by 
USAID and managed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). In the realm of 
biotech cotton, the U.S. has played a role in the diffusion of this technology through the West African 
Cotton Improvement Program. The Syngenta-supported SABIMA (Strengthening Capacity for Safe 
Biotechnology Management in sub-Saharan Africa) project, launched by the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa (FARA) under its African Biotechnology Biosafety Policy Platform (ABBPP), is 
designed to strengthen capacity in biotechnology and biosafety in Africa. 
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facilitate the development of ‘pro-poor’ technology in the developing world, given 
commitments to ‘product stewardship.’85 Biotechnology outreach not only mitigates 
fears through ‘awareness creation’ of the benefits of GM seeds, but it also improves 
the reputation of maligned companies like Monsanto. Ultimately, the greater exposure 
to these new technologies and improved public relations efforts enables multinational 
agribusiness companies to expand their market reach in the developing world. 
 
IV. Law and the GMO debate 
Besides hype and science, the law has also been used as an instrument to both 
advance and resist GMOs. Well-funded and networked biotech proponents have 
helped to shape the legislation that currently governs the entry of GMOs into Ghana. 
On June 21, 2011, after a seven-year-long deliberation the Ghanaian Parliament 
unanimously passed Ghana’s Biosafety Bill. In December 2011, President Atta Mills 
passed the bill into law. This unanimous decision to pass the bill was in part the result 
of the work of a coalition of organizations involved in biotechnology outreach led by 
the USAID-funded Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS). Outreach educational 
events to “create awareness” about the status of biotech crops and the need to have a 
biosafety bill contributed to parliamentarians’ shift of opinion in favor of passage of 
the legislation.86 The PBS program in Ghana had established a Country Advisory 
Group in 2005, distributed information on biotechnology and biosafety issues to 
                                                
85 My research indicate that the industry, specifically Pioneer, Syngenta and Monsanto, has been “very 
willing to license technology” though it is concerned with “product stewardship,” as they “don’t want 
to see the technology stop working” and “mismanaged.” Quotes from author interview with 
biotechnology advisor at USAID, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2012.  
86 Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013; phone interview 
with Dr. Walter Alhassan of Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, March 6, 2013; author 
interview with biotechnology advisor at USAID, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2012.  
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policymakers, and helped draft87 a national biotechnology and biosafety policy (not 
unlike the recently passed Ghana Biosafety Bill). The IFPRI-managed and USAID-
funded PBS programs have a global reach—they operate not only in Ghana, but also 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria, Mali, South 
Africa and Malawi.88 These programs involve a collection of international, national 
and local participants and seek to create conditions for the implementation of plant 
biotechnology by reaching out to policymakers at the national and supranational 
level, as well as through targeted efforts to shape public perceptions of GM crops at 
the local level. These biotech outreach efforts have had success not only in Ghana: a 
growing number of African countries have passed biosafety legislation (the first step 
towards the commercial cultivation of GM crops), and Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria have already begun field trials.89   
Ghana’s Biosafety Act reflects the influence of both the lobbying of the PBS 
as well as the dominant approach to precaution enshrined in the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety, to which Ghana is a party.90 Ghana’s Biosafety Act has not adopted the 
holistic approach to risk assessment initially advocated by the African Group that 
calls for a consideration of the socio-economic impacts of genetically modified 
crops.91 Ghana’s Biosafety Act 831, 2011 specifies two objectives of the Act: 
(a) to ensure an adequate level of protection in the field of safe development 
transfer, handling and use of genetically modified organisms resulting from 
biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on health and the environment, 
                                                
87 The PBS program was active with biosafety legislation and early drafting up until 2008-9. Author 
interview with biotechnology advisor at USAID, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2012.  
88 “Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS)- Partners,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 
accessed August 21, 2011, http://programs.ifpri.org/pbs/pbspart.asp. 
89 Author interviews at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute, 2/13/13 and 2/22/13. Olivia 
Kumwenda, “GM on the rise in Africa,” Reuters, March 31, 2011. 
90 “Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” https://bch.cbd.int/protocol. 
91 Andrée, “Cartagena Protocol,” 37. 
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and (b) to establish a transparent and predictable process to review and make 
decisions on genetically modified organisms specified in paragraph (a) and 
related activities.92 
After specifying the establishment, constitution, conduct and powers of the National 
Biosafety Authority (Articles 3-10), the Biosafety Act discusses the handling of 
request for approval including the application for export, import, transit, and 
introduction of GMOs into the environment, (Articles 11- 15). Article 16 allows for 
certain information provided to the National Biosafety Authority (NBA) by the 
applicant to be designated as confidential, following approval by the NBA. Article 18 
identifies the Gazette as the publication that will provide public notice regarding an 
application for release of a GMO into the environment.  
It is not until Article 19 of the Biosafety Act that risk assessment and risk 
management are mentioned. Risk assessment takes place following the screening and 
successful completion of the application and “shall be carried out taking into account 
available information concerning a potential exposure to the genetically modified 
organism.”93 Although Article 19.3 states that the Board may request additional risk 
assessment, it does not state if or how the socio-economic risks of the technology will 
be considered. This is an important oversight as many of the concerns raised by food 
sovereignty organizations like Food Sovereignty Ghana concern the possibility of 
severe indebtedness, and even subsequent suicides, by farmers whose costs of 
production for GM crops well exceed their profits.  
                                                
92 Ghana Biosafety Act 831, 2011, Article 2.  
93 Full text on risk assessment and risk management in Biosafety Act 831, 2011 Article 19: “19. (1) 
Where an application is screened and found to be complete, the Board shall act in accordance with the 
advice of the technical advisory committee is respect of the risk assessment conducted as set out in the 
Fourth Schedule (2) Risk assessment shall be carried out taking into account available information 
concerning a potential exposure to the genetically modified organism.” 
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The establishment of a National Biosafety Authority necessitates the creation 
of expert positions to monitor the applications for genetically modified crops. The 
development of expertise to monitor biosafety entails the training not only by the 
Program for Biosafety Systems, but also support for bureaucrats to study the 
biosafety regulatory systems of countries such as the U.S., Italy, and Australia.94 The 
potential adverse effects on health and the environment posed by genetically modified 
organisms are the focus of biosafety. The question of the socio-economic effects of 
genetically modified crops in Ghana is seen as residing outside the parameter of 
biosafety.95 This narrowing of scope is a manifestation of what Escobar (2008) terms 
“genecentrism,” a concept I discuss in Chapter Three. 
More than three years after the passage of the Biosafety Act, activists from 
Food Sovereignty Ghana sued the Ghana National Biosafety Committee and the 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture in order to ban the commercial introduction of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). On February 8, 2015 Food Sovereignty 
Ghana filed a writ of summons against the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) and 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) with an application for an interim 
                                                
94 This is Eric Okoree’s, acting CEO of the National Biosafety Authority, account of how he developed 
the expertise to monitor biosafety applications. Author interview with the acting CEO of the National 
Biosafety Authority, Accra, May 20, 2015.  
95 When interviewing Eric Okoree, the acting CEO of the National Biosafety Authority, about the 
socio-economic effects of GMOs he said that this would be considered if the application was 
completed. He stated that he is “not a socio-economic analyst” and suggested that raising such issues 
was the responsibility of civil society organizations. Author interview with the acting CEO of the 
National Biosafety Authority, Accra, May 20, 2015. This is additionally seen in the way the OFAB 
describes its work—to distill scientific fact from the impurities of social and ethical considerations: 
“Most African countries have been reluctant to adopt biotechnology-derived products as policy makers 
are confronted with contradictory sources of information. Scientific facts are often mixed with social, 
ethical and political considerations. In the face of a rapidly growing population, declining agricultural 
productivity and reduced resources available for agricultural research, policy makers are pressed to 





injunction to stop the release and commercialization of genetically modified cowpeas 
and rice on the grounds that the provisions of the Biosafety Act 831 have not been 
followed. They cite 13.1 of the Biosafety Act 2011, 831 “A person shall not, without 
the prior written approval of the Authority, import or place on the market a 
genetically modified organism.” However, the confined field trials are scientific trials 
and are many years, and stages of approval, from commercial release. Food 
Sovereignty Ghana pointed out that the National Biosafety Authority had not yet been 
created. On February 17th, the same day when the National Biosafety Authority was 
inaugurated, the court case began.96 
The catalyst for this court case appears to be the contentious Plant Breeders’ 
Bill, which was recently tabled by Parliament to allow more time for consideration.97 
The ongoing court case has succeeded in attracting the attention of Ghanaians to the 
issue of GMOs, of which three years ago most Ghanaians had limited knowledge.98 
The Ghana National Association of Farmers and Fishermen joined the case in defense 
of the introduction of GM crops, whereas the Convention People’s Party (CPP) joined 
on the side of Food Sovereignty Ghana. The Program for Biosafety Systems and the 
African Agricultural Technology Foundation have attended the hearings in support of 
                                                
96 From my interview with PBS, the NBA gets inaugurated the same day as the court case, which for 
some reasons provided in the interview is “sheer coincidence” because the court case was originally 
scheduled for an earlier date. Author interview with the Country Coordinator for the Program for 
Biosafety Systems, Accra, May 5, 2015. 
97 This can be implied through reviewing Food Sovereignty Ghana’s web presence. I am still waiting to 
hear more from Food Sovereignty Ghana on why they chose to file the court case when they did. 
98 Based off of my fieldwork observations during the first two research trips in January 2012 and from 
July 2012-March 2013, most Ghanaians, particularly in Northern Ghana, I spoke to were unfamiliar 
with GMOs. Familiarity with the debate was generally limited to academics, activists involved in 
environmental issues, Ghanaians with extensive connections abroad, and ex-pats. 
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the defendants, whereas members of local and international environmental 
organizations99 have attended in support of Food Sovereignty Ghana. 
Food Sovereignty Ghana’s choice of strategy to ban the commercialization of 
GMOs raises the unanticipated prospect of legitimating, rather than undermining, this 
regime of biosafety. That is, by calling upon specific provisions of the Biosafety Act 
831 they imply that it is a matter of the implementation of the law, rather than the law 
itself, that poses the problem. Although activists within COFAM have framed the 
Plant Breeders’ Bill as the “GMO bill,” it is rather the Biosafety Act that allowed 
GMOs to enter Ghana. The consequences of this legitimation of the Biosafety Act are 
that many of the socio-economic risks that food sovereignty activists are so concerned 
with are slighted in this regime of biosafety. In this case, the use of juridical expertise, 
which I define as expertise of or relating to juridical proceedings and the 
administration of the law, may undermine some of the key objectives of the food 
sovereignty movement.100 
 
V. Conclusion  
I argue that despite the polarized nature of the debate, both proponents and 
opponents of GM crops rely on a combination of hype, science, and law in order to 
advance their positions. Both lay claims that either utilizing or banning GM seeds will 
contribute to environmental sustainability and improve livelihoods. These advocacy 
                                                
99 Author interview with the Country Coordinator for the Program for Biosafety Systems, Accra, May 
5, 2015. 
I am waiting to hear from Food Sovereignty Ghana to get more details on who attended in support of 
their case.  
100 David Harvey argues that such a turn toward the courts to address rights violations: “…accepts the 
neoliberal preference for appeal to judicial and executive rather than parliamentary powers.” David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 176. 
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efforts to persuade publics of the detriments or benefits of GM seeds could not be 
continued without steady sources of funding. How then is this funding secured over 
the long term? One way to attract support is to frame the issue as one that has 
significant and long-standing implications, a “matter of life and death.” Whereas anti-
GM movements frame transgenic seeds as threatening the livelihoods of farmers and 
the fundamental building blocks of life through ‘biopollution,’101 biotech proponents 
see tragedy in the resistance to technologies that could fight hunger and save children 
from blindness. Supporters of advocacy efforts on both sides of this debate can feel 
that their financial support—whether in the form of donations to anti-GM 
organizations or investment in biotech companies producing drought-resistant seed—
is critical in order to ‘save’ vulnerable populations. The use of scientific research to 
substantiate certain claims or debunk ‘myths’ is exercised to bolster the legitimacy of 
certain prescriptions or prohibitions disseminated by these advocacy groups. Yet 
these prescriptions and prohibitions intended to improve the lives of target 
populations are closely tied to donor funding priorities and fiscal cycles, and can 
often be at odds with the needs of those whose lives they intend to improve. 
The benefit that proponents and opponents gain from the construction of 
emergency incentivizes the use of hype. This, in turn, produces important effects on 
the character and quality of discussions on global food security. The discursive 
strategy of hype has affected debates over the future of food production in two 
primary ways. First, the rendering of GM seed technology as a special technology 
with a unique set of risks has created a demand for a particular set of experts to 
                                                
101 Biopollution refers to gene flow of transgenic species of plants to native varieties of plants through 
cross-pollination. This is often framed as a form of contamination and a serious threat to biodiversity. 
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manage these risks, a theme I further develop in the following chapters. The 
consequent shift in authority to the domain of experts is likely counter to the 
objectives of food sovereignty and anti-GMO movements that aspire for greater 
democratic control over decisions related to food. In a similar vein, the use of 
biosafety law to halt the commercialization of GMOs further legitimates this 
biosafety regime, and can lead to outcomes at odds with the aims of food sovereignty.  
Second, under conditions of emergency, simplistic, total solutions that follow a 
prescribed formula may be preferred over incremental, experimental, and procedural 
responses. In this sense, bans of GM seeds achieved through court injunctions can be 
an outcome of this emergency framing, and this may be a desirable end for some anti-
GMO opponents. Yet for those opponents who view GM seed as a larger symbol for 
deeply rooted problems of inequality, power, and injustice, the emergency framing, 
through its consequent shifts in authority and its narrowing of focus, may hinder 
efforts to address these social problems. In this way, the emergency discourse and its 
corresponding relief plans may do violence to contingency and small steps, and 
render the actions of individual farmers and communities insufficient in the face of 
such urgency.102  
 
 
                                                
102 To critique the emergency framing that is deployed by GM proponents and opponents alike is not to 
understate the severity of the challenge of producing sufficient, healthy, and sustainable food now and 
in the future. Rather, I would argue that the problems that farmers face in this warming world are 
critical—drought-related water shortages or excessive flooding can certainly damage entire plots—but 
that the appropriate means to address these challenges cannot be found through viewing problems 
through this emergency lens. An alternative to hype would be to focus more attention on individual 





What is New About the ‘New Green Revolution’? 




The negative effects of climate change and anticipated population growth 
have prompted calls within development circles for African countries to embrace a 
“new Green Revolution” in order to promote food security. This new Green 
Revolution is advanced by an international assemblage of actors that includes 
governments, agribusiness, international aid agencies, foundations, and international 
and national agricultural research centers. The work advocated and executed by this 
assemblage is intended to address perceived flaws in African farming systems and 
promote high agricultural productivity. A part of these initiatives to modernize 
African agriculture, discussed in the previous chapter, includes the adoption of 
genetically modified (GM) seeds. Scholars such as Scoones and Thompson (2011) 
identify access to markets, credit, and technology as a central feature of this African 
Green Revolution. 1 The idea of the “new Green Revolution” is to bring to Africa the 
high crop yields that countries in Asia and Latin America experienced in the mid-20th 
century through the introduction of scientific seeds, agrochemicals, irrigation, and 
linkage to markets. The work of international organizations and agribusiness to 
establish and strengthen “farmers’ linkages to markets” as well as other links along 
                                                
1 Ian Scoones and John Thompson, “The Politics of Seed in Africa’s Green Revolution: Alternative 
Narratives and Competing Pathways,” IDS Bulletin 42, no.4 (2011): 1-23. 
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“value chains” reflects this key aspect.2 This new face of agricultural transformation 
is also expected to address some of the uneven social effects of the first Green 
Revolution through the provision of better access to credit, the empowerment of 
female farmers and producers, the use of integrated soil management strategies, and 
the scientific research to develop locally appropriate crops for Africa.3  
How new is this Green Revolution in Africa? On the one hand, the 
agricultural transformation that is being promoted in countries such as Ghana can be 
seen as a repackaging of modernization discourse that emerged in the 1950s. The 
prescriptions share a number of continuities with the agricultural changes initiated 
after the 1966 coup that ousted Nkrumah, as well as neoliberal structural adjustment 
policies initiated in the 1980s.4 These blueprints of agricultural change, presented 
often as a “new Green Revolution in Africa,” follow certain formulas that have been 
attempted before and others that appear more novel. Demonstration farms and the 
promotion of the ‘progressive farmer’ with an emphasis on the integration of small 
farmers into the market economy has been a feature of agricultural modernization 
                                                
2 I discuss these linkages of farmers to global markets in the following chapter. These terms came up 
repeatedly in conversations with my contacts. 
3 See, for example, the work of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, a leading organization in 
the promotion of new Green Revolution programs. “AGRA: Growing Africa’s Agriculture,” Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in Africa, accessed July 3, 2015, http://agra-alliance.org/. Criticisms of the first 
Green Revolution began to emerge in the 1970s, but have re-emerged with greater force in response to 
the new Green Revolution agenda. On first Green Revolution criticisms see Edmund K. Oasa, “The 
Political Economy of International Agricultural Research: A Review of the CGIAR’s Response to 
Criticisms of the ‘Green Revolution,’” in The Green Revolution Revisited: Critique and Alternatives, 
ed. Bernhard Glaeser (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), 13-55. 
4 Amanor (2013) writes that the 1966 coup that ousted President Kwame Nkrumah “brought pro- 
Commonwealth and pro-US interests to the fore in Ghana. The agricultural sector was re-organised to 
support the development of private capitalist estate agriculture and the creation of a new extension 
service in tune with the US model based on the Land Grant system.” Kojo Sebastian Amanor, 
“Chinese and Brazilian Cooperation with African Agriculture: The Case of Ghana,” Future 






programs since the 1960s.5 Though some of the language has changed, the promotion 
of entrepreneurship and market integration is an integral part of both Green 
Revolution programs. New (albeit different) agricultural technologies have been 
introduced, and actors like the CGIAR, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the national agricultural research institutions (NARIs) have been 
involved in their dissemination.6 In both Green Revolutions, agricultural 
transformation is conceived as a means to address poverty, development, and security 
concerns.  
On the other hand, the particular configuration of partnerships between the 
public and private sector, alongside a growing role of “philanthrocapitalist” funding 
and demand for juridical expertise, has led to a deepening engagement of the 
corporate private sector within African domestic policy development. In the new 
Green Revolution we see a shift towards an expanded role of the private sector in 
plant breeding as public spending on plant breeding has declined. Legal regimes of 
intellectual property, biosafety, and formal land registry support and shape this 
program of agricultural transformation. Even though many of these legislative 
changes can be traced back to free trade agreements and structural adjustment loan 
conditionality, today they have been reframed as ways to ‘Grow Africa’ and meet its 
potential.7  
                                                
5 Kojo Sebastian Amanor, “From Farmer Participation to Pro-poor Seed Markets: The Political 
Economy of Commercial Seed Networks in Ghana,” IDS Bulletin 42, no.4 (2011): 50. 
6 Though for most of these actors their manner of participation has changed. 
7 Grow Africa is a public-private partnership platform “that seeks to accelerate investments and 
transformative change in African agriculture based on national agricultural priorities and in support of 
the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), a Programme of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), established by the African Union in 2003.” It 
facilitates the work of the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition programs. See “About 
Grow Africa,” Grow Africa, accessed July 3, 2015, http://growafrica.com/about; G8 New Alliance for 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, proponents of the new Green Revolution 
with its attendant controversial technology—genetically modified seed—face the 
challenge of promoting agricultural change in the context of suspicion over the safety, 
motivations, and outcomes of their agenda. This chapter shows that this contestation 
extends to broader concerns over the enclosure of seed, land, and knowledge: the 
patenting of seed and the prevention of seed-saving; ‘land grabs’ of traditional 
communal lands; and the exclusion of traditional or local knowledge from food and 
agriculture policy, respectively. I argue that these processes of enclosure reveal three 
key distinctions between the first and the new Green Revolution in Africa: 1) a shift 
in the role of the state to a state that relinquishes its leadership in service provision 
and instead “enables” rather than leads; 2) a new composition of legal and techno-
scientific expertise that informs the new Green Revolution strategy; 3) and the 
proliferation of new forms of capital that integrate biotechnology with philanthropy to 
create new market value. These shifts are engendered by new laws that entail changed 
relationships to seed, whereby seed becomes patentable material, with specific 
regimes of access and use. These legal changes support the expansion of the private 
sector in Ghana by securing an ‘enabling environment’8 that purportedly makes 
investment in agriculture more profitable and beneficial. Philanthropy and the use of 
community seminars to discuss issues such as the establishment of formalized land 
                                                                                                                                      
Food Security and Nutrition. G8 Cooperation Framework to Support the “New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition” in Ghana. Accessed July 1, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/190626.pdf.  
8 The language of ‘enabling environment’ is used widely in policy documents, from Ghana’s CAADP 
compact to World Bank reports. It is connected to the concept of good governance and the promotion 
of clear and transparent legal regimes to encourage economic growth and investment. 
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titles and transgenic seeds alter conceptions of seed and land, and lay the foundation 
for their commodification.  
What actors, expertise, and models of development are advanced by the ‘new 
Green Revolution in Africa’? The chapter tackles this central research question 
through an examination of the roles of the public and private sector in agricultural 
research and development, the promotion of biotechnology and its related body of 
expertise, and the emergence of new forms of capital that characterize the African 
Green Revolution. The chapter is organized as follows. First, I describe the 
continuities between the first and the new Green Revolution in Africa. These 
continuities are further analyzed in the following chapter that examines efforts to 
transform farming from a way of life to a business. Second, I discuss the changing 
role of the state in agricultural research and development over time, noting both shifts 
in funding and in the roles of the public and private sectors, as well as the 
implications of these shifts. Third, I explore the role of public-private partnerships in 
the introduction of genetically modified crops by turning to the example of the Bt 
cowpea project in Ghana. This project reveals some of the novelty of this Green 
Revolution in Africa: the role of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology as a mechanism to 
minimize contestation over GMOs; the prevalence of new sets of expertise that have 
emerged alongside the introduction of genetically modified crops; and the ways in 
which the commodification of seed can be furthered through the concept of 
“donation.” Fourth, I examine how legislative changes in the seed sector promote 
novel forms of capital accumulation. In the final section, I consider the relationship 
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between two new forms of capital—biocapital and philanthrocapital—that have 
emerged as key sources of market value in the new Green Revolution in Africa.  
 
II. Continuities Between the First and the New Green Revolution in Africa 
The first Green Revolution is characterized by a technological breakthrough in 
the development of high-yielding hybrid varieties of cereal grains, increased 
mechanization and irrigation, the growth of international and national agricultural 
research institutes (NARIs),9 and the geopolitical context of the Cold War.10 
Supported by the Rockefeller Foundation and the U.S. government as a means to stop 
the spread of communism, Green Revolution programs initiated in Mexico in 1941 
and India in 1956 were designed to promote high-yielding agricultural practices.11  
Faced with the plant disease wheat rust that led to a significant decline in yields and 
widespread hunger, Mexico was targeted as the first site for the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s agricultural assistance.12 The Green Revolution programs introduced 
high yield dwarf varieties of wheat and rice, as well as pesticides, fertilizers and 
improved irrigation technologies. This capital-intensive agriculture is attributed with 
averting famine in India and helping Mexico become an export-oriented agricultural 
economy. High-yield varieties of rice and maize were developed in Asia and Latin 
                                                
9 Oasa, “The Political Economy of International Agricultural Research,” 40. 
10 Perkins argues that U.S. commitments to promote Green Revolution wheat breeding in Mexico and 
India were part of Cold War efforts to contain the former Soviet Union. John H. Perkins, Geopolitics 
and the Green Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
11 Natural Sciences Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, Warren Weaver, articulated this rationale 
in an address to the President of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1951: “In this struggle for the minds of 
men the side that best helps satisfy man’s primary needs for food, clothing, and shelter is likely to 
win.” Rockefeller Foundation, “The world food problem, agriculture, and the Rockefeller Foundation,” 
100 Years: The Rockefeller Foundation, accessed June 16, 2015, 
http://rockefeller100.org/items/show/3780. See also Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. 
12 Mexico was also chosen because the Roosevelt administration “wanted neither a socialist nor a 
fascist state on its southern border.” Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, 9. 
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America suited to their respective local agro-ecological context; by contrast, Asian 
varieties of rice were brought to African countries without similar adaptations and 
with disappointing results.  
The term ‘Green Revolution’ was coined by William Gaud, former director of 
USAID, to contrast it with a ‘red revolution’ of the spread of communism or a ‘white 
revolution’ of land redistribution in Iran.13 The Green Revolution would promote 
‘plant improvement’ and crop productivity, but it also suggests a benign, if not 
positive, effect on the environment.14 Research in crop improvement was supported 
by international agricultural research centers like the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI), the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), 
and the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), bilateral aid agencies, 
the Rockefeller, Ford, and Kellogg Foundations, agribusiness corporations, and 
national agricultural research institutions. This agricultural transformation can be 
considered a revolution in process as it enabled a new method of producing particular 
crop commodities.15 In order to realize the benefits of these high-yielding varieties, a 
new process of the use of supportive agricultural technologies—fertilizers, pesticides 
and irrigation—changed agricultural systems and the landscape upon which they were 
grown. The Green Revolution worked to standardize agricultural practices and 
generate agricultural surplus through the adoption of more limited number of cereal 
                                                
13 Raj Patel, Eric Holt-Gimenez, and Annie Shattuck. “Ending Africa’s Hunger,” The Nation, 
September 21, 2009. 
14 This dual meaning of “green” came into play when I gave a guest lecture on behalf of the U.S. 
Embassy in Accra. I was to give a lecture on the new Green Revolution at the University of Ghana. 
This was publicized by flyers with stick figures holding hands around the earth. A tree seedling 
sprouted from the top, reflecting a different understanding of a “green revolution.” 
15 Keith Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1974), 48. 
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varietals and a more formulaic application of inputs. This standardization in process 
rendered legible agricultural systems for global markets.16  
Who were the beneficiaries of the Green Revolution?  One of the overriding 
concerns of the Green Revolution was the overall increase in agricultural productivity 
measured in aggregate terms, and this was achieved in certain staple food grains. In 
India, whose agricultural programs during this period were frequently given as a 
Green Revolution success story, yields for rice increased from 902 kg/hectare in 
1953-54 to 2,240 kg/ha in 2010-11, whereas wheat increased from 750 kg/ha in 1953-
54 to 2,938 kg/ha in 2010-11.17 Such productivity was generated through the 
‘productive power’ of industrial inputs that substituted (and undervalued) the 
‘reproductive power’ of nature.18  The components of farming reliant on the 
reproductive power of nature—seed saving, rainfall, composting, intercropping, the 
use of manure and animal labor—were substituted by the purchase of scientific seed, 
the establishment of irrigation systems, and the application of fertilizers and 
herbicides.   
The introduction of Green Revolution technologies marks a shift from a labor-
intensive agriculture dependent upon reproductive power to a capital-intensive system 
dependent upon industrial inputs. In this sense, Green Revolution technologies were 
landowner-biased, offering differential results to peasant farmers that did not have 
access to capital. Griffin (1974) argues that “unequal access to land and capital 
                                                
16 For more on legibility see the introduction and James Scott, Seeing Like a State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998). 
17 Pratyusha Basu and Bruce A. Sholten, “Technological and Social Dimensions of the Green 
Revolution: Connecting Pasts and Futures,” International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 10, 
no.2 (2012): 111. 
18 Yapa, Lakshman. “Improved seeds and constructed scarcity,” in Liberation Ecologies, eds. Richard 
Peet and Michael Watts (London: Routledge, 1996), 82. 
 
 93 
frequently is accentuated by unequal access to water and technical knowledge.”19 In 
other words, landed wealth frequently goes hand-in-hand with political influence, and 
with that, privileged access to scarce means of production (i.e. tractors, subsidized 
fertilizer).20 These existing patterns of inequality were deepened by technological 
change and government policies that privileged improvements in wealthier farming 
regions like rich river valleys, rather than improving the conditions of peasant farmers 
reliant on rainfed agriculture.  Large farmers were given subsidies to mechanize 
production, whereas peasant farmers, especially women, struggled to gain access to 
small amounts of credit to improve their farming.21  
Part of the idea of a new Green Revolution in Africa is to bring to Africa the 
appropriate technologies that “missed” the continent during the earlier Green 
Revolution. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the idea of a “Green Revolution” was 
largely unknown across the continent; only in the late 1970s did African countries 
begin to integrate Green Revolution measures into their agricultural policies.22 For 
most African countries, the 1970s signaled a shift towards programs of national food 
self-sufficiency in order to address a growing population.23 African governments 
established state farms, large-scale irrigation programs, marketing boards, input 
subsidy programs, and minimum price guarantees. In African countries such as 
Ghana much of the focus of these agricultural programs was placed on large estate 
agriculture that targeted large ‘progressive farmers’ who received subsidized fertilizer 
                                                
19 Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change, 30. 
20 Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change, 18. 
21 Griffin, The Political Economy of Agrarian Change, 53.  
22 Hans Holmén, “The State and Agricultural Intensification in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The African 
Food Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Green Revolution, eds. G. Djurfeldt, H. Holmén, M. Jirstrøm, and 




and other inputs, low-interest loans, and tractors.24A number of countries were self-
sufficient in food crop production during this time and production of maize and rice 
increased, but often as a result of the expansion of cultivated areas rather than yield 
increases. State farms and large-scale irrigation that focused on export crops proved 
uneconomic and were not continued. The 1980s economic crisis and the deterioration 
in African terms of trade for export crops contributed to the state’s inability to 
continue such food production policies.25 As Djurfeldt, Holmén, Jirström, and 
Larsson (2005) point out, a look at agricultural policies in Africa in the 1960s and 70s 
shows that Green Revolution programs didn’t “miss” Africa, rather, they were just 
not sustained.26 
Development planners advocating for a new Green Revolution intend to bring 
a program of agricultural modernization to transform African agricultural systems. A 
leading force in the promotion of the new Green Revolution in Africa is the Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). Formed in 2006, the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa was “born of a strategic partnership between the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation to dramatically improve African 
agriculture, and to do so as rapidly as possible.”27 Its agenda, in the words of the first 
Board Chair, Kofi Annan, is the following: 
AGRA is working with its partners to bring about a uniquely African Green 
Revolution that will unleash the continent’s agricultural potential. Towards 
that end, we are evolving a strategy designed to deliver both near-term and 
longer-term results. This strategy…rests on the idea that AGRA's resources 
                                                
24 Amanor, “From Farmer Participation to Pro-poor Seed Markets,” 50. 
25 Holmen, “The State and Agricultural Intensification in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 89. 
26 Göran Djurfeldt, Hans Holmen, Magnus Jirstrøm, and Rolf Larsson, eds., The African Food Crisis: 
Lessons from the Asian Green Revolution (Cambridge: CAB International, 2005). 
27 The Bill and Melinda Gates and the Rockefeller foundations are the major funders of AGRA. “Who 




and its efforts with partners should initially focus on where they will have the 
highest payoff—in Africa's high-potential ‘breadbasket’ areas.28 
As with the introduction of hybrids during the first Green Revolution, modernization 
of agricultural technologies remains a key focal point. In particular, the introduction 
of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology is seen as a critical component of addressing food 
insecurity and the impact of climate change.29 The concept of ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology is appealing in three ways: first, as a technology that appears to be 
appropriate for resource-poor farmers and is thereby inclusive; second, as a 
technology to be developed and assessed by African national agricultural research 
institutions30; and third, as suggestive of a technological development motivated by 
humanitarian concerns rather than profit. In this way, the introduction of this new 
technology acknowledges concerns regarding the exclusionary effects of the first 
wave of green revolution technologies. Whether those crops identified as ‘pro-poor’ 
                                                
28 Speech by Kofi Annan at the inauguration of AGRA, available at “Who We Are: History of 
AGRA,” Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, accessed July 3, 2015,  http://www.agra.org/who-
we-are/our-history/. 
29 Beta carotene-enhanced cassava and water-efficient maize are two examples of ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology. BioCassava Plus aims to address micronutrient malnutrition in Nigeria and Kenya and 
“ensur[e] the cassava varieties meet the needs of farmers.” “BioCassava Plus,” Donald Danforth Plant 
Science Center, accessed July 5, 2015, https://www.danforthcenter.org/scientists-research/research-
institutes/institute-for-international-crop-improvement/crop-improvement-projects/biocassava-plus.  
The Water Efficient Maize for Africa “was created with a goal to enhance food security in Sub-
Saharan Africa through developing and deploying water-efficient maize royalty-free to the smallholder 
farmers. Insect-protection is complementary to the efforts of developing more drought-tolerant maize 
varieties and will also be available royalty-free. This increased yield stability has the potential to help 
reduce hunger and improve the livelihood of millions of Africans.” See “Water Efficient Maize for 
Africa (WEMA),” Monsanto Company, accessed July 5, 2015, 
http://www.monsanto.com/improvingagriculture/pages/water-efficient-maize-for-africa.aspx. For more 
examples of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology development, see Appendix 1: Philanthrocapitalism and 
Agbiotech Public-Private Partnerships in Africa. 
30 This is emphasized by organizations like the AATF that this biotechnology is developed by and for 
Africans in their indigenous research institutions. However, much of the product development occurs 
upstream in research institutions like CSIRO Australia or by companies like Monsanto. See Appendix 




will benefit this targeted demographic remains to be seen—most of these transgenic 
crops have not yet moved beyond the confined-field trial stage of development. 
Although frequently treated as a distinct ‘revolution’ in agricultural 
technologies, the introduction of genetically modified seed, sometimes referred to as 
the ‘Gene Revolution,’ could not have occurred without the prior collection of 
germplasm31 from biodiverse regions achieved through the work of CGIAR during 
the first Green Revolution. The Green Revolution’s Mexico program was not only 
about the introduction of dwarf hybrid wheat, it also enabled the collection of maize 
germplasm from Mexico, which advanced the development of hybrid maize in the 
United States.32 Kloppenburg identifies that although there is extensive scholarship 
on the introduction of ‘improved’ varieties to countries like Mexico and India, there is 
little attention on the transfer of genetic material from Mexico to the U.S. This 
exchange of maize germplasm as a free good represents a common pattern whereby 
plant genetic resources from the developing world are conceived of as part of the 
“common heritage” that can be collected widely and freely and do not need to be 
remunerated for. This genetic transfer through global germplasm collection, 
sometimes referred to as “plant hunting” programs,33 has value in the billions of 
dollars for its role in the development of agricultural commodities produced in 
advanced capitalist countries. The work of CGIAR-supported research in Africa also 
collects the local germplasm of centers of biodiversity for cowpea, millet, and 
                                                
31 The reproductive material of a plant, in the form of seed or plant tissue, collected for research, 
breeding, and conservation. 
32 Kloppenburg 152-90. 
33 The USDA had an extensive “plant hunting” program: between 1900 and 1930 the agency sponsored 




sorghum. Not unlike the first Green Revolution, international agricultural research 
centers utilize local germplasm for agricultural research and development of drought-
tolerant grains. Depending on how the products derived from this genetic material are 
handled, this could be accessed as a free good (as with the FAO “International 
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources”34), or as a commodity and intellectual 
property.  
Another commonality between these periods of agricultural transformation is 
the efforts to integrate farmers into the market economy through the introduction of 
hybrid or genetically modified seed. The adoption of improved seed draws farmers 
into the market economy in two ways. First, both hybrid and GM crops create 
dependencies and vulnerabilities, as both have mechanisms to prevent the saving of 
seeds and require intensive application of inputs to support them. The reduced 
fertility of hybrid seeds in subsequent replanting provides a strong incentivize for 
farmers to purchase hybrid seed each season. Genetically modified seed is patent 
protected, which makes seed saving a violation of contract and prohibited by law. 
Therefore, farmers that rely on either hybrid or GM seed will need to purchase their 
seed each season from agro-dealers (along with supporting inputs), rather than relying 
on seed saving.35 Second, these new technologies are designed to generate surplus 
that will be sold on the market, rather than meeting local food needs. Farmers’ market 
                                                
34 As Kloppenburg shows “delegates from Third World and industrialized socialist countries called for 
the application of the principles of common heritage and free exchange to all categories of 
germplasm.” Kloppenburg 172, original emphasis. See United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization. Resolution 8/83: International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. 1983. 
35 There are two mechanisms by which this happens. With hybrid seed—the defining technology of the 
first Green Revolution—farmers will experience marked reductions in yields if they replant hybrid 
seed due to a loss of hybrid vigor in the subsequent season. With patent-protected genetically modified 
crops, farmers will be in violation of intellectual property law if they save seed. 
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integration has also been supported by a focus on elite (or ‘progressive,’ ‘serious’36) 
farmers that could demonstrate the successful use of these new technologies that then 
could be emulated by others. In this way, the dissemination of these two technologies 
for agricultural transformation focus on the farmer as a key driver of agricultural 
change.  
In both Green Revolutions, development planners present agricultural 
transformation as an engine for economic growth that can alleviate poverty and 
promote security. In the first Green Revolution, US geopolitical interests were 
concerned with expanding the reach of new agricultural technologies into countries 
with large peasant farmer populations as a means to diminish the possibilities of 
peasant revolts connected to famine.37 Food insecurity was seen as holding the 
potential to increase the appeals of communism. Thus, agricultural technology 
diffusion was perceived as a means to stop the spread of communism and a matter of 
US national security. Likewise, in the African Green Revolution, the US State 
Department now promotes biotechnology.38 The acceptance of biotechnology in 
African countries is considered a matter of US national interest because of the 
benefits of increased market access for American businesses.39 Biotechnology is also 
seen as key to reducing food insecurity both through the potential to increase 
household incomes by greater crop productivity (through the reduction of pest or 
                                                
36 I discuss this in the following chapter. 
37 Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. 
38 Author interview with Country Coordinator for Program for Biosafety Systems, Accra, May 5, 2015. 
39 See Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research Committee on Science House of Representatives, 108th 
Cong., (June 12, 2003). 
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drought-related crop loss) and through micronutrient enrichment of biotech crops to 
help address malnutrition.   
 
III. Public-Private Partnerships and the Changing Role of the State 
In the first Green Revolution, the state played a more central role in plant 
breeding and crop improvement research through large amounts of funding for 
national agricultural research institutions (NARIs). Between the 1960s to the 1980s, 
the Ghanaian government implemented policies of self-sufficiency in food production 
through subsidizing inputs like fertilizers, providing support for marketing, a system 
of guaranteed prices for crops such as rice, and access to credit.40 The Ghanaian 
government also experimented with state farms and large-scale irrigation projects. In 
1972, the military dictatorship of Colonel I.K. Acheampong instituted an ambitious 
national self-reliance plan entitled Operation Feed Yourself. The emphasis on large 
enterprises, at the neglect of small farmers, failed to produce expected results. 
Furthermore, loans to farmers required land documentation, but the majority of land 
in Ghana is held under customary arrangements, making it “difficult to use as 
collateral for a mortgage.”41 Girdner et.al. argue that the critical factor in the failure 
of this policy has been the preferential position given to export crop production, 
which did not address domestic demands.  
                                                
40 These policies had varying degrees of success, particularly in the distribution and access to these 
government benefits—typically it was the large and well-connected farmers that were able to benefit 
from these programs. Anuradha Mittal, “The Blame Game: Understanding Structural Causes for the 
Food Crisis,” in The Global Crisis, eds. Jennifer Clapp and Marc J. Cohen (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2009), 24-5.  
41 Furthermore, the registration of land required a trip to Accra and the process of securing a loan was 
arduous. Girdner et.al. “Ghana’s Agricultural Food Policy: Operation Feed Yourself,” Food Policy 5, 
no.1 (1980): 20. 
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The role of the state in agricultural development changed from being a 
manager to an enabler during the 1980s African economic crisis when African 
countries sought the financial assistance of the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund.42 Support for African countries was given on the condition that 
programs such as input subsidies and guaranteed minimum pricing were reversed and 
state support for agriculture was cut significantly.43 Austerity measures in African 
countries contributed to a dramatic decrease in public-sector expenditures for plant 
breeding: expenditures dropped from 347 million in 1985 to 99 million in 2005.44 
Additionally, donor funding for agricultural research and development declined 
dramatically in the mid-1980s.45 The Ghanaian government’s agricultural spending in 
2007 was .39% of total government expenditures, down from 12.23% in 1980.46 
During this time, agricultural research institutions were restructured to shift 
agricultural research to the private sector and the national agricultural research system 
was further integrated into the international agricultural research system, particularly 
the network of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
                                                
42 Holmén, “The State and Agricultural Intensification in SSA,” 93. 
43 This change in World Bank policy, which had previously financed state-led agricultural 
modernization programs, to ‘structural adjustment’ was heralded by the influential 1981 report 
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981).  
44 These figures from the FAO (2011) are both adjusted to 1993 international dollars. Chambers et.al. 
2014. Chambers et.al., GM Agricultural Technologies for Africa (Washington, D.C.: International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 2014), 28. Kojo Amanor discusses how structural adjustment policies 
in the 1980s undermined successes of public plant breeding in the 1970s. Amanor, “From Farmer 
Participation to Pro-poor Seed Markets.”  
45 David J. Spielman, Fatima Zaidi, and Kathleen Flaherty, “Changing Donor Priorities and Strategies 
for Agricultural R&D in Developing Countries: Evidence from Africa,” Working Paper 8 presented at 
the ASTI-IFPRI/FARA Conference, Accra, Ghana, December 5-7, 2011. 
46 Chambers et.al., GM Agricultural Technologies for Africa, 27. 
 
 101 
(CGIAR).47 This economic crisis led to a mass exodus of qualified staff from African 
countries, undermining the capacity of the NARIs to conduct research and impacting 
their research agendas. 48  
Drops in spending by both governments and donors on agricultural research 
and development continued to occur during the 1990s. A decade later there was 
widespread recognition49 that such spending cuts were detrimental to African 
development because of the central role of agriculture in African economies. In 2003, 
the African Union issued the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security 
that called on all African states to increase spending on agricultural research and 
development to a minimum of 10% of their national budget because of concerns that 
existing expenditure levels were stifling the development of African agribusiness.50 
Ghanaian public sector expenditures have come close to meeting this goal in a single 
year (2013) with 9-10% of the total national budget spent on agriculture, but this goal 
has not been consistently met.51 
One manifestation of this underinvestment in agriculture in Ghana is 
agricultural extension: the current ratio of agricultural extension officers to farmers is 
                                                
47 Korbla P. Puplampu and George O. Essegbey, “Agricultural Biotechnology and Research in Ghana: 
Institutional Capacities and Policy Options,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 3, 
no.3 (2004): 275. 
48 Puplampu and Essegbey. “Agricultural Biotechnology and Research in Ghana,” 275, 277. 
49 One example of this is in the UN Millennium Development Goals that generated some of the 
political will to reverse policies that cut social spending. 
50 Shenggen Fan, Babatunde Omilola and Melissa Lambert, “Public Spending for Agriculture in 
Africa: Trends and Composition,” Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System 
Working Paper No. 28. Washington, D.C.: Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support 
System, 2009. 
51 For comparison, Kenya and Uganda have only allocated less than 5% of their national budgets to 
agriculture in the last few years. Nigeria’s spending on agriculture is 3.5% between 2007-11, four 
times less than its military budget. Mark Curtis and David Adama. Walking the walk: Why and how 




1:1,000, and in some cases the disparity is as great as 1:1,500.52 Deficits of 
government investment in agricultural development of this kind create a demand for 
the private sector, aid agencies, and international agricultural research centers to fill 
in these gaps. The global food price crisis of 2007-8, combined with increased 
commitments to agricultural spending by national governments and foreign aid 
agencies, attracted greater private sector investment in agriculture.53 The World Bank, 
the Group of 8, bilateral aid agencies, as well as the Alliance for a Green Revolution 
in Africa (AGRA) have also identified the transformation of African agricultural 
systems as a key development objective. Public-private partnerships in Africa have 
proliferated as a response to these conditions.54 Governments are able to gain from 
advances in research and development and additional financial support that the 
private sector brings to the table. Companies benefit from an investment climate 
where risk is distributed and local knowledge of the uses of plants is accessible.  
With the state reliant on private sector support of agriculture, the private 
sector has had the opportunity to exert a greater influence on agricultural priorities in 
countries such as Ghana. The lack of state capacity to substantially fund agricultural 
research “accounts for the donor-driven nature” of research in the region.”55 One such 
agricultural issue that has become a priority as a result of PPPs is the introduction of 
genetically modified crops in African countries. In Lois Muraguri’s (2010) study of 
agricultural biotechnology (hereafter “agbiotech”) PPPs in Kenya she finds that the 
                                                
52 Presentation by Northern Region Regional Director of Ministry of Food and Agriculture Plant 
Protection Unit at the Mango Value Chain Workshop, Tamale, Ghana, July 18, 2012. These ratios 
were repeated in conversations with other informants. 
53 Spielman, Zaidi, and Flaherty, “Changing Donor Priorities.” 
54 See Amanor, “From Farmer Participation to Pro-poor Seed Markets”; Scoones and Thompson, “The 
Politics of Seed in Africa’s Green Revolution.”  
55 Puplampu and Essegbey. “Agricultural Biotechnology and Research in Ghana,” 279-80. 
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partnerships are mostly donor-led, time-bound, and often disconnected from the “end 
users”—that is, the farmers that will utilize these genetically modified crops.56 
However, the resources and experience provided through these partnerships can be 
important for building national research capacity, as it did with the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). Muraguri’s study of agbiotech PPPs is 
significant both because of Nairobi’s position as the epicenter of the new Green 
Revolution in Africa57 and because of the leading role that KARI has provided in 
initiating some of the first transgenic field trials in Africa. The Kenya Agricultural 
Research Institute partnership with Monsanto formed in the early 1990s to develop a 
virus-resistant sweet potato was one of the first of its kind.58 
Muraguri argues that biotechnology research in Kenya operated for decades in 
a “legal and political vacuum.” 59 By contrast, I find that the recently formed Cowpea 
Productivity Improvement PPP in Ghana is shaped by a politics of contestation over 
GMOs and deeply entangled in legislative change, of which some partners are 
actively involved in influencing. Additionally, Kenya’s national research agenda is no 
longer operating in a political vacuum since a government ban on GMOs instituted in 
2012 has put a halt to biotech research in the country.60 In my analysis of the 
                                                
56 Muraguri is referencing one of the first agbiotech partnerships between KARI and Monsanto in 
developing a virus-resistant sweet potato. As a result of a disconnect between the farmers and the 
product developers, the sweet potato was engineered to be resistant to a virus that was uncommon in 
the area, and did not have the intended effect of reducing crop loss. Lois Muraguri, “Unplugged! An 
Analysis of Agricultural Biotechnology PPPs in Kenya,” Journal of International Development 22, 
no.3 (2010): 298. 
57 Both AGRA and the AATF are headquartered in Nairobi. 
58 See Jennifer A. Thomson, Genes for Africa: Genetically Modified Crops in the Developing World 
(Landsdowne, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, 2002).  
59 Muraguri, “Analysis of Ag Biotech PPPs in Kenya,” 304. 
60 AgroNews, “Kenya Banned Importation of All GMO Foods,” AgroNews, November 22, 2012, 
accessed July 3, 2015. http://news.agropages.com/News/NewsDetail---8425.htm; Jeff Otieno, 
“Researchers in a Fix Over GMO Ban,” The East African, August 16, 2014, accessed July 5, 2015, 
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development of maruca-resistant Bt cowpea in Ghana, I show the important role of 
both legislative change and donation in simultaneously attracting private investment 
and mitigating concerns regarding GMOs in Africa. It is to the Cowpea Productivity 
Improvement public-private partnership in Ghana that I turn to next.  
 
IV. PPPs and the Promotion of Biotechnology: Bt Cowpea in Ghana  
Scientific advancements in biotechnology in the 1970s and 1980s enabled 
more sophisticated and specific modifications of living organisms. Yet this was not 
the only significant breakthrough of this period: this new techno-scientific complex 
heralded both a greater corporate consolidation of the seed industry and a more rapid 
growth of genetic engineering firms.61 This pattern of consolidation in the life 
sciences industry has since continued: the agribusiness corporation DuPont Pioneer 
(itself the product of a merger in 1999)62 purchased the South African seed company 
Pannar in 2013;63 Syngenta has rejected Monsanto’s second offer to merge, which 
effectively would consolidate the two biggest agribusiness corporations.64 The 
relative size of these multinational corporations in comparison to local seed industries 
has raised concern regarding the influence that global agribusiness may have on 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Researchers-in-a-fix-over-GMO-ban/-/2558/2421314/-/item/0/-
/qprcmnz/-/index.html.  
61 See Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,” 
International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 282; and Jack Ralph Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: the 
Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2004). 
62 George Gunset, “Dupont to Buy Pioneer Hi-Bred as Agribusiness Mergers Heat Up,” Chicago 
Tribune, March 16, 1999.  
63 “Media Statement: DuPont Pioneer Completes Acquisition of Pannar Seed,” DuPont Pioneer, 
October 29, 2013, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.pioneer.com/home/site/about/news-media/news-
releases/template.CONTENT/guid.2A29ED4E-7EE4-A71B-46BB-49973731A7A1. 
64 Syngenta reported sales of $15.1 billion in 2014. Although they have rejected the merger as of July 
6, 2015, Syngenta has recently outlined what would be needed in a takeover deal in order for it to be 
taken seriously. Chad Bray, “Syngenta Chairman Sets Criteria for Further Monsanto Talks.” The New 
York Times, June 23, 2015. 
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African agricultural systems.65 An illustration of this is the African Centre for 
Biodiversity’s (2009) report, Africa Bullied to Grow Defective Bt Maize: The Failure 
of Monsanto’s MON810 Maize in South Africa, that claims that South Africa was 
“bullied to grow [Monsanto’s] defective Bt maize,” which resulted in Monsanto’s 
domination of the seed market, with troubling results.66 In this context of 
contestation, the development of agbiotech for African markets has necessitated 
partnerships with the public sector and local research institutions. As the Country 
Coordinator for the Program for Biosafety Systems in Ghana told me in May 2015, 
“If Monsanto was the one pushing it, I’m sure that farmers would be a bit hesitant. 
Because it’s being pushed by their indigenous research institutions, through a 
government negotiation, that’s easier to accept.”67  
The global resistance to GMOs makes the introduction of GM crops 
politically challenging. This resistance to GMOs is found across the African 
continent, particularly in South Africa, where Bt maize is cultivated at a commercial 
scale with seed and agro-chemicals provided by agribusiness corporations Monsanto 
and Syngenta. Proponents of GM crops have sought an image makeover to ease the 
diffusion. Efforts to push commercialization of GM crops in African markets have 
not focused on genetically modified Bt maize and glyphosate-resistant soyabean, two 
                                                
65 To give some idea of the relative economic weight, consider that the entire GDP of Ghana in 2013 
was $48.14 billion, whereas the net sales for the Monsanto Company were $14.86 billion in 2013. 
“Data: Ghana,” The World Bank, accessed July 6, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ghana. 
“Monsanto Company 2013 Annual Report,” Monsanto Company, accessed July 6, 2015, 
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/documents/annual%20report/2013/monsanto-2013-annual-
report.pdf . 
66 African Centre for Biosafety, Africa Bullied to Grow Defective Bt Maize: The Failure of Monsanto’s 
MON810 Maize in South Africa (Melville, South Africa: The African Centre for Biosafety, 2009), 12-
13. The activist organization is now called the African Centre for Biodiversity. 
 
 
67 Author interview with Country Coordinator for PBS, Accra, May 5, 2015. 
 
 106 
of the most popular genetically modified crops in the world. Rather, the greatest 
research and commercialization efforts have been placed on the development of ‘pro-
poor’ biotechnology—that is, the development of transgenic crops to suit the needs of 
the small farmer and the diets of the local people—like Bt cowpea or in Bt cotton.68 
Biotechnology outreach supported by the Program for Biosafety Systems and the 
development of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology work to change perceptions about this new 
technology.  
The public-private partnership that has worked to develop and introduce a 
transgenic Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) cowpea to West Africa exemplifies some of the 
distinguishing characteristics of this new Green Revolution in Africa. The 
development of maruca-resistant cowpea as part of the Cowpea Productivity 
Improvement project attempts to appeal to the crop selection and challenges of small 
farmers.69 Cowpea is a major part of peoples’ diets in Ghana and Nigeria and serves 
as an inexpensive source of protein; its leaves and stems an important source of 
animal feed.70 Just as the first Green Revolution focused on the staple crops of maize 
in Mexico and rice in India, this new Green Revolution includes the introduction of a 
                                                
68 Bt cotton has rapidly diffused to many poor countries including Ghana’s northern neighbor, Burkina 
Faso, and has had what many would consider agricultural success. Multiple conversations with 
informants have validated my intuition that Bt cotton adoption has met less obstacles to cultivation 
because of its nature as a fiber, rather than a food, crop. 
69 Author interview with agricultural research scientist Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at SARI, Nyankpala, 
February 13, 2013. 
70 The cowpea, referred to as local beans in Ghana or Nigeria, is the main ingredient to Northern 
Ghanaian dishes waakye, kosi and tubaani. Waakye, a delicious, simple dish of beans and rice cooked 
with tomatoes and pepe, is one of the most common roadside dishes found in any tro-tro or shared taxi 
station across Ghana. It is inexpensive and immediately satisfying. Tubaani is more of a special treat, 
something you may eat on Sundays or during sala, at the end of Ramadan. It is essentially cowpeas 
cooked and processed with shea nut oil to create a condensed shape, spongy and dense, which is 
soaked in an incredibly spicy pepe sauce. Cowpea displays this kind of versatility and significance in 
the Northern Ghanaian diet—a legume that can be prepared and eaten as either an ordinary dish or as a 
special treat.  
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modified version of the staple West African legume, developed in part through the 
collection of local germplasm. 
Before genetically modified cowpea could be tested, there needed to be 
legislative change. Following years of deliberation and the outreach of the Program 
for Biosafety Systems, Parliament unanimously approved the Biosafety Act 831 in 
December 2011. This legislation enabled the approval of research on Bt cowpea. In 
Ghana, Bt cowpea trials were approved October 2012 and planting commenced in 
September 2013. Bt cowpea is one of four GM crops on the horizon in Ghana: if 
experimental trials and political conditions are favorable, Bt cotton will likely be 
commercialized first, followed by Bt cowpea, micronutrient-enhanced sweet potato, 
and nitrogen-use efficient, water-use efficient, and drought-tolerant rice.71  
The Rockefeller Foundation and USAID are the most active donors for 
biotechnology capacity building and research support.72 USAID supports plant 
biotechnology at all stages: from lab research and field trials to the delivery of 
technology and building effective regulatory systems.73 USAID supports outreach 
activities by the Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) in order to “ensure that 
stakeholders have the necessary resources to make informed decisions about 
                                                
71 This timeline is based on expectations that less time in continuous field trials will need to be done 
for Bt cotton and Bt cowpea due to commercial activity (Bt cotton in Burkina Faso) and research (four 
years of confined field trials in Nigeria prior to confined-field trial approval in Ghana) in similar 
agroecological environments. The rice is known as NEWEST rice and confined field trials are being 
held at CSIR Kumasi. See Appendix 1 for more information. The micronutrient-enhanced sweet potato 
has faced funding issues and research has been delayed. Author interviews with agricultural research 
scientist Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013 and May 7, 2015. 
72 Walter Alhassan, The Status of Agricultural Biotechnology in Selected West and Central African 
Countries (Ibadan, Nigeria: International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, 2001). 
73 USAID, Agricultural Biotechnology for Development (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for 
International Development, no date). 
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biotechnology.”74 PBS works alongside the U.S. State Department and the Forum for 
Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), as well as the Open Forum on Agricultural 
Biotechnology (OFAB).  
These efforts to support biotechnology capacity building culminated in the 
formation of the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF) in 2003.75 
Supported by USAID and the Rockefeller Foundation, the AATF is identified as a 
“new and unique public-private partnership” that is designed to assist in the access of 
agricultural technologies for smallholder African farmers.76 USAID adds that it is 
also intended to facilitate the transfer of technology to national agricultural research 
institutions: 
The public sector in developing countries often lacks the institutional capacity 
to acquire the intellectual property (IP) rights needed to conduct research and 
develop new crops, as well as to promote transfer of technology to the local 
private sector for commercialization. Through organizations such as the 
AATF and U.S. universities, USAID partners assist developing country 
researchers to access proprietary technology.77 
AATF currently collaborates with agricultural companies Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow, 
and DuPont and receives additional funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, the Howard G. Buffet Foundation, the Syngenta Foundation for 
Sustainable Agriculture, and PepsiCo. The AATF has a mandate to facilitate and 
promote public-private partnerships by finding “solutions to the complex intellectual 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 The AATF is an initiative led by the Rockefeller Foundation, founded with support from USAID as 
well as the UK Department for International Development. 
76 USAID contributes $500,000/yr to AATF of core support. The AATF “is a new and unique public-
private partnership designed to assist small-holder farmers in Africa to gain access to existing 
agricultural technologies, including biotechnology, with the goal of relieving food insecurity and 
alleviating poverty.” Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa: Challenges and 
Opportunities, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Research Committee on Science House of 
Representatives, 108th Cong., p.31 (June 12, 2003) (statement by Andrew Natsios of USAID). 
77 USAID, Agricultural Biotechnology for Development.  
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property arrangements that often hamper plant biotech research and development in 
Africa.” 78 The AATF assists countries in access to genetic material to develop new 
agricultural technologies by negotiating with companies like Monsanto to donate 
genetic material for public sector research.  
AATF negotiates royalty-free transfers of technology for use during the crop 
development stage. One of its most prominent projects is the leadership of the Water-
Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA) project, a public-private partnership of the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Howard G. Buffet Foundation, USAID, the 
National Agricultural Research Institutes (NARIs) in Kenya, Mozambique, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center (CIMMYT), and Monsanto. The AATF has also been active in supporting the 
development of both the maruca-resistant cowpea and nitrogen-use efficient, water-
use efficient, and salt tolerant (NEWEST) rice in Ghana (see Appendix: 
Philanthrocapitalism and Agbiotech Public-Private Partnerships in Africa).79 The Bt 
gene used to develop this transgenic cowpea is a result of the AATF’s negotiations 
with Monsanto.80  
The Bt cowpea public-private partnership is the product of collaboration 
among international and national agricultural research institutes, governments, 
foundations, and agribusiness corporations. The international agricultural research 
institute that has taken the lead on cowpea is the International Institute for Tropical 
                                                
78 “Our Donors,” AATF, accessed July 3, 2015, http://aatf-africa.org/about-us/governance/our-donors; 
Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa, Hearing, 7. 
79 For details on the public-private partnerships that AATF is involved in to develop ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology in Africa see Appendix 1: Philanthrocapitalism and Agbiotech Public-Private 
Partnerships in Africa. 
80 Author interview with lead agricultural research scientist on cowpea, Dr. I.D.K. Atokple, at SARI, 
Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
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Agriculture (IITA) in Ibadan, Nigeria whose mandate is improving food production in 
the humid tropics. The development of improved seeds of staple crops to meet the 
needs of small farmers in the tropics is one expression of this. The IITA has been 
researching cowpea resistance to maruca for over 30 years, and failed to find a 
variety resistant to this pod-borer that could damage cowpea crops by 30-80%.81 The 
difficulty in identifying a resistant variety through conventional means motivated the 
institution’s pursuit to explore genetic modification of the cowpea.82 The research and 
genetic material of cowpea lines from Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Ghana is supplied 
by the national agricultural research institutes of these three countries, the Institute for 
Agricultural Research (IAR), the Institut de l’Environnement et de Recherches 
Agricoles (INERA), and the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI), 
respectively. The variety that successfully accepted the introduction of the Bt gene 
was the cowpea line provided by Nigeria’s IAR. Following negotiations with the 
AATF to initiate a royalty-free transfer to the project, Monsanto provided the 
Cry1AB (Bt) gene that expresses the desired insect resistance trait. The 
“transformation event” took place at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO) in Australia, where the Bt cowpea product is being 
developed.83  
In Ghana, national agricultural research institutions like the Savannah 
Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) conduct agricultural research as part of the 
                                                
81 Ibid. 
82 This led to the creation of the Network for Genetic Improvement of Cowpea for Africa that includes 
Purdue University, the University of Zimbabwe, International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
University of California-Riverside, Michigan State University, the University of Virginia-
Charlottsville, Kirkhouse Trust, and Monsanto Company. See Chambers et.al., GM Agricultural 
Technologies for Africa (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2014), 31. 
83 Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple, at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
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Council on Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the main government research 
organization in Ghana. SARI is a participatory research institution that focuses on the 
savannah agroecological context.84 The Ministry of Food and Agriculture is the 
agency responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy. BNARI, the 
Biotechnology and Nuclear Agriculture Research Institute, does work on crop 
irradiation and tissue culture but does not have advanced research capacity to conduct 
genetic modification. The confined field trial research for Bt cowpea in Ghana is 
taking place at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute in Nyankpala, a village 
outside of Tamale. It is the site of field trials and farmer demonstration fields to 
educate local people about Bt cotton and Bt cowpea. Whereas the Bt cotton fields are 
multi-locational open trials, the field where Bt cowpea is cultivated is enclosed and 
isolated with 24-hour security.85  
What the Bt cowpea project highlights is three dimensions of novelty of this 
new Green Revolution in comparison to the earlier phases of rapid agricultural 
change. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, the contestation over genetic 
modification has motivated a set of strategies to change the perception of this new 
technology. The emergence of a discourse and practices around ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology has helped to change the reputation of genetically modified crops by 
highlighting its potential role in food security in African countries. Second, this new 
technology operates within shifting legal and technocratic regimes that deem this 
                                                
84 As one of the agricultural research scientists at SARI explained, “We represent people, we do what 
farmers want, researchers don’t just sit down and say, “ok, this is what I want to do” and dump it on 
the people. We get feedback from the farmers, what is it that they want to address and from the farmers 
it comes to us, and then we sit down together and see how research can address them. There are some 
programs and we may not be able to do them, but what we can do, we do.” Author interview with 
agricultural research scientist at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
85 When I asked why, I was told that it was to scare away the animals that may come. Author interview 
with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple at SARI, Nyankpala, May 7, 2015. 
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technology both as property and as risk. The first Green Revolution lacks similar 
legislative and risk perception dimensions. Third, the work of the African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation in persuading Monsanto to “donate” the Bt gene 
used to develop the maruca-resistant cowpea can be understood as an example of 
philanthrocapitalism. Donation offers reputational benefits to Monsanto, and this may 
help expand Monsanto’s market reach in the future. The donation of proprietary 
material in the case of Bt cowpea normalizes the perception of the seed as patentable 
material, advancing Western notions of property as enclosure. I will now discuss the 
latter two points. 
 
V. Legislative Change in the African Seed Sector 
We must revive and rebuild Africa’s battered capacity for applied research and make 
research institutions a cornerstone of our efforts. This process should encourage a 
spirit of entrepreneurship and the incubation of private companies that commercialize 
innovations that come out of Africa applied research centers at various 
universities…We must help Africans create legal certainty, predictability, 
transparency to help spur investment from the public sector and to nurture an 
entrepreneurial spirit. And we must act very quickly because technology is moving so 
fast, and if Africa is already behind and nothing is done, it is unbelievable what is 
going to happen in 10 or 15 years. We have seen Asia move, we have seen South 
America move. Africa is moving backwards.86 –Dr. Kilama, President of the Global 
Bioscience Development Institute  
 
This statement by Dr. Kilama, President of the Global Bioscience 
Development Institute,87 at a 2003 U.S. Congressional Hearing on “Plant 
Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa” summarizes the rationale 
                                                
86 Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, Hearing 
Before the Subcommittee on Research Committee on Science House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 
p. 48-9 (June 12, 2003) (statement by Dr. Kilama, President of the Global Bioscience Development 
Institute). 
87 “GBDI is a not for profit institute, working to help industries gain excess (sic) to emerging markets 
by directly linking industries with key policymakers, regulatory authorities and health, agricultural and 




behind the push for legislative change and applied research to support biotechnology: 
to nurture an entrepreneurial spirit that “commercializes innovation” as a way to 
move Africa forward. During this hearing, actors including Gordon Conway of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Andrew Natsios of USAID, and Robert B. Horsch, Vice 
President, Product and Technology Cooperation for Monsanto testified to the need 
and business potential of agricultural biotechnology development in Africa. This is 
when the AATF, formed earlier that year, was introduced to Congress and eagerly 
received. Two weeks prior to this hearing, the Forum on Agricultural Research in 
Africa, a lead organization in the agenda of the New Program for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) held a meeting in Dakar where the participants declared their 
commitment to building capacity “…to be able to engage with global public and 
private sector partners to capture the advances needed to sustainably intensify African 
agriculture.”88 With this turn of attention to the potential of agricultural biotechnology 
in Africa came a push for legislative change.  
The World Bank and International Finance Corporation’s “ease of doing 
business” rankings celebrate and encourage laws that make business regulation more 
predictable and transparent.89 The desire of countries to be highly ranked within this 
influential indicator motivates legislative changes in line with Western models of 
property rights, dispute resolution, and land registration. In a similar vein, the G890 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition have identified key policy 
                                                
88 Plant Biotechnology Research and Development in Africa, Hearing, p.31 (statement by Andrew 
Natsios of USAID). 
89 World Bank, Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size 
Enterprises, 11th ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group, 2013). 
90 Now G7 after Russia was suspended from the Group of Eight in 2014. Members are France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US, and Canada.  
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commitments of the Ghanaian government that to improve agricultural productivity 
and thereby food security in the country. Such measures include “regulations 
developed to implement the new seed law,” a “new agricultural input policy for 
fertilizer and certified seed use developed,” a “database of suitable land for investors 
established,” “clear procedures to channel investor interest to appropriate agencies,” 
and “private sector representatives of key grain value chains appointed to the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) Post Harvest Committee.”91  
While the G8’s New Alliance strategy lays out commitments for the Ghanaian 
government to follow in exchange for funding, other actors such as the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa work alongside the New Alliance to reform the Ghanaian 
seed sector. One of the programs to achieve this goal is AGRA’s Program for 
Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS).92 This program includes policy and advocacy in 
legislation over seed and provides “toolboxes” for African seed company 
entrepreneurs.93 The seed laws promoted by PASS are a form of investors’ 
protections for plant breeders. AGRA’s Policy and Advocacy Program for the seed 
sector worked with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture as well as ACDI/VOCA to 
influence seed and fertilizer legislation in Ghana such as the Plant and Fertilizer Act, 
                                                
91 G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, G8 Cooperation Framework to Support the “New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” in Ghana, accessed July 1, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/190626.pdf. 
92 “AGRA’s progress report 2007-2014 mentions the following: “AGRA’s policy node in Ghana has 
helped the government to revamp its seed policy law and regulations, and is now involved with others 
in a review of the country’s land policies. AGRA’s Seed Policy Action Node in Ghana has helped the 
government to revamp its seed and plant variety protection laws and regulations, which in turn has 
helped to increase the production of foundation and certified seed several fold.” Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa, Progress Report 2007-2014 (Nairobi, Kenya: Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA), 2015), 15. 
93 For a discussion of AGRA’s work in this domain see “The African Seed Company Toolbox,” 




2010 (Act 803).94 The World Bank describes Ghana’s Plant and Fertilizer Act, 2010 
(Act 803) as opening “the door for an increased role for the private sector in 
producing seeds for a number of grains.”95 AGRA has provided the most financial 
support for the Ghanaian seed sector, funding plant breeding in Ghana’s National 
Research Institutes, providing post-graduate training for plant breeders, distributing 
grants for small private seed companies, and supporting the development of agro-
dealers. USAID’s Feed the Future initiative has also outlined means to support seed 
production and regulatory reform.96 The Program for Biosafety Systems has offered 
regulatory reform guidance for the Plant Breeders’ Bill, as it had in the lead up to the 
passage of Ghana Biosafety Act, 2011 (831) that allowed GMOs into the country.97 
The hotly debated Plant Breeders’ Bill is an extension of the Plant and Fertilizer Act, 
2010 that AGRA’s policy and advocacy work promoted.  
The Plant Breeders Bill that is currently being debated in Ghana is in line with 
the policy commitments found in the G8 cooperation framework to support The “New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition” in Ghana report. As stated in the report, 
The Government of Ghana intends to improve incentives for private sector 
investment in agriculture, in particular, taking actions to facilitate inclusive 
access to and productive use of land; developing and implementing domestic 
seed regulations that encourage increased private sector involvement in this 
                                                
94 ACDI/VOCA refers to the Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in 
Overseas Cooperative Assistance. “Update on AGRA Programs and Grants in Ghana,” Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, Republic of Ghana, accessed July 6, 2015, 
http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?page_id=7588; Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, AGRA in 2012: 
Moving from Strength to Strength (Nairobi, Kenya: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), 2013).  
95 World Bank, “Agribusiness Indicators: Ghana,” Report Number 68163-GH (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, 2012). Whether this includes the local private seed sector is a source of contention and 
one reason why the Plant Breeders’ Bill has been contested in the streets of Accra. 
96 Robert Tripp and Akwasi Mensah-Bonsu, “Ghana’s Commercial Seed Sector: New Incentives or 
Continuing Complacency?” IFPRI Working Paper 32 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 2013). 
97 Phone interview with a senior advisor to the Program for Biosafety Systems, May 15, 2015. 
 
 116 
area; and supporting transparent inclusive, evidence-based policy 
formulation.98 
If this seed law passes, it would strengthen the rights of foreign and certain domestic 
plant breeders. As stipulated in Clause 23 of the Plant Breeders Bill, subsequent 
Ghanaian legislation could not override these rights: “A plant breeder right shall be 
independent of any measure taken by the Republic to regulate within Ghana the 
production, certification and marketing of material of a variety or the importation or 
exportation of the material.”99 The Coalition for Farmers’ Rights and Advocacy 
Against GMOs (COFAM), which includes Food Sovereignty Ghana, organized 
protests against the bill. Some of their concerns over this legislation regard its ability 
to override Ghanaian legislation and the requirement that seeds be stable and uniform 
in order for these protections to be applied. As these activists identified, this may be a 
bar set too high for local plant breeders, but protects foreign plant breeders capable of 
meeting these standards.100  
The overall thrust of these efforts to transform the Ghanaian seed sector is a 
part of continent-wide move to harmonize seed laws in order to encourage investment 
in the seed sector. The USAID-funded Program for Biosafety Systems has also 
identified and tracked the evolution of Plant Breeders’ Rights in Eastern and Southern 
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99 Plant Breeders Bill, Ghana, Clause 23. “Plant Breeders Bill,” accessed July 6, 2015, 
http://media.peacefmonline.com/docs/201312/919280493_445860.pdf. 
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Africa.101 Whereas countries like Ghana have adopted legislation (such as Biosafety 
Act 831) that is more risk acceptant, the African Model Law on Biosafety adopts the 
precautionary principle.102 Activists groups like the South African-based African 
Centre for Biodiversity (ACB) highlight that such harmonization of seed law could 
make it difficult for countries opposed to GMOs to prevent them from entering their 
country. For example, a uniform Southern African seed law, via the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), could assist the spread of GMOs, which southern 
African countries have been able to resist thus far in spite of South Africa’s 
commercialization of GM crops.103 In West Africa, Ghana is the only country to 
attempt to pass a bill like the Plant Breeders’ Bill, however, it is expected that if it 
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V. New Forms of Capital: Biocapital and Philanthrocapital 
Biocapital 
The natural characteristics of the seed serve as a biological barrier to its 
commodification, as seeds are both the means of production and the product.105 
Hybrid seeds, developed during the first Green Revolution, experience reduced 
fertility following replanting. Yet, it was during the 1970s and 1980s that the seed 
industry was took further steps to overcome these barriers to commodification. The 
consolidated seed industry took two paths towards this transformation—through the 
development of genetic use restriction technology (GURT) and through patents. First, 
it became technologically possible to make genetically engineered GURT seeds 
sterile, thereby limiting the use-value to that of a grain rather than to a seed with 
reproductive capacity. GURT was initially developed by a subsidiary of Monsanto, a 
major producer of genetically modified (GM) seeds, together with the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) in order to prevent farmers from saving seeds for 
subsequent harvests.106  Following activist pressure, Monsanto pledged in 1999 not to 
commercially release this technology.107  
The second path involved the transformation of the seed into a commodity, 
enabled by the lobbying of large agricultural interests, pharmaceutical, and genetic 
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engineering industries for a global and uniform patent regime.108 The initial steps to 
legally enclose109 the seed as a form of private property coincided with major 
developments in biotechnology. This effort encountered little resistance from 
advanced industrialized nations as these new technologies—and the economic gains 
they promised—provided justification for stronger intellectual property protection. 
Subsequent legal developments in intellectual property law like the 1991 revision to 
the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) removed the 
farmer’s privilege, making it possible to infringe upon the tradition of seed-saving, 
although the 1991 agreement did provide an avenue to limit breeders’ rights.110  
The interpretation of biological material as “patentable” was globalized in 
1994 through the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.111 This Agreement can be conceived of as a 
legal means to enclose life as the private property of individual “innovators”112 by 
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enabling the patenting of biological material and requiring all 153 members to adhere 
to the intellectual property protections found in this agreement.113 The discursive 
effect of these patent laws is that it re-defines life as a form of property, as a 
commodity that can be traded. Genetically modified seed is no longer just biological 
material, but, rather an informational, proprietary technology that is licensed to 
farmers and protected through legal means. The representation of life in informational 
terms, as a commodity that can be bought and sold, is a way by which “life itself” has 
been turned into a business plan.114 
Biotechnology development and the patent regimes that accompany it reflect a 
form of the commodification of knowledge and what Rajan (2006) considers a new 
phase of capitalism.115 Despite the growing corporatization of the life sciences 
industry, pharmaceutical and plant biotechnology companies have continued to rely 
on indigenous people to share traditional knowledge of the use of plants in order to 
develop new drugs and seeds. The indigenous people that share this knowledge, 
however, did not treat the natural world as something that could be individually 
owned.116 Bratspies (2007) argues that one of the reasons that indigenous 
communities have faced such an uphill battle in trying to gain recognition of their 
property and culture is based in the incompatibility of Indigenous and Western 
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individualistic notions of property.117 Indigenous knowledge and communal systems 
of property are disregarded through the globalization of Western intellectual property 
regimes. As Bratspies explains, “Most legal regimes award the mantle of ‘property,’ 
with its attendant rights, only to the tangible goods produced by indigenous cultures, 
paying no attention to the contexts in which those goods were produced and used.”118  
The formation of biocapital focuses on the gene as the source of market value, 
rather than the socio-ecological context from which germplasm is reproduced. The 
plant genetic material used as raw material for genetic engineering is not merely the 
product of a laboratory, but generations of farmer experimentation and plant 
breeding. Yet the patented material is isolated from this basis in vernacular 
knowledge and the socio-ecological context upon which this is developed. Escobar 
(2008) calls this a “genecentric” view of nature: 
And although biodiversity is seen as encompassing more than genes, the 
recognition of its genetic foundation suggests that it is in genes, not in the 
complex biological and cultural processes that account for particular 
biodiverse worlds, where ultimately ‘the key to the survival of life on 
earth’…is supposed to reside.119  
The development of gene banks as a conservation strategy, such as the Svalbard 
Global Seed Vault, can be characterized as genecentric. The dominant approach to 
biosafety also focuses on the gene with risk assessments that concentrate on the 
environmental and public health effects of possible gene flow.120 As Andrée (2005) 
points out in his analysis of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the African Group’s 
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position that risk assessment should include socio-economic impacts was not adopted 
in the final protocol.121 In Ghana, socio-economic risks are considered outside the 
parameters of the risk assessment study, but would rather be considered at the stage 
of public comment following field trials of genetically modified crops.122  
The proprietary material in a genetically modified crop is the transgene, the 
gene construct that has genetic material from two different species. For example, this 
would be the insect resistance trait derived from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt) introduced into the plant genetic material of the target crop through genetic 
modification. The 2004 Supreme Court case Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser 
defended the patent protection on the glyphosate-resistant gene introduced into 
Monsanto’s RoundUp Ready canola products.123 The defendant Percy Schmeiser, a 
Canadian farmer, was found guilty of patent infringement. Schmeiser claimed that he 
had never purchased RoundUp Ready seeds, but rather the GM seeds had cross-
pollinated with his canola plants. Tests conducted by Monsanto identified the 
transgene on Schmeiser’s field. Subsequently, Monsanto sued Schmeiser for patent 
infringement on the basis of the unauthorized use and replanting of its genetically 
modified canola seeds. The Supreme Court of Canada refused to weigh in on 
questions of the moral desirability of genetic modification or on possibility of 
unintended cross-pollination. Rather the presence of the gene and Schmeiser to 
replant his seeds, regardless of the intention, was designated as unauthorized use and 
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thereby patent infringement.124 The court’s decision reflects genecentrism: the 
ecological possibility of cross-pollination was not considered relevant, the use of 
Monsanto’s genetic material was. Monsanto owned the canola plants on Schmeiser’s 
farm because they expressed the transgene that Monsanto had developed. 
Biocapital, the commodification of life itself, is also furthered with the work 
of the AATF in countries such as Ghana. The AATF does more than support the 
expansion of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology. It advances the conception and legal 
protection of biological life as patentable, “ownable” material to be protected through 
intellectual property rights. I argue that the work of the AATF represents a form of 
philanthrocapitalism, an argument that I explore next. 
 
Philanthrocapital 
Philanthrocapitalism is a form of charitable giving guided by the logic of, and 
happening alongside, flows of transnational venture capital. As described in a 2006 
article in The Economist, “The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism,” this new form of 
charity calls upon philanthropy “to become more like the for-profit capital markets” 
and is particularly popular among those new philanthropists that have made their 
millions in finance.125 It is concerned with “impact investing,” which the Rockefeller 
Foundation describes as efforts to help “address social and/or environmental 
problems while also turning a profit.”126 As the Global Impact Investment Network 
states, impact investment is distinguished by its intentionality: its aim to generate 
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social and/or environmental impact as well as the generation of financial return (or at 
a minimum, a return on capital investment).127  
Much of the recent wave of investment in African agriculture can be identified 
as “philanthrocapitalist:” agbiotech PPPs in Africa, in particular, are characteristic of 
this idea.128 Philanthrocapitalism is reflected in the work of the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the AATF; microfinance, support for legislative 
changes in the seed sector, and the donation of genetic material for crop research are 
expressions of this phenomenon. Microfinance provides opportunities for “impact 
investing”: access to small amounts of credit to support farming investments deepens 
capital’s reach into rural towns and villages, allowing new markets to take root.129 
AGRA and the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project’s guidance for legislative 
changes in the seed and land arenas, respectively, are intended to help small farmers 
and also to expand the private seed sector. The “donation” of a gene by Monsanto to 
develop African crops for food security, as in the case of the Bt cowpea project, 
creates new markets and serves to normalize a Western-style patent regime.  
Philanthrocapitalist giving is not just a strategy among the new 
philanthropists, but also includes some familiar faces in philanthropy. Actors like the 
Rockefeller Foundation are traditional philanthropic organizations that have 
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advocated new strategies such as impact investing in their philanthropic work. In an 
environment in which aid-based development has been heavily criticized for creating 
dependency and failing to substantially reduce poverty, a business approach to 
addressing developmental concerns has had significant appeal.130 Philanthrocapitalists 
critique existing philanthropy as too short sighted and not results-oriented. The idea is 
for philanthropists to behave more like investors—allocating money in such a way as 
to maximize ‘social returns.’131 A central tenet in this approach to maximize social 
returns is the promotion of entrepreneurship.  
Philanthrocapitalism recognizes the need for infrastructure in order to support 
its work, “the philanthropic equivalent of stock markets, investment banks, research 
houses, management consultants and so on.”132 AGRA, the G8 New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition, and USAID-supported ADVANCE133 program 
demonstrates this work in action: the establishment of linkages to finance, input 
suppliers, research, with a centralized strategic management plan. ‘Venture 
philanthropists’ favor partnerships, are hands-on, and more likely to interact with 
states that favor neoliberal partnerships. Philanthrocapitalism measures success 
through tabulation of ‘results-based’ outcomes, linear progression over time, and a 
singular system of accounting.134 This is exemplified in the domain of agriculture 
with the fixation on yield as a measure agricultural success (where alternate measures 
could include resource use efficiency or compatibility with local technology, 
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knowledge, and context). Charitable ‘giving’ becomes another form of investment, as 
‘venture philanthropy’ seeks to increase revenue as well as obtain reputational 
benefits.135 This form of philanthropy can also lead to contradictions in the 
foundation’s goals.136 Hands-on venture philanthropy, such as the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, has had a significant influence on public policy in the developing 
world.137 
Philanthrocapitalism, not unlike traditional philanthropy, is also a legitimating 
mechanism. It can deflate criticism of the exorbitant wealth of monopolists like Bill 
Gates: the more he gives to charity, the more his wealth is legitimated. Furthermore, 
his identity as a successful entrepreneur further validates his project to support other 
entrepreneurs. Philanthrocapitalism is related to the emergence of global corporate 
social responsibility initiatives, triggered through a dynamic interplay between actors 
within civil society and business.138 Innovative, successful campaigns by activists139 
have highlighted unethical corporate practices such as the use of sweatshops, child 
labor140 and war141, deforestation and habitat destruction142 and affected change in 
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these practices. In a context in which so much value is ascribed to a brand, an easily 
identifiable corporate brand is vulnerable to re-branding by activists. Corporate social 
responsibility is a means to change public perceptions of corporations, and has in 
effect changed corporate practices.  
Global anti-GMO campaigns have been successful at framing genetically 
modified crops as dangerous to health and social welfare, and commercialization of 
maize has faced fierce resistance in South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa’s only 
commercially grown food crop. Presenting genetically modified crops as serving 
humanitarian ends is a powerful way to re-characterize the work of controversial 
agribusiness companies like Monsanto and Syngenta. Furthermore, the “donation” by 
Monsanto of the Bt gene, the $273 million that the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation gave to agricultural development in Africa, or other such charitable acts 
wield a certain degree of political influence—political capital—in subsequent 
relevant decision-making. Spielman, Zaidi and Flaherty (2011) find that the scale at 
which the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gives to support development 
infrastructure across the domains of agriculture, public health, technology, and 
education has given the foundation significant political influence in discussions 
regarding development priorities within multilateral aid agencies.143 This political 
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capital gained through philanthropy encourages African states to cooperate with and 
facilitate the objectives of entities like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Monsanto, or the Rockefeller Foundation.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The promise of the dual effects of positive social impact and the generation of 
profits have been linked to mechanisms of commodification in this new Green 
Revolution in Africa. This commodification is enabled by the establishment of 
Westernized property rights regimes in the form of patented seeds and formalized 
land titles, the latter of which has emerged as a priority among AGRA. The AATF’s 
negotiations of royalty-free transfers of technology create a new proprietary regime 
protecting transgenic seeds with patents. This facilitates the development of ‘pro-
poor’ biotechnology by encouraging research into locally suitable varieties, at the 
same time as it normalizes both the patent system and the seed as a commodity. These 
activities are undertaken under the guise of support for the smallholder farmer, the 
women whose rights are not recognized, the local plant breeder. But it is unclear 
whether the establishment of Western intellectual property rights and formalized land 
titles will have such an effect because the ability of these rights to protect these 
people is linked to the ability to understand, accept, and exercise those rights. It is 
clear that Western corporations would fit this criteria; it is less than certain whether 
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the targeted rural populations will be beneficiaries of these legislative and proprietary 
changes that are at odds with local understandings of property. 
Bt cowpea could offer benefits to small farmers in places like Northern Ghana 
because it addresses a pest that has had dramatic impacts on crop yields, and is suited 
to the local tastes and agro-ecological context. Scientists familiar with the concerns of 
local farmers guide the project.144 Yet this project also raises some difficult questions 
regarding the future distribution of benefits. The Bt cowpea project is an international 
collaboration, so it is unclear who exactly would be the direct beneficiaries of the 
commercial sale of Bt cowpea seed. The question of patents, that is who would hold 
the patented technology upon commercialization, was an issue that many of the 
agricultural scientists and biosafety experts either preferred to stay out of or preferred 
to consider later.145 The AATF has explained to me “The Bt Cowpea plant variety 
will be owned by AATF in trust for the local partners.”146 The lead scientist of the Bt 
cowpea project understood that Monsanto would hold the patent. During an interview 
when I asked about the Plant Breeders’ Bill and patents on plants, the Program for 
Biosafety Systems’ Country Coordinator stated “I stay out of this” and referred me to 
the PBS Senior Advisor to Ghana, Dr. Walter Alhassan. I had spoken to Dr. Alhassan 
a few years back in his leadership capacity in the Forum for Agricultural Research in 
Africa (FARA) and as a spokesperson for the benefits of biotechnology for African 
countries. He was now serving as a Senior Advisor for the Program for Biosafety 
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Systems. He had an unclear answer regarding who would hold the patent in the case 
of the commercialization of Bt cowpea, though he recognized it as an important 
question. His initial response was that he was not really sure, that the rights would be 
with CSIR and SARI, granted on a royalty-free basis by the AATF for “humanitarian 
purpose.” Farmers would be able to save seed as this was “not a commercial thing” 
but rather a humanitarian gesture, as Monsanto has “donated” the gene royalty-free. 
When asked about patent rights and Bt cotton, he was much more clear: “that one is 
definitely patented.”147 
Ultimately, within a genecentric policy environment, Monsanto owns the gene 
that confers this desirable trait, insect resistance. However, that is one component in 
the production of Bt cowpea as Nigeria’s national agricultural research institution 
provided the cowpea germplasm. This germplasm was also the product of years of 
farmer experimentation that would not be recognized by a patent. Monsanto has in the 
past attempted to enclose future research findings derived from its initial investments 
as its property. For example, when the Rockefeller Foundation attempted to bring 
herbicide-resistant maize into Kenya “negotiations broke down after Monsanto 
demanded full ownership of all future research results derived within Kenya, a 
demand that Kenyans understandably refused.”148 This legal ambiguity and desire to 
settle these complicated legal definitions on seed patents at a later date may lead to 
unequal outcomes when it comes to sharing the benefits of GM crop 
                                                
147 Phone interview with Dr. Walter Alhassan, May 15, 2015. 
148 Robert L. Paarlberg, The Politics of Precaution: Genetically Modified Crops in Developing 
Countries (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2001), 48. 
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commercialization.149 That is, those that possess the legal expertise to defend their 
investments in the development of Bt cowpea are unlikely to be the national 
agricultural research institutes; rather, Monsanto Company and its team of legal 
experts are more than likely in a position of greater strength. However, one thing that 
is clear is that the idea of the plants as patentable material, previously part of an 
excluded category in the Ghana Patents Act of 2003, is gaining some acceptance.150 
With that, the property rights regime in Ghana is shifting away from communal 
notions of property and towards Western neoliberal ideas about ownership in this new 
Green Revolution in Africa.  
In this sense, the new Green Revolution in Africa generates struggles over 
property through the treatment of seed as a commodity to be privately owned, sold, or 
donated. This understanding of the commodity form of seed is reinforced through 
specific legal regimes that recognize intellectual property and grant greater authority 
to those actors that possess biosafety and biotechnology expertise. Furthermore, this 
agricultural model elevates the importance of the laboratory and the legal arena—
rather than the farmer’s field—to agricultural development. 
                                                
149 Author interviews with agricultural research scientists at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013, 
February 22, 2013, and May 7, 2015; author interview with Country Coordinator of PBS, Accra, May 
5, 2015; phone interview with Dr. Walter Alhassan, May 15, 2015. 




Experts and Entrepreneurs: 
From Farming as a Way of Life to Farming as a Business 
 
Even though Ghana has achieved the [UN Millennium Development Goal 1], we are 
working hard to position the country as the “Bread Basket” of West Africa through her 
accelerated modernization and commercialization of agriculture, with women 
empowerment and re-orientation from subsistence production to market-oriented 
production… At the centre of the strategy is the empowerment of small, medium and 
large scale farmers (with emphasis on women farmers) to enable them[to] acquire and 
use appropriate modern technologies to make farming in Ghana a business rather than a 




Global aid agencies, agribusiness, and the Ghanaian government have 
repeatedly identified Northern Ghana as a space that requires a series of professional 
interventions in order to realize its potential.2 The wide expanses of land of the 
Northern Region with “good soil” and access to water promise a future of commercial 
agricultural success yet to be realized.3 Global venture capital has also recently turned 
its attention to ‘Africa’ as a place of enormous potential, ripe for investment: “Africa 
is the final frontier—the last sizable area of untapped growth in the global economy. 
                                                
1 “Statement by Honourable Kwesi Ahwoi at FAO,” Government of Ghana, statement at the 37th 




2 “There is an increasing development gap between the Northern Savannah Ecological belt and the rest 
of the country. By all indications the North lags behind the South and the gap seems to be increasing. 
This gap is a critique of the status quo…The Northern Savannah Development Initiative (now referred 
to as SADA) defines the parameters of a major paradigm shift in stimulating economic growth and 
sustainable development in the belt.” Savannah Accelerated Development Authority, SADA: 
Secretariat and Organizational Structure, Strategy and Work Plan 2010-2030 (April 9, 2011), 1. 
3 Author interview with a Northern Region district assemblyman, Tamale, September 18, 2012. 
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To succeed, companies will need to bring Africa into the boardroom.”4 The 2014 
World Economic Forum Annual Meeting echoed this sentiment by pointing out that 
six of the top ten fastest growing economies are in Africa, where a third of the 
countries on the continent are experiencing 6% GDP growth. Africa’s abundance of 
natural resources, 60% uncultivated arable land, and the largest global workforce 
were highlighted as other factors to excite investment on the continent.5 Investment in 
African agriculture is perceived to be more profitable now for a number of reasons: at 
a time of global economic downturn and a global shortage of arable land the African 
savannah is a frontier for new capital investment and emerging markets; the 
financialization of agriculture has made the trade in commodity futures possible and 
lucrative; legislative change within African countries has created a more secure 
‘enabling environment’ for investors; and technological change have increased 
expectations that agriculture can be profitable in these agricultural frontiers.6 
Between 2009-2014, the government of Ghana has increased its efforts to 
modernize Ghanaian agriculture in line with the new Green Revolution in Africa 
agenda. It has done so through the promotion of agribusiness entrepreneurship, the 
                                                
4 This is also reflected in the increase in magazines focusing on investment in Africa: Fortune Africa, 
African Business, African Banker. Another example of this excitement over African investment is seen 
in the BBC award-winning documentary (2005) Africa: Open for Business. See Carol Pineau, Africa: 
Open for Business, 60 min, released in 2005. Quote from Dupoix et.al., Winning in Africa: From 
Trading Posts to Ecosystems, (Boston: The Boston Consulting Group on behalf of Private Equity 
Africa, 2014), accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.privateequityafrica.com/wpm/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/2014_January-_Winning_in_Africa_BCG.pdf. Private Equity Africa has a 
link to Catalyst, which is supported by DFID and a part of the Agriculture Fast Track launched by 
USAID in 2013. 
5 “Africa’s Next Billion,” World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2014, accessed July 6, 2015, 
http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/africas-next-billion. 
6 Ghana’s foreign direct investment inflows have increased from $636 million to $2.53 billion at a 
compound annual rate of 41%. Ghana “has been recognized as one of the most open economies in sub-
Saharan Africa for foreign equity investment.” “Ghana’s Private Sector Investment Plan for 




registration of land, and the introduction of modern agricultural technologies such as 
high yield and genetically modified seeds, fertilizers, and tractors via private sector 
initiatives and “complementary and targeted public support.”7 The John Mahama 
administration’s Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA) public-
private partnership aims to “transform agriculture” in Northern Ghana through the 
expansion of commercial agriculture and the linkage of smallholder farmers to 
markets. This commitment to agricultural modernization is further demonstrated by 
Ghana’s participation in the “Grow Africa” partnership, co-convened by the African 
Union Commission, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development Agency 
(NEPAD), and the World Economic Forum. This is available to countries that have 
signed a Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
Compact and that “demonstrate readiness to attract investment aligned to a national 
strategy for agricultural transformation.”8 Efforts to modernize agriculture in Ghana 
are not new, as the idea that reforms in small-scale agriculture can lead to a 
transformation in African economies has been repeatedly invoked in African 
agricultural policy since the 1960s.9 What is new is who leads: whereas in the 1960s 
                                                
7 This is the language of the Grow Africa first annual report (2013): “Recognizing some of the 
challenges of past efforts, the government is adopting a new public-private partnership (PPP) approach 
in which complementary and targeted public support serves to leverage or facilitate private agri-
investment.” Grow Africa Secretariat, Grow Africa: Investing in the future of African agriculture, 1st 
Annual Report (Geneva, Switzerland, May 2013), 42. 
8 Ghana signed a CAADP compact in 2009. The idea of the CAADP is for countries to identify their 
own priorities and strategies to improve agricultural development, with support provided by the World 
Bank. An evaluation of Ghana’s CAADP plan by the Washington, D.C.-based International Food 
Policy Research Institute states that “Though growing, the expenditure shares are short of the CAADP 
targets. The allocations also suggest that the agricultural sector does not receive funds commensurate 
with the importance accorded to it in national plans.” Kolavalli et.al, “Do Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Processes Make a Difference to Country Commitments 
to Develop Agriculture? The Case of Ghana,” IFPRI Discussion Paper 01006 (Washington, D.C.: the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2010). 
9 Alice Wiemers, “A ‘Time of Agric’: Rethinking the ‘Failure’ of Agricultural Programs in 1970s 
Ghana,” World Development 66 (2015): 104. 
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the state led efforts to modernize agriculture, now public-private partnerships take the 
lead.10  
In this chapter I argue that these agricultural initiatives are targeted not only at 
the private sector and at national governments, but at also at the micro-political level 
of social identities. The idea is to change farmers’ relationships to farming and even 
their own self-identifications. A common trope repeated in agricultural development 
circles and articulated by Kwesi Ahwoi, the former Minister of Food and Agriculture 
in Ghana, is the need or desirability to “transform farming from a way of life into a 
business.” Development agencies, as well as industry, pursue this transformation 
through the training, production and dissemination of knowledge about good 
agricultural practices,11 the use of demonstration farms, and the expansion of 
Western-influenced formal education and educational exchanges. These actors 
promote entrepreneurship as the preferred solution to agricultural development 
challenges. Farming as a business contrasts with farming as a way of life in its 
reliance on scientific knowledge as well as its focus on profits and exports, rather 
                                                
10 Amanor (2009) makes the following point: “Agribusiness is not a new field of concern for the World 
Bank and has formed an important part of World Bank interventions in agriculture from the 1960s, 
when the forerunners of contemporary agribusiness emerged as a statist project, in which the peasantry 
was locked into various forms of modern capitalist agrarian production, through which they had to 
produce for parastatal marketing organizations according to specific prescriptions. By the 1980s 
successful examples of these projects were privatized under structural adjustment, often taken over by 
large international consortiums.” Kojo Sebastian Amanor, “Global Food Chains, African Smallholders 
and World Bank Governance,” Journal of Agrarian Change 9, no.2 (2009): 247. See also Hans 
Holmén, “The State and Agricultural Intensification in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in The African Food 
Crisis: Lessons from the Asian Green Revolution, eds. G. Djurfeldt, H. Holmén, M. Jirstrøm, and R. 
Larsson (Cambridge: CAB International, 2005), 87-112. This shift is discussed in the previous chapter. 
11 The UN FAO identifies four pillars of ‘good agricultural practices’: economic viability, 
environmental sustainability, social acceptability, and food safety and quality. In practice, most GAPs 
are de facto determined by Western countries. For a discussion of “good agricultural practices” see 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. “What are Good Agricultural Practices?” 
FAO, accessed July 6, 2015, http://www.fao.org/prods/gap/. 
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than self-provisioning. It also entails more formulaic farming (e.g. the use of 
prescribed inputs), rather than improvisation and experimentation.12  
Building on Chapter Three, I argue that such efforts to transform farming 
from a way of life to a business revolve around three processes: the commodification 
of seed and land, the commercialization of farming activity, and the 
professionalization of the farmer. The aim of these processes is to render messy 
practices of cultivation and land use legible, and to change of what it means to be a 
farmer. The next section opens with an ethnographic vignette from my fieldwork in 
Ghana to illustrate how this promotion of entrepreneurship and proliferation of 
expertise operates at the micro-political level. It analyzes the development of value 
chains supported by public-private partnerships. It also highlights the role of 
education and training in support of standardization, professionalization of farming, 
and integration into the market economy that function as central components of Green 
Revolution agricultural programs. I consider the connection between the promotion of 
entrepreneurship and the privileging of scientific expertise in agricultural 
modernization programs. Next, I discuss the logic of agricultural “exit” and how this 
logic invokes struggles over identity: who should farm, who is an expert, who is an 
authority, and whose knowledge counts. However, ethnography allows me to show 
that these grand plans to reorder rural society become constantly frustrated by 
existing complexity: multiple, coexisting roles, risk reduction practices, and local 
notions of entrepreneurship. I provide several examples from my fieldwork and close 
                                                
12 For a discussion on the use of improvisation among self-provisioning farmers see, for example, Paul 
Richards, “Cultivation: Knowledge or Performance?” in An Anthropological Critique of Development: 
The Growth of Ignorance, ed. Mark Hoban, (London: Routledge, 1993) 61-78. 
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with a discussion of the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program’s ongoing attempt 
to establish a land bank. 
 
II. The ‘Serious’ Farmer: Entrepreneurship and the Global Food Economy 
…Mango Value Chain Workshop… 
We had walked in late to the Mango Value Chain13 workshop, but it didn’t seem to 
bother Latif, who had just been enskinned14 as a chief. Though we were all academics 
and had met through a mutual friend, a professor at the University of Development 
Studies, we were attending the workshop as representatives of one of the largest agro-
chemical dealers in Tamale. It was an uncomfortable affiliation, one that I was 
fortunately able to distance myself from when we joined the forty participants who 
had gathered to talk about how to develop and strengthen the mango value chain in 
Northern Ghana. The workshop was put together by the Market-Oriented Agricultural 
Programme (MOAP), a German-Ghanaian partnership. It was quite obvious that there 
was German money involved—everyone was given nametags, a spiral notebook, a 
pen, and a plastic folder. Bottles of water were at each table in the air-conditioned 
room, with breaks of fish pies and sodas and a full spread of food at lunch.  
 
After the first coffee break, Nana Ampofo spoke about the experience of mango 
production in Brong-Ahafo, a region directly south of the Northern Region, which 
                                                
13 Organizers of the workshop defined a value chain as that which connects the following: input 
provision, production, processing, distribution and sales, and consumption. Actors involved in this 
chain include input providers, primary producers, logistic centers, industry, traders, financiers, and 
final consumers. 
14 This is the term used to refer to the process of making someone a chief. The reference is to the 
sheepskins upon which chiefs sit. 
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had well-established mango plantations and is the center of mango production in 
Ghana. In a talk entitled “Lessons from Brong-Ahafo,” Nana spoke of the need to 
“target consumers first” and posed as a central question, “what does the consumer 
want?” The identification of the “consumer” became clear with his follow-up 
question, “how can mangoes be exported?” Whereas he later addressed local 
consumer demand, his clear focus was the production for export markets in locations 
like the European Union. Growers, Nana explained, need to acquire more knowledge 
of mango production and should look to input providers for fertilizers, agro-chemicals 
and seedlings. Service providers such as banks also played a role in strengthening 
value chains. Nana Ampofo spoke of issues like post-harvest loss, certification, the 
necessity to establish standardized good agricultural practices in Ghana, the damage 
posed by fruit flies, and the need to use caution when using insecticidal sprays. He 
then emphasized the importance of training—farmers need to be taught how to spray 
and how to handle pesticides. He also emphasized that the lack of access to 
information was a key impediment to success: going into “serious mango business” 
requires information. He then relayed how the Brong-Ahafo value chain committee 
meets every two months, evidence of the seriousness of the endeavor.   
 
During the question and answer session that followed, Nana Ampofo stated “we have 
a motto that says ‘mango is a serious business’…If you don’t want to get into a 
serious business, then don’t get into mango.” One of the facilitators of the event, Al-
Hassan, found this articulation of mango farming as a “serious business” so 
compelling that he led a call and response whereby he would shout “mango” and we 
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participants would respond “serious business!” Al-Hassan explained that this refrain 
was important because it expresses the idea that producing mangos for export (that 
meet international standards) is a different enterprise than meeting local demand. The 
workshop included value chain role-playing activities that articulated some of the 
common challenges which different actors along the mango value chain experiences, 
as well as opportunities to discuss possible solutions. Throughout the nine-hour 
workshop, a tension arose between producers who thought largely in terms of local 
markets and service providers in the business of export-promotion like EDAIF 
(Export Development and Agricultural Investment Fund). As one producer 
explained—much to the chagrin of organizers—farmers must produce for themselves 
first, and then for international markets. Sentiments such as these were not the 
intended outcome of the Market-Oriented Agricultural Programme. 
 
****** 
The ‘Serious’ Farmer 
As one informant working with ADVANCE told me, “farming needs to be 
seen as a Big Man’s job.”15 Another farmer, the son of one of the larger farms in the 
Northern Region, told me that farming is often associated with being “poor, illiterate” 
and not as a profitable enterprise, contributing to the loss of young people in 
agriculture.16 The thrust of these commercial agriculture programs in Ghana is to 
change peoples’ perceptions about the nature of farming: farming can be a business, 
                                                
15 Author interview with representative from the Agricultural Development and Value Chain 
Enhancement (ADVANCE) Program, Tamale, February 18, 2013. ADVANCE is a USAID-funded 
project to support the Obama Administration’s Feed the Future strategy, implemented by local and 
international partners led by ACDI/VOCA. 
16 Author interview with large-scale rice farmer in Northern Region, May 9, 2015. 
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and a profitable business at that. Training events like the Mango Value Chain 
workshop, which are taking place all over Africa, are more than just opportunities to 
train farmers in the meaning of ‘good agricultural practices.’ They are attempts to 
create new identities.  When the adoption of new agricultural practices is framed as 
part of ‘progress,’ this adoption produces corollary subjects that are ‘modern.’  
Likewise, the rejection of new agricultural technologies can render those that are 
averse to these technologies as ‘backward’ and provide justification for land 
dispossession, as I discuss in the section on “agricultural exit.” The promotion of 
‘serious’ farmers and ‘businessmen’ indicates not only identity shifts, but also 
possible ramifications for food security.  ‘Serious’ farmers are farmers who no longer 
focus only on staple crops, but are looking at production for export and ways to add 
value to crops. As such, these farmers become more integrated into the global food 
economy and tend to focus on crops and varieties that are most lucrative, and not 
necessarily on those that are the most critical for fulfilling the dietary needs of local 
communities.17 Furthermore, increased demand for staple crops like maize and yam 
from external markets may also price out poorer consumers that can no longer afford 
to pay for such staple foods.18 
                                                
17 Mango in particular is not a common food consumed by people in Northern Ghana, but an exotic 
crop more typically eaten by ex-pats. 
18 This is not necessarily new, as farmers have responded to market demand before the advent of these 
market-oriented programs. In Ghana, there has been significant loss of yam varieties “because of the 
market” as farmers’ focus on the most lucrative yam, the Larbico. One of the agricultural research 
scientists I spoke to at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) acknowledged that efforts 
to promote yam for export could likely have the effect of rising the price of this staple crop. Author 
interview with agricultural research scientist at SARI, Nyankpala, February 22, 2013. During the 
global food crisis of 2007-8, demand for corn for ethanol in the industrialized world had the effect of 




Interventions like Grow Africa and SADA are intended to connect farmers to 
the tools necessary (both material and informational) for increasing aggregate yields. 
They aim to transform an agricultural landscape rife with subsistence farming into a 
‘bread basket’ of high agricultural productivity through “pro-poor private sector led 
value chain development.”19 Although lack of technology and access to credit are 
posited as some of the reasons for low productivity, the lack of information and 
training are considered the key impediments to agricultural development. 
Traditional20 farmers in Northern Ghana are framed not only as under-producing, but 
also as uneducated, isolated, and backward. ‘Serious’ farmers, by contrast, are 
modern, knowledgeable, and connected. With access to ‘right knowledge’21, 
agricultural training and demonstration, ‘sensitization’ about land, and seed, 
technology and property22, and market linkages, farmers can help to realize Northern 
Ghana’s food production potential. 
Such ‘serious’ farmers are usually conceived as participants in transnational 
‘value chains’ that link African farmers to distant markets and places. The 
transformation of African agriculture is also linked to discourses about ‘feeding the 
world’ emanating from institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Food and Agriculture 
                                                
19 Republic of Ghana, Ghana Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (GASIP): Design Completion 
Report, February 18, 2014, accessed July 6, 2015, 
http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/design/111/ghana.pdf, 4. 
20 I use the term “traditional” as many chiefs and elders I spoke to in my research in farming villages 
identified as “traditionalists.” Other possible terms include: peasant or subsistence farmers, self-
provisioning farmers, smallholder farmers (though the latter has been misused by agencies like the 
World Bank to include farmers with up to 100 ha of land, certainly not the “smallholders” I 
encountered in Northern Ghana). 
21 This is the language of the Grow Africa platform, see Grow Africa Secretariat, Grow Africa: 
Investing in the future of African agriculture, 12. 
22 This is a reference to ‘sensitization’ seminars that I discuss in Chapter Two. 
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Organization (FAO) as well as African governments. They translate concerns about 
how to reduce vulnerability to food price shocks into mandates to increase 
agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. Calls to ‘feed Africa’ through private 
donations and governmental food aid compete with assertions that ‘Africa’ does 
indeed feed itself23 or can with technocratic market interventions. Such narratives 
highlight the role of small farmers24 as agents of development: the promotion of 
smallholder entrepreneurship and its linkage to markets is seen as an appropriate 
means to increase production and alleviate poverty.25  
The promotion of entrepreneurship as a means to alleviate poverty has 
emerged as a new strategy to address widespread criticisms that traditional aid and 
philanthropy do not work. Influential development economists such as Dambisa 
Moyo and William Easterly argue that aid prevents people from searching for their 
own solutions and can do more harm than good. Rather, when markets are free and 
incentives are right, people will find ways to address their own problems.26 From this 
perspective, aid and philanthropy can maintain conditions of underdevelopment and 
breed corruption, as aid moneys find their way into the wrong hands or are 
                                                
23 See, for example, “Hungry for Land: Small Farmers Feed the World—With Less Than a Quarter of 
All Farmland,” La Via Campesina/GRAIN Press Release, May 29, 2014, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/agrarian-reform-mainmenu-36/1615-
hungry-for-land-small-farmers-feed-the-world-with-less-than-a-quarter-of-all-farmland; Miguel A. 
Altieri and Victor Manuel Toledo, “The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Rescuing 
Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 38, 
no.3 (2011): 587-612.  
24 “Small farmer” or “smallholder farmer” (often used interchangeably) is commonly used terminology 
that refers to farmers that participate in small-scale, often subsistence, farming. Subsistence farming is 
producing food to support the family and not for trade. 
25 The World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank, 2007); Kandeh K. Yumkella and Patrick M. Kormawa, “Agribusiness for 
Africa’s Prosperity,” (lecture on behalf of UNIDO at the International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Washington, D.C., October 25, 2011).  
26 See Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010); William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the 
West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2007). 
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inappropriately used by interventionists that understand little about the local 
context.27 The Millennium Villages Project (MVP), led by Jeffrey Sachs, differs in its 
diagnosis of the causes of poverty: it is too little aid, not too much, that is the root of 
underdevelopment. However, the MVP not only infuses large amount of aid into 
programs to address the “poverty trap,” it also promotes entrepreneurship: “As the 
globalized world becomes ever more connected and new markets emerge to meet the 
demands of growing economies, developing business and entrepreneurship is the next 
evolutionary step in sustaining the gains of the Millennium Villages Project.”28  
An entrepreneurial farmer is one that sees farming as a business, not just a 
way of life. He29 is able to envision scaling up production to ‘feed the world.’ The 
entrepreneur is concerned with profits, he produces cash crops for export, and he is 
able to meet certification requirements. He has received training in the use of inputs, 
utilizes mechanization, and knows ‘good agricultural practices.’ He is a part of a 
value chain and knows how to access capital to scale up his business. He is willing to 
take risks. He likely comes from a family that owns land, perhaps from a chiefly 
                                                
27 Jeffrey Sachs, on the other hand, argues that the problem with aid is that there has been too little of it 
and that this, subsequently, has not enabled people to overcome the “poverty trap.” This trap is 
understood as the way in which poverty prevents people from investing in their future (for example, 
not educating African children because families need their labor or not consistently buying fertilizer 
because the cost is too high) and entrenches people in their own deepening poverty. See Jeffrey D. 
Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2005). For a 
further comparison and empirical assessment of these two views on aid, see Abhijit V. Banerjee and 
Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2011). 
28 “About Millennium Villages Sector Strategy,” Millennium Villages Project, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://mvs.millenniumvillages.org/about/sector-strategy/. 
29 My choice of the pronoun “he” is deliberate. Although there is a lot of talk about gender inclusion in 
development circles, in the Northern Region—where many of these agricultural development 
interventions will take place—the businessman farmer involved in commercial agriculture was 
typically male. The agricultural experts working in research institutes and the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture were also typically male. Women are involved in a larger share of the food production and 
nutrition by tending to plots adjacent to the household. By contrast, the farming of cash crops such as 
cocoa, maize, roots and tubers, and tomato are generally in the domain of men.  
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family, and would be considered a ‘big man,’ a man of status, for his business know-
how. He knows about new technologies and he is eager to use them. He may be a 
contender for a National Farmer Award on National Farmers’ Day and travel to 
Accra.30 Rather than rely on communal systems of reciprocal labor exchange during 
the harvest season, he hires paid laborers to work on his farm. In the terms described 
by Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP) and the USAID-funded 
Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement (ADVANCE) Program, he 
has the large “nucleus” farm that is connected to smaller “outgrowers” that sell their 
product in-kind for the use of his tractor.  
 
Nucleus-Outgrower Schemes: Commercialization and Value Chains  
A 2010 World Bank report, Building Competitiveness in Africa’s Agriculture, 
specifies that outgrower schemes are generally understood as  
schemes where agribusiness has considerable control over the smallholder 
production process, providing a large number of services, such as input 
credits, tillage, spraying, and harvesting. The smallholder provides land and 
labor in return for this comprehensive extension/input package.31  
Most nucleus-outgrower schemes that I became familiar with in my research expected 
farmers to acquire and prepare their own land. These outgrower-schemes are 
generally linked to global value chains, a buzzword used to conceptualize linkages 
between businesses, even businesses of significant disparity in size. The concept of 
value chains advances a vision of linkages between small farmers and global markets: 
for example, small farmers may produce as outgrowers that sell to nucleus farmers, 
                                                
30 Author interview with former recipient of a National Farmer award, Kukuo Yapalsi, September 18, 
2012. 
31 Martin C. Webber and Patrick Labaste, Building Competitiveness in Africa’s Agriculture: A Guide to 
Value Chain Concepts and Applications (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010), 133.  
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who then sell their products to much larger processers that add value to the raw 
materials. The idea of the value chain perspective is to provide “…an important 
means to understand business-to-business relationships that connect the chain” in 
order to increase efficiency, productivity, and add value along the chain.32 This 
conceptualization is intended to assist in the identification of needed “improvements 
in supporting services and the business environment.”33 This arrangement of nucleus-
outgrowers servicing global value chains renders legible decentralized farms through 
creating nuclei to centralize production.34 These schemes are facilitated by 
government work to “improve the enabling environment for agriculture” with a 
“stronger role for the private sector in transforming agriculture.”35 It is for this reason 
that McMichael (2013) critiques value chains as “a new frontier of publicly 
subsidised corporate investment, incorporating smallholding farmers into commercial 
relations to redress apparent food shortages.”36 
The talk of “nucleus-outgrower” arrangements dominates agricultural public-
private partnerships in Ghana like the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority 
and the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program that seek to support entrepreneurs 
and link them to the global economy. In a report entitled “Ripe for Change: The 
Promise of Africa’s Agricultural Transformation,” Bono’s nonprofit organization 
ONE celebrates GCAP:  
                                                
32 Webber and Patrick Labaste. Building Competitiveness in Africa’s Agriculture, 1. 
33 Ibid. 
34 A parallel investment to these nucleus-outgrower schemes is financial support for the creation of 
feeder roads that can connect distant farms.  
35 Grow Africa Secretariat, Grow Africa: Investing in the future of African agriculture,” 42. 
36 See Philip McMichael, “Value-chain Agriculture and Debt Relations: Contradictory Outcomes,” 
Third World Quarterly 34, no.4 (2013): 671. 
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A good example of a recent initiative to develop public-private partnerships is 
the Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (2012–17), supported by USAID 
and the World Bank, which has a special focus on linking smallholders to 
commercial business through contract farming and outgrower schemes. So far, 
it has identified a number of investment opportunities, including seed and 
cassava processing.37  
The stated GCAP philosophy is to promote inclusive agriculture. Yet this inclusive 
agriculture has a specific design: the GCAP approach understands that “people who 
want to invest [in agriculture] will only promote a nucleus-outgrower scheme.”38 
The Mahama Administration’s SADA initiative focuses its efforts on the 
Savannah Ecological Zone, which includes the three northernmost regions of 
Ghana—the Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions. This initiative can be 
understood as a public-private partnership that works to reduce “the North-South 
gap” through the promotion of agricultural modernization and climate change 
mitigation. According to a 2011 report,  
At the core of the SADA programme is an attempt to transform agriculture 
from its subsistence base to a high-yield commercial agriculture. In this 
transformation, ability to attract private sector investors into the agricultural 
value chain is critical. Such private sector must be animated to support and 
sustain thousands of small-holder farmers as out-growers, and also provide 
needed capital, technology and access to large domestic, regional and internal 
markets for new crops.39 
Although there has been considerable controversy over the implementation of the 
program, this logic continues to shape the approach to agricultural modernization in 
Ghana.40 The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa has recently celebrated 
                                                
37 “Ghana: Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project,” Grow Africa, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://growafrica.com/initiative/ghana. 
38 Author interview with a representative of the National Lands Commission, Accra, May 20, 2015. 
39 Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA). SADA Secretariat and Organizational 
Structure: Strategy and Work Plan 2010-2030. April 9, 2011, p.3.  
40 There are major issues with corruption within SADA. SADA’s afforestation project, in particular, 
was widely panned as a total disaster. The former SADA CEO Gilbert Seidu Iddi had selected ACI 
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SADA’s rice intensification program, which is reliant on an outgrower scheme, 
noting the increase in productivity and a decline in the importation of rice.41 
Likewise, the plans to disseminate genetically modified cowpea seed—if it is 
approved for commercialization—reveals how this new technology is at once 
conceived of as ‘pro-poor’ but also promotes entrepreneurship and nucleus-outgrower 
structures. Amanor (2011) makes the point that Ghanaian farmers tend to save seed 
and are reluctant to purchase improved seed. With regard to the development of a 
certified seed sector in Ghana, Amanor argues that this development is “…is 
predicated on creating an enabling social infrastructure for seeds, which gradually 
builds demand among farmers and integrates them into seed, input and food 
processing markets.”42 The Bt cowpea public-private partnership provides an example 
of how a market in genetically modified seed may be created. In an interview with the 
lead scientist at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute on the Bt cowpea 
project, he explained, “if you involve too many farmers too soon you won’t be able to 
control it.”43 Rather, they are likely to “identify a few elite farmers” that would be 
trained on the use of the technology. SARI would make sure that farmers utilize 
                                                                                                                                      
Construction Limited, registered by Roland Agambire and Miriam Ajavon, for the afforestation project 
despite the fact that the construction and electrical company had no experience with afforestation 
projects. Online news reports by My Joy online, Ghana News Web, the Ghanaian Chronicle, 
allAfrica.com each reported on the failure of the SADA afforestation and guinea fowl projects. I spoke 
to more than a dozen different people about SADA’s efforts in the North in my return trip in May 2015 
and not a single person disputed the claim that the SADA afforestation project had failed. I visited one 
of the afforestation sites and not a single tree planted had survived. See, for example, “SADA Broke 
Procurement Laws in Award of 32.4 Million Afforestation Contract to ACI- Audit Report,” 
MyJoyOnline, March 16, 2004, accessed July 7, 2015,  
http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2014/april-16th/sada-broke-procurement-laws-in-award-of-324-
million-afforestation-contract-to-aci-audit-report.php#sthash.rhBbDDCE.FsJtYGbw.dpuf . 
41 “Ghanaian President Hosts AGRA Board Members at State House, Ghana,” AGRA, accessed July 7, 
2015, http://agra-alliance.org/media-centre/news/president-mahama-meets-agra-board/. 
42 Kojo Sebastian Amanor, “From Farmer Participation to Pro-poor Seed Markets: The Political 
Economy of Commercial Seed Networks in Ghana,” IDS Bulletin 42, no.4 (2011): 48. 
43 Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple, SARI, Nyankpala, May 7, 2015.  
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proper biosafety procedures such as the use of refuge zones.44 These farmers would 
be the outgrowers that would work with a private Tamale-based seed company, 
Heritage Seed Company, Ltd., supported by AGRA and owned by seed entrepreneur 
Zakaria Iddrisu, that would be the nucleus of the operations, producing certified seed 
from the SARI foundation seed.45 In the first few years following commercialization, 
SARI would work only with Heritage Seed Company and a few farmers, but would 
gradually bring other farmers in during field days that would view the demonstration 
fields of the transgenic cowpea.46 This example provides an illustration of the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and scientific expertise. In the next section, I 
elaborate on these ideas and specify some of the mechanisms of the 
professionalization of the farmer.  
 
III. The Professionalization of the Farmer 
Many international interventions in rural Africa identify an aging population 
of farmers and a declining interest in farming among young people. In order to 
address these dynamics, agricultural interventions need to not only to change the 
                                                
44 In order to reduce the chances of insect resistance to the transgene, biosafety protocol specifies that 
any farmer using genetically modified seed must have fields that cultivate a maximum of 80% 
genetically modified crops, with the remaining 20% conventional.  
45 It is quite possible that AGRA would work with SARI in providing the training, though this was not 
specified. AGRA has provided such training in the past as it states here: “Since 2008, AGRA has been 
providing technical and financial support to seed companies in Ghana as well as a number of other 
African countries. Heritage Seeds Company Limited is one such company. It has benefitted from 
AGRA's support in form of grants as well as on-site technical advice through field trips, workshops, 
training sessions, and coaching over the years. The firm received a grant to produce certified seeds, 
create awareness among farmers on the new seeds and distribute the new seeds to farmers. Through 
efficient coaching and other technical support received from Program staff of AGRA, Mr. Idrissu 
moved from producing Open Pollinated Variety (OPV) to improved variety seeds within a short 
period, which has resulted in winning this prestigious award.” “AGRA Grantee Wins National Award 
in Seed Production in Ghana: Award Expected to Strengthen Public-Private Partnerships,” AGRA, 
accessed July 7, 2015, http://archive.agra.org/media-centre/news/agra-grantee-wins-national-award-in-
seed-production-in-ghana/. 
46 Author interview with Dr. I.D.K. Atokple, SARI, Nyankpala, May 7, 2015.  
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existing orientations of farmers from producing for households to producing for 
export-oriented value chains, but also to entice young people into farming.  
Presenting commercial agriculture as a lucrative enterprise that can rely on 
mechanization, rather than difficult manual labor, is intended to attract young people 
into food production. Public-private partnerships have played an influential role in 
altering such orientations through a discourse of entrepreneurship. The African 
Accelerated Agribusiness and Agro-Industries Development Initiative, otherwise 
known as 3ADI, is a collaboration between the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Through 
assisting in the processing of agricultural commodities (one of the links in the value 
chain), 3ADI “…can help them make the leap from subsistence agriculture to a 
thriving business that generates income.”47 The objective is to “transform the rural 
world to turn it into an attractive career proposition to the eyes of the youth.”48 In this 
way, farming becomes “…no longer a subsistence occupation carried out from 
generation to generation as a matter of tradition: it is a complex business with its 
technological, scientific, human resource, marketing, and accounting demands.”49 
What, then, are the mechanisms by which this transformation takes place? 
Training events, farmers’ associations, access to credit, and the linkage of smallholder 
plots with larger “nucleus” farms are some of the mechanisms.50 Training events like 
                                                
47 “Why 3ADI?” 3ADI, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.3adi.org/. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The ADVANCE program connects many small farms with larger “nucleus” farms, as smallholder 
farmers sell their grain to the nucleus farm in exchange for tractor servicing. The intention of the 
program is to facilitate the linkages between smallholder farmers and value chains in attempts to 
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the Mango Value Chain workshop in Ghana are hosted by export-oriented service 
providers, input suppliers, or the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (“Agric”) 
extension officers. Farmers’ associations like Masara N’Arziki are programs that 
provide a package of inputs and a ready market for maize. Farmers who enroll obtain 
hybrid maize seed, along with a formula of supporting inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, 
irrigation and tractor servicing, in exchange for selling back a portion of their 
harvested grain.51 Similar programs in Burkina Faso, Ghana’s northern neighbor, 
have facilitated the expansion of genetically modified cotton.52 Such arrangements 
encourage standardized agricultural practices and shift the focus of agricultural 
production to certain commodities. In a similar vein, the nonprofit international 
economic development program ACDI/VOCA, which has supported value chain 
development programs in Ghana, explains that their “Farming as a Business” 
curriculum  
creates profound change in a smallholder farmer’s mentality and in her or his 
prospects for economic improvement. It is not merely a new way of thinking, 
but also a substantially novel way of operating that puts even a small farm on 
an enterprise plane and provides tools for proper management.53  
With proper management, farmers can adhere to ‘good agricultural practices’ and 
meet the expectations of export markets. 
                                                                                                                                      
develop the profit potential of these farmers. Author interview with a representative of ADVANCE, 
Tamale, February 18, 2013. 
51 On a billboard on the northern edge of Tamale along the Bolgatonga road, Masara N’Arziki 
advertises: “Masara Your Association for: better bargaining power; training and education; improved 
technology; guaranteed markets; sustainable access to credit; higher yields and higher income.” 
52 Author interviews with agricultural research scientists at SARI, February 13, 2013 and February 22, 
2013. 
53 “Farming as a Business: Development Tool Promotes Both Food and Income Security,” 
ACDI/VOCA, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.acdivoca.org/farming-as-a-business. ACDI/VOCA 




What kinds of people do the proponents of agricultural modernization want in 
agriculture?  Educated youth, trained technocrats that can use modern farm inputs, 
‘serious farmers’ that view ‘farming as a business.’ In such efforts to modernize 
agriculture, ‘unproductive’, subsistence farmers are identified as those who should 
“transition” out of agriculture. “Scaling up” is a concern of these agricultural 
development programs due to the expectation that less young people will choose rural 
occupations like farming and an aging population of farmers.  Farmers’ associations 
and the placement of graduates of agriculture programs in the field are ways to train 
young people to become ‘serious’ farmers. A collaboration between Premium Foods, 
a Ghanaian processing company, the African Union, and the Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology (KNUST) plans to take graduates of the 
KNUST agriculture and agribusiness program, allot them 100 acres and connect them 
to “champion” farmers that will be given 5 acre parcels of land. The hope is that the 
university students’ technical knowledge will lead to technical change on the farm.54  
Building techno-scientific knowledge is a key component in the 
transformation from farming as a livelihood to farming as a business. As proclaimed 
in the Grow Africa 2014 Annual Report:  
There is huge potential for smallholder farmers and other rural communities, 
in particular women, through access to productive resources to increase yields 
by accessing the right knowledge, tools, seeds, fertilizers, and market 
opportunities. Additionally, growing populations provide sources of labour 
and opportunities for greater innovation and entrepreneurship…Africa is on 
the rise and poised to bring about its own transformation through agriculture.55   
In 2009, AGRA started a training program for 170 soil scientists and agronomists in 
Africa. The project responds to a declining investment in tertiary education in African 
                                                
54 Phone interview with a high-ranking official of the National Lands Commission, October 28, 2013.  
55 Grow Africa Secretariat, Grow Africa: Investing in the future of African agriculture, 12. 
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universities, particularly since the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Farm 
tours of the United States, many led by private companies, have become another way 
by which knowledge of commercial agriculture is shared with Ghanaian farmers.56 
Tours of places like Grand Forks, North Dakota led by groups like Praxis Strategy 
and AdFarm “focused on identifying and developing opportunities in the Ghanaian 
agricultural sector.” 57 Through touring commercial farms in the U.S., participants are 
encouraged to envision parallel agricultural developments within their home country. 
Praxis Africa, one of the new outcomes of the collaboration between Praxis Strategy 
and AdFarm, has developed a Farm Channel that disseminates information in Ghana 
on how to develop value chains to “promote farm productivity and profitability in 
Ghana.”58  
Formal education, educational exchanges, and training normalize industrial 
agriculture and build trust in the ability of expert knowledge to address agricultural 
challenges. Western, industrialized agriculture is perceived as the model and African 
agriculture is framed as deficient in this light. Rather than asking what can be learned 
from traditional agricultural practices, many Western-educated young people no 
longer view the village as a rich source of knowledge. By contrast, young people with 
access to education now return to the village as the “experts” to educate the elders. 
Furthermore, the patterns of who becomes the entrepreneur frequently replicate 
                                                
56 Though a few of my agronomist contacts that had traveled to the United States either on tours or to 
pursue graduate education where not always favorably impressed by the farming practices in the U.S. 
One remarked that he was struck by how little agricultural diversity was present in the mid-West. 
Others remarked at how unhealthy Americans appeared and questioned the American diet.  
57 Mikkel Pates, “Transforming Ghana’s agriculture is focus of project,” Agweek, June 6, 2011, 
accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.agweek.com/event/article/id/18558/.  
58 For more on Praxis Africa’s Farm Channel, see “Broadcasting Ghana’s Development,” Praxis 
Africa, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.praxissg.com/praxis-africa/the-farm-channel.  
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existing North-South divides in Ghana—it is the college-educated KNUST student 
from Kumasi that is the champion farmer, or the ‘serious’ mango farmer from Brong-
Ahafo. That is to say that the work of entrepreneurial farmers and their nucleus farms 
and demonstration fields can inspire farmers to become ‘serious,’ emulate their 
behavior, and one day become a farmer like them. Yet, few farmers in these programs 
are likely to realize this ultimate goal. The more common prospect is to find 
themselves in the position of “outgrowers” with fairly significant constraints on their 
activities. 
 
IV. Exiting agriculture 
What are the implications of this development approach for smallholder 
farmers deemed not to have “profit potential”? And who decides that? The influential 
Washington, D.C.-based International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) think 
tank suggests that such farmers should be aided in transitioning out of agriculture 
altogether: 
Smallholder farmers in developing countries play a key role in meeting the 
future food demands of a growing and increasingly rich and urbanized 
population. However, smallholders are not a homogeneous group that should 
be supported at all costs. Whereas some smallholder farmers have the 
potential to undertake profitable commercial activities in the agricultural 
sector, others should be supported in exiting agriculture and seeking nonfarm 
employment opportunities. For smallholder farmers with profit potential, their 
ability to be successful is hampered by such challenges as climate change, 
price shocks, limited financing options, and inadequate access to healthy and 
nutritious food. By overcoming these challenges, smallholders can move from 
subsistence to commercially oriented agricultural systems, increase their 
profits, and operate at an efficient scale—thereby helping to do their part in 
feeding the world’s hungry.59 
                                                
59 “Main Findings: From Subsistence to Profit: Transforming Smallholder Farms,” IFPRI, accessed 




The World Bank Development Report of 2008 echoes a similar sentiment: 
“Agricultural growth is especially important to improve well-being in geographic 
pockets of poverty with good agricultural potential. For regions without such 
potential, the transition out of agriculture and the provision of environmental services 
offer better prospects. But support to the agricultural component of the livelihoods of 
subsistence farmers will remain an imperative for many years.”60  Those farmers who 
“under-produce” are expected to shift out of farming into the wage labor economy as 
they are not suitable for the project of ‘feeding the world.’61  
As Amanor (2009), points out, such decisions to sell land and enter the wage 
economy are presented as an individual choice to alleviate poverty rather than 
evidence of a lack of options.62 One informant working on the SADA initiative 
commented that the local farmers’ participation in proposed commercial agriculture 
projects like sugarcane for biofuel will likely be negligible because of the inability of 
such farmers to operate on such scale. Rather, “local farmers will be turned into 
                                                                                                                                      
New_at_IFPRI_August_26_2013&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_7b974d57a5-60e7f8b31b-
69105353. Citation for full report: Shenggen Fan, Joanna Brzeska, Michiel Keyzer, and Alex Halsema. 
From Subsistence to Profit: Transforming Smallholder Farms (Washington, D.C.: International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2013). My emphasis. 
60 World Bank, World Bank Development Report 2008, 22. 
61 The World Bank states in a project appraisal document for the Ghana Commercial Agriculture 
Project that these farmers are not included in plans for commercial agricultural activities such as 
outgrower schemes: “Small holder, family farms can be commercial if they interact sufficiently with 
the market (for inputs and especially outputs). Agri-business and agro-processing – large- and small-
scale – is also included. It would not include extremely poor marginalized households dependent on 
subsistence farming under extremely fragile and disadvantaged circumstances. The opportunities 
created by this project, for instance participation in out-grower schemes, are unlikely to be accessible 
because of severe capacity and behavioral constraints.” The World Bank, Project Appraisal Document 
on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 64.5 Million (US$100 Million Equivalent) to the Republic 
of Ghana for a Commercial Agriculture Project, February 27, 2012, p.6. My emphasis. 
62 Amanor illustrates this point through an analysis of the World Bank’s 2008 World Development 
Report. See Kojo Sebastian Amanor, “Global Food Chains, African Smallholders and World Bank 
Governance,” Journal of Agrarian Change 9, no.2 (2009): 247-62. 
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laborers” to work on those plantations.63 Through this shift from being in control of 
the farm to working as a laborer, local farmers may “forget those skills.”64 This, in 
turn, may undermine one of the driving objectives of SADA: to improve the 
livelihoods of the most vulnerable citizens in Northern Ghana. 
 This logic of agricultural exit put forth by these development planners can be 
thought of in Foucauldian terms as the neoliberal state’s exercise of the power of 
regularization. As part of the normalization of industrial agriculture, the outliers of 
the state’s population, in this case the ‘unproductive’ small farmers of the North, can 
be sacrificed.65 This can help us understand why certain biotech proponents dismiss 
the critique that the cost of inputs to support the use of improved seed is too high.66 
That is, if these farmers are just outliers in a population that gets normalized around 
the ideal of farmer-as-entrepreneur, the state is not necessarily going to intervene to 
bring these farmers in line with the norm by making these inputs affordable for them. 
Rather, they will be outliers on this curve of normalization that the state will “let die,” 
or exit agriculture.67 
 
V. Discourse Meets Reality: Complexity on the Ground 
This exercise of the state power of regularization and the logic of agricultural 
exit would be a lot more worrisome if this outlier population were so dependent on 
                                                
63 Phone interview with an official of the National Lands Commission, October 28, 2013.  
64 Ibid. 
65 This is what is meant by Foucault’s idea that the modern state exercises a right to make live and let 
die. See for example, The History of Sexuality, Vol.1: “One might say that the ancient right to take life 
or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.” Michel Foucault, 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), 138. Original italics. 
66 Phone interview with U.S. State Department official based in Accra, April 9, 2015. 
67 Thanks to Casey McNeill for this point. 
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the Ghanaian nation-state. My ethnographic observations in rural villages in Northern 
Ghana reveal that many such communities rely little on state resources, but rather 
practice local forms of risk reduction and communal support.  
An examination of the non-market system that is, the system of exchange that 
exists in the local community, reveals the resources to support the resilience of these 
outlier populations.68 Throughout Northern Ghana, the plots adjacent to the family 
homes were typically planted with vegetables and legumes, often tended to by women 
(though in the Northern Region this was less common), and grown utilizing little to 
no inputs. Non-market systems of exchange include exchange of seeds, of food, and 
of kin through marriage.69 Informal systems of seed exchange are ways of 
diversifying the range of crops planted and forms of local innovation, frequently 
discounted in Green Revolution agricultural programs.70 The practice of labor-
pooling is another important feature of the non-market system and is still an essential 
part of meeting labor shortfalls within certain families. The preparation of yam 
mounds in the Eastern corridor of the Northern Region is one such labor-sharing 
practice. Groups of people from the community will focus their efforts on one family 
farm, rotating to another family the next day, followed by a few days rest.71 I have 
been told that reliance on inputs like herbicide and tractors have begun to displace 
these labor-pooling practices in Northern Ghana. 
Yet this term “non-market” may be a bit of a misnomer: the Gurene people of 
the Upper East Region speak of the days of the week in terms of their sequence 
                                                
68 Author interview with Bakari Sadiq Nyari, Tamale, February 13, 2013.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Ian Scoones and John Thompson, “The Politics of Seed in Africa’s Green Revolution: Alternative 




around market days.72 This organization of time reflects the reality that people do 
generate enough surplus produce to trade in markets, just not in the markets of the 
global food economy. Farmers in rural Northern Ghana are frequently termed 
“subsistence” farmers, suggesting that they only produce to get by, but do not 
generate surplus. This assumption overlooks the ways in which surplus is in fact 
generated, but is distributed in different ways. I was told on several occasions of how 
people would share their harvest with farmers who experienced harvest loss, 
delivering food discretely after sundown. 
These systems of exchange and labor sharing practices are ways that peasants 
use to reduce their risks and improve food security. Scott (1976) contends that the 
self-provisioning farmer is risk averse and hesitant to adopt new technologies because 
“he works close enough to the margin that he has a great deal to lose by 
miscalculating.”73 Peasant farmers operate by a ‘safety-first’ principle whose goal is a 
secure subsistence. This goal “is expressed in a wide array of choices in the 
production process; a preference for crops that can be eaten over crops that must be 
sold, an inclination to employ several seed varieties in order to spread risks, a 
preference for varieties with stable if modest yields.”74 By this logic, stable yields are 
more important than yield increases; new technologies that promise yield boosts may 
be regarded skeptically without the environmental learning75 that can demonstrate the 
new technology’s stability over time.  
                                                
72 The days are organized as day before market day, market day, day after market day, and two days 
after market day. 
73 James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 25. 
74 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 23. 
75 For a discussion of environmental and social learning in the case of genetically modified cotton 
seeds, see Glenn Davis Stone, “Agricultural deskilling and the spread of genetically modified cotton in 
Warangal,” Current Anthropology, 48, no.1 (2007): 67-103. 
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This ‘safety first’ principle is reflected not only in the choice of which crops 
to grow, but also in the prioritization of efforts. As one of the producers explained in 
the Mango Value Chain workshop, producing for the local market and community 
takes precedent over production for international markets. Farmers’ associations have 
been frustrated by the frequency with which smallholder farmers divert inputs like 
fertilizers and pesticides (intended for the maize that has been purchased through the 
association) to tend to the crops produced for family consumption.76 Such 
observations are consistent with Scott’s account that “the villager only attends to his 
‘selling rice’ field after his subsistence field tasks are complete.”77 Deviations from 
this ‘safety-first’ principle are likely to face criticism. Following the devastation of 
tomato crops brought on by roundworms called nematodes (resulting from poor crop 
rotation), one of the chiefs I spoke to in the Upper East, a former farmer, explained 
that the rush to plant tomatoes was about “quick money” and criticized these farmers’ 
failure to diversify their farming. “This is not good for food security…They should be 
planting crops that you can store…maize, rice, groundnut…not perishable crops.”78  
 
“Mixers”: Hybrid Farming Practices, Multiple Roles 
Fatimata Adongo provides an example of a local entrepreneur that has built  
locally-appropriate risk reduction strategies into her business plan. During my first 
visit, Fatimata told me about the 250-acre mango farm that the family ran, a large 
farm by Northern Region standards. She said that they had actually acquired more 
                                                
76 This was articulated at the Mango Value Chain Workshop. See also author interview with farmer 
Fatimata Adongo in Northern Region, Tamale, March 12, 2013. 
77 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 23. 
78 Author interview with Chief of Vea, Vea, December 11, 2012. 
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land than this so that the farmers that work on the farm were given land to grow crops 
of their own along the boundaries. This way, “the farmers see a direct benefit” and 
“have a stake in their success.” This approach, she explained, “generates more 
security.” The farmers intercrop with peanuts, beans and rice—“leguminous crops.” 
They employ people in the surrounding communities and this better standing in the 
community generates security.79 
We can think of Fatimata Adongo’s story as one of family entrepreneurship.  
The family performs different roles to support the various facets of the business 
enterprise. Whereas Fatimata’s family business is meeting export demand, they also 
recognize the importance of local food security. The way the family structures the 
250-acre mango farm to allow their permanent workers to farm crops of their own 
choice recognizes the importance placed upon providing food for your family, which 
becomes essential for “having a stake” in the business’ success. Providing food for 
families comes first, followed by production of cash crops. This pattern was also 
revealed in the Mango Value Chain workshop, whereby farmers insisted on providing 
for themselves and local markets first, and then on thinking about production for 
exports. I was also told by multiple sources that a common practice among farmer 
participants in programs such as Masara N’Arziki was the distribution of inputs such 
as fertilizer to the staple crops that would feed their families along with the cash crops 
the inputs were intended for. This indicated a deviation from the formula and would 
likely lead to lower yields of the cash crops than expected. 
Another observation of farming in Northern Ghana was the adoption of what 
we might call “hybrid” farming practices. Fatimata explained to me that whereas the 
                                                
79 Author interview with Fatimata Adongo, Tamale, March 12, 2013. 
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plants and trees used for traditional healing were grown organically, “they also do 
commercial…use inputs—some chemicals” on their mango and cashew crops to 
“make it easier” and “improve upon yields.” She explained to me that she “doesn’t 
feel bad because in other ways” she’s “doing other things to save the environment.”80  
Joseph Abaas, a farmer and assemblyman of one of the districts outside of Tamale, 
uses fertilizer on his 50-acre rice plot, but is a big proponent of the use of compost in 
his village.81 This “mixing” of different farming practices was even found within the 
local agricultural research community: one agricultural research scientist at the 
Savannah Agricultural Research Institute imagined genetically modified crops as part 
of a diversity of crops grown in Northern Ghana, rather than the large mono-
croppings of genetically modified crops found in the Americas.82 
Many people farm in Northern Ghana, and it is not only people that identify as 
“farmers.” I recall two different taxi cab drivers telling me about their diverse sources 
of income, which also included having plots of maize. While searching for a rental 
house in Northern Ghana, I began small talk with the man who had shown me the 
place. This business is not all that I do, he told me, he was also a “serious farmer.”83 
He grows soyabeans and corn as part of the ADVANCE program designed to help 
him make more money through growing “cash crops.”84 In a similar way, Fatimata 
Adongo is a “serious farmer” who is also involved in education and traditional 
healing. In Northern Ghana, it is common for entrepreneurs to rely on diversified 
sources of income and thick networks of mutual assistance.  
                                                
80 Author interview with Fatimata Adongo, Tamale, September 13, 2012. 
81 Fertilizer was more frequently utilized on grains or high-value crops like tomatoes. 
82 Author interview with agricultural research scientist at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013. 
83 This is when the term “serious farmer” was first on my radar. 
84 Conversation with taxi driver/realtor/maize farmer, Tamale, July 24, 2012. 
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Complexity and Enclosures on Land 
This complexity on the ground is also apparent in the case of land. On the 
African continent, there has been growing concern,85 brought to the world’s attention 
by the food sovereignty movement, about the practice of ‘land grabbing.’ Land grabs 
can be defined by as the “exploration, negotiations, acquisitions or leasing, settlement 
and exploitation of the land resource, specifically to attain energy and food security 
through export to investors’ countries and other markets.”86 The combination of an 
increased value of real estate and plans to develop commercial agriculture has driven 
up the price of land across Ghana. Chiefs have given up communal land in Northern 
Ghana to city dwellers from Accra or for agricultural projects like biofuel 
production.87 One response to these ‘land grabs’ has been the formalization of land 
rights and the institution of a regulatory mechanism by the National Lands 
Commission for large land leases. 
Through its policy and advocacy program, the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa has promoted the formalization of land titles. In Ghana, AGRA 
                                                
85 This concern was institutionalized in 2010 through the Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment (PRAI) sponsored by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Jennifer Clapp, 
“Responsibility to the Rescue? Governing Private Investment in Global Agriculture” (paper presented 
at the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 26, 2014). 
86 Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene, “Introduction: biofuels, food security and 
land grabbing in Africa,” Biofuels, food security and land grabbing in Africa, edited by Prosper B. 
Matondi, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene (London: Zed Books, 2011), 1. For more on the land 
grab see Philip McMichael, “The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring,” Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39, no.4 (2012): 681-701; and the work of the transnational activist network La Via 
Campesina that characterizes the ‘land grab’ as an “Old phenomenon, new appearance.” La Via 
Campesina, “International Conference of Peasants and Farmers: Stop land grabbing!” Report and 
Conclusions of the International Conference of Peasants and Farmers, Mali, November 17-19, 2011, 
(2012) accessed July 2nd, 2015, http://viacampesina.org/downloads/pdf/en/mali-report-2012-en1.pdf . 
87 Author interview with a district assemblyman of the Northern Region, Tamale, May 11, 2015, which 
informed me about the increasing incidence of chiefs giving away communal land in the Northern 
Region. On a case of biofuels and a ‘land grab’ in Northern Ghana see Bakari Sadiq Nyari, Biofuel 




has set up a Land Access and Tenure Security Project at the Kwame Nkrumah 
University of Science and Technology, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. The stated intention is “to secure the livelihood and economic wellbeing 
of the smallholder farmers, especially women, in Northern Ghana by mitigating 
against risks of land and property rights.”88 The work of AGRA to establish clearer 
property rights appeals to a humanitarian concern regarding women’s access to land. 
Activists have raised alarm that such formalization of land rights can lead to land 
consolidation and dispossession of land access from peasants.89 However, it is 
apparent that dispossession is happening at a rapid pace without mechanisms to 
monitor land access and tenure.90 
Formalizing land rights is not only a concern of AGRA, but is also central to 
the World Bank-supported Ghana Commercial Agriculture Project (GCAP). GCAP is 
focused on “land facilitation” for private commercial agriculture. Ghanaian 
agriculture is still dominated by traditional smallholder farms: approximately 90% of 
farm holdings are less than two hectares.91 The GCAP land bank concept is a means 
to assist the private sector in acquiring larger tracts of land for commercial agriculture 
through voluntary arrangements with local communities. This mechanism to 
centralize land registration is being developed through a private contractor, but under 
the guidance of the National Lands Commission. The aim is to guide “acquisitions of 
                                                
88 “Where we work,” AGRA, accessed July 7, 2015, http://agra-alliance.org/where-we-work/where-
we-work/#top-link.  
89 See for example the work of AGRA Watch, “Monitoring the Gates Foundation and AGRA,  
Promoting Food Sovereignty and Agricultural Sustainability in Africa,” AGRA Watch, accessed July 
7, 2015, http://www.cagj.org//wp-content/uploads/AWbrochure.pdf. 
90 See interactive map of global land grabs (data compiled by GRAIN), “Global Map of ‘Land Grabs’ 
By Country and By Sector,” Circle of Blue, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.circleofblue.org/LAND.html. 
91 Republic of Ghana, GASIP, http://www.ifad.org/operations/projects/design/111/ghana.pdf, 1.  
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large tracks of land to protect livelihoods of local communities, guarantee food 
security, protect land rights of local and indigenous communities and protect the 
environment.”92 The Ghana Commercial Agriculture Program characterizes the 
fragmented parcels of farmland across Ghana as an impediment to the development of 
agribusiness. In order for commercial agriculture to thrive, the land bank would 
centralize information about available land into a database that has been developed 
through “voluntary transfer of land” acquired through “open and arms length 
negotiation” with local communities.93  
Identifying land to include within the land bank is done with the recognition 
of the complexity of customary land ownership and local uses of the land that may 
appear to be “underutilized.”94 In an effort to clarify the meanings of the lease 
agreements and contracts private investors wish to acquire, there are ‘sensitization’ 
seminars to discuss the implications of land sales and discuss lease agreements.95 
Arguably, this is a means to get local people to accept new land rights protected 
through Western forms of property rights. It is a dimension of this ‘participatory’ 
work that is supposed to ease this transition to private commercial agriculture in the 
SADA zone.  
The leadership of the National Lands Commission by Bakari Sadiq Nyari 
suggests that this work to identify land rights may indeed be participatory. Prior to his 
political appointment as Chairman of the Lands Commission, Bakari Sadiq Nyari 
                                                
92 Losamills Consult Ltd. “The Establishment of Land Banks,” Powerpoint presentation for the 
National Lands Commission, May 18, 2015. Stephen Kumadoh of the National Lands Commission 
provided me a copy of this. 
93 Author interview with Stephen Kumadoh of the National Lands Commission, Accra, May 20, 2015. 
94 There are long sections in World Bank Project Appraisal document of the GCAP that discuss this, 




worked for twelve years in the regional lands commission of the Upper East, taught 
as a university professor, and has also written an influential article condemning a land 
grab deal in Northern Ghana by a Norwegian biofuel company.96 His involvement in 
this biofuel ‘land grab’ case led to a return of the land to the community and has been 
used as an example of success by transnational activists in the struggle against ‘land 
grabs’ across Africa.97 His influence in the design of the GCAP land bank has led to 
the specification that only a percentage of the land could be sold in the form of 
limited time leases, appearing to strike a balance between the realities of rural to 
urban migration and high land values, without denying communities access to land. In 
explaining the National Lands Commission’s decision to only allow communities to 
sell 40% of their land as part of the land bank, Mr. Nyari told me forcefully, “I am not 
interested in creating landless people.”98 In its current form, GCAP’s land facilitation 
mechanism reflects Mr. Nyari’s concerns to prevent the dispossession of peasants 
from communal land. The question is whether these policies will be implemented 
with these concerns in mind. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Farmer participation in nucleus-outgrower schemes in Northern Ghana will 
expose farmers to techno-scientific approaches to farming and connect these farmers 
to markets for exports. This effort to professionalize farming may have a particular 
impact on younger farmers that are lured with the promise of a new, less labor-
                                                
96 See Nyari, Biofuel Landgrabbing in Northern Ghana.  
97 Mr. Nyari is also affiliated with the African Biodiversity Network. 




intensive and more lucrative way to farm. The discourse of entrepreneurship invoked 
by developing planners signals that this is not your grandfather’s farming. The 
identity of the farmer entrepreneur (the nucleus in the nucleus-outgrower model) 
figures as an aspiration that farmers seek to achieve, but few can attain. Most farmers 
that join this undertaking to professionalize farming will perform the role of the 
outgrower that meets the growing specifications of an externally determined 
production system. In this sense, the discourse of entrepreneurship has some of the 
key attributes of hype: it is future-oriented, it exaggerates the promise of 
entrepreneurship (since most farmers are not likely to achieve the status of the serious 
nucleus farmer), and it is a bid for attention to attract investment in agricultural 
development programs. 
The aim to transform farming from a way of life to a business in Ghana is 
unlikely to be fully realized as farmers pick and choose what kinds of “modern” or 
“organic” agricultural practices to adopt, and hold multiple roles that secure not only 
income, but also food for their families. Such practices of “mixing” complicate both 
the agricultural and identity transformations that are crucial components in this 
change. However, not all agricultural interventions ignore these multiple roles in the 
diversification of income and means to food security.  
Within this array of agricultural development programs, there are divisions, 
and they often fall along the lines of those that are more publicly funded99 and those 
that are private sector-led. The USAID-funded Africa Rising Project in Ghana works 
in cooperation with scientists from the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture 
                                                
99 Here I mean not just national public funding but rather a mix of funding from the national 
government, international agricultural research institutions, and bilateral aid agencies. 
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and the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute. One expert involved in the Africa 
Rising Project described the AGRA and Africa Development Bank of Ghana (ADB) 
as “myopic” in their focus on commodities. He commented that the Africa Rising 
program was different than AGRA or ADB because it was a research program that 
examined the impact of agricultural practices on households and livelihoods. In 
contrast to the “commodity-specific activities” of organizations like AGRA or ADB, 
Africa Rising takes a more expansive approach that looks at the interactions between 
crops and soil and water. The reason for such a systems approach that examines these 
interactions was that “when you consider a household the farmer handles many things 
at once.”100  
Another expert working on the rice intensification and community seeds 
project of Africa Rising described the efforts to understand the “yield gap”—the gap 
between potential yields using fertilizer and irrigation and actual crop yields (where 
crops are rainfed and fertilizer may or may not be used) near Navrongo and in the 
Tolon-Kumbungu districts of Northern Ghana. The project team recruited eighty 
farmers and clarified that to the farmers that they “are not an NGO, we are not giving 
you inputs.” The participants farmed as usual and the research scientists observed. 
Later, the experts “sit down” with them and advise the participants on what they have 
done right and wrong, based upon an “optimal model” developed by the experts. One 
Navrongo farmer was doing considerably better than the optimal model, frequently 
                                                
100 Author interview with lead agricultural consultant and agronomist of Africa Rising, Tamale, 
October 10, 2012.  
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tills after the rain, plants in rows, and does not use herbicide.  The project team wants 
to see whether his model is “economically viable.”101  
The University of Development Studies Integrated Community Development 
undergraduate program is concerned with rural livelihoods and offers undergraduate 
students interested in development an opportunity to learn through participant 
observation.102 In this trimester program, students spend eight weeks living among a 
rural community and work to assess the development priorities of the community. 
Students are chosen on the basis of their language skills103 and work with opinion 
leaders and conduct surveys in order to understand what those development priorities 
should be. The idea is that through their lived experience in the community, they 
should be better able to ascertain some of the challenges faced by members of the 
community. As such, it is an excellent educational opportunity, provided the students 
are willing to abandon preconceived ideas about what constitutes development 
necessities.104 Such programs allow for the possibility of cross-generational 
knowledge exchange as the university students are given the opportunity to learn 
from the community rural living skills and the university student can render legible 
the development concerns of the community to a wider audience.105 This is also a 
way to produce more experts to address rural poverty in Northern Ghana. One of the 
                                                
101 Author interview with agricultural research scientist of Africa Rising, Tamale, September 13, 2012.  
102  The University of Development Studies is a university system set up by J.J. Rawlings in Northern 
Ghana intended to counter-balance the colonial patterns of educational investment in the South.  
103 Although English is the official language of Ghana, some linguists identify more than sixty distinct 
languages in Ghana. The Government of Ghana sponsors nine languages: Akan, Dagaare/Waale, 
Dangbe, Dagbani, Ewe, Ga, Gonja, Kasem, and Nzema. 
104 Ivan Illich, “Needs,” in The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, 2nd ed., ed. 
Wolfgang Sachs (London: Zed Books, 2010), 95-110. It is possible that the students’ experience of 
discomfort could also color their interpretations of what is necessary in a community. 
105 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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students that we met who participated in the program claimed to have formed his own 
NGO “Save the Rurals”—though, when asked, couldn’t clearly articulate what his 
organization would do in order to accomplish this goal (or what the “rurals” were 
being saved from).  Such programs, while offering the opportunity for 
intergenerational knowledge exchange, may serve to reinforce a shift of agenda 
setting and knowledge holding away from elders and towards the educated youth.  
Analysis of this period of agricultural transformation allows us to see within it 
struggles over knowledge, identity, and authority. Who possesses the knowledge best 
suited to promote food security in Northern Ghana? How should farming be 
organized? Who should determine how farming should be practiced? What does it 
mean to be a successful farmer? As this chapter reveals, although there are 
interventions to render legible farming to support the expansion of the market 
economy, there are existing modes of resistance that make such a total transformation 
unlikely. That is, the multiple roles that people in rural Northern Ghana perform, their 
food distribution and risk-reduction strategies, and their tendencies towards a 
pragmatic hybridization of farming practices suggests that efforts to standardize, 
professionalize, and integrate farming will encounter obstacles. However, there is one 
significant trend that presents the possibility that a new Green Revolution may take 
hold in Northern Ghana: the shift from elders being the bearers of knowledge and 
authority on farming to that of the educated youth. Through formalized education and 
training, traditional knowledge held by elders in farming communities may be valued 
less as young people are encouraged to embrace techno-scientific approaches to 
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farming. The transition from farming as a way of life to farming as a business is 





Seed Politics and the Question of Democracy 
 
What actors, expertise, and models of development are advanced by the ‘new 
Green Revolution in Africa’? What struggles over authority, knowledge, identity, and 
property define this contemporary political economy of agricultural modernization in 
Ghana? I have argued that legal, techno-scientific expertise and agribusiness work 
together to advance a model of agricultural development based on new forms of 
capital, governance structures, and technology. This model of agricultural 
development is mobilized and legitimated through discourses of emergency, 
salvation, entrepreneurship, and humanitarianism. In this new Green Revolution in 
Africa, regions like Northern Ghana are seen by development planners as 
‘backwards,’ with growing ‘yield gaps’ that undermine food security. What is needed, 
from this perspective, is capital investment, entrepreneurship, and access to yield-
enhancing technologies, such as ‘pro-poor biotechnology.’ Deficiency frames, the 
combined use of hype and science, and donations become critical mechanisms to 
facilitate—or resist—the entry of contested agricultural technologies and models of 
agricultural development.  
 
Democracy and the Politics of Agricultural Modernization 
While at the Savannah Agricultural Research Institute I asked agricultural 
research scientists about their views on GMOs. During an interview, one of the 
scientists expressed concern not only regarding GMOs, but the fact that he was the 
one being asked to assess this controversial technology. “I think the major problem 
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here is when you say GMO it raises ethical and other questions,” he hesitated, and 
then continued, “whether the scientist may not be the best to answer those questions 
even though he is at the forefront of the debate.”1 The ‘rule of experts’ in Ghana’s 
biosafety regime places considerable power, however ambivalently held, in the 
authority of scientists like him.2  Determining the safety of this technology has so far 
operated through a constriction of vision: a focus on testing in confined field trials for 
gene flow, at the neglect of the socio-economic and ethical impacts of the technology. 
The Ghana Biosafety Act 831, 2011, which governs biotechnology in Ghana, 
formalizes this genecentric view. I was told by the acting CEO of the National 
Biosafety Authority that a consideration of socio-economic concerns is the “duty of 
the ‘anti-group’ whatever are the downsides of GMOs.”3 In the view of the Authority, 
such concerns were to be raised by “civil society” and activists after the confined 
field trials are completed and approved, and before placing the technology on the 
market.  
Paradoxically, Food Sovereignty Ghana, who has raised such concerns, has 
turned to the same biosafety legislation to demand a ban on the commercialization of 
GMOs, de facto legitimating the mechanism that allowed GMOs into the country in 
the first place. This move, although an understandable strategy to delay further 
development of GM crops,4 is at odds with their key aspirations to address broader 
socio-political concerns regarding GM seeds’ impact on the livelihoods of farmers 
                                                
1 Author interview with agricultural research scientist at SARI, Nyankpala, February 13, 2013.  
2 Mitchell, Rule of Experts. 
3 Author interview with acting CEO of National Biosafety Authority, Accra, May 20, 2015. 
4 At the time of the writ of summons was filed in February 2015, there was not yet a National 
Biosafety Authority, but rather a National Biosafety Committee years after the passage of the 
Biosafety Act in December 2011. FSG likely thought that this could be a way to advance the case since 
the government was apparently not abiding by its own legislation. The National Biosafety Authority 
was inaugurated on the same date that the court case began.  
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and consumers in Ghana. This maneuver of bringing the GMO debate to the 
courtroom reinforces a ‘rule of experts,’ and has potentially exclusionary, and 
contradictory, effects for the movement of food sovereignty in Ghana.5 
This dissertation has argued that the ‘rule of experts’ is an outcome of the 
struggles, contestations, and discursive strategies that take place in courtrooms, 
boardrooms, experimental fields, and the streets. Proponents and opponents of GM 
seeds use a blend of two discursive strategies—hype and expertise—to facilitate the 
entry, or to resist, the cultivation of genetically modified crops. The use of hype 
attracts attention and support, whereas the use of scientific knowledge is a bid for 
authority. The emergency framing collectively constructed through hype renders 
incremental approaches, compromises, and deliberation careless in the face of such 
urgency. Rather, because emergencies are conceived as large-scale, responses are 
expected to match this scale. From this perspective, global problems require global 
solutions: local risk-reduction and food security strategies are seen as inadequate; 
rather, a global class of professional managers that supports farmer entrepreneurs 
capable of ‘feeding the world’ is necessitated.6  
This blend of hype and expertise works in tandem with the law to generate 
political shifts that grant scientists, biosafety experts, and lawyers greater power in 
shaping decisions on food and agricultural policy. Hype about GMOs as 
‘Frankenfoods’ and ‘terminator seeds’ creates a perception of genetic modification as 
a uniquely “risky” technology that demands management by biosafety expertise and 
                                                
5 Again, it should be stressed that the debate over GMOs in Ghana is in an early stage, and this is a 
period of transition. However, observations at this stage indicate that many of the dynamics I have seen 
in South Africa and around the world, theorized in Chapter Two, are likely to also play out in Ghana. 
6 Escobar, “Planning.” 
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legislation. In the speculative economy of the life sciences industry, hype about the 
promise of biotechnology to deliver both economic and humanitarian benefits also 
solicits the authority of legal experts and intellectual property protection to safeguard 
investments and handle liability issues. In the courtroom and in Parliament, 
professional advocates navigate and shape legislation to advance their case. This 
proliferation and elevation of expertise can marginalize the majority of Africans who 
lack such expertise, and may ultimately lead to less democratic decision-making on 
food and agriculture policy.  
This contestation extends to broader concerns over the enclosure of seed, land, 
and knowledge: the patenting of seed and the prevention of seed-saving; ‘land grabs’ 
of traditional communal lands; and the exclusion of traditional or local knowledge 
from food and agriculture policy, respectively. These processes of enclosure reveal 
three key distinctions between the first and the new Green Revolution in Africa: first, 
a shift in the role of the state to a state that relinquishes its leadership in service 
provision and instead “enables” the private sector to take the lead; second, the new 
composition of legal and techno-scientific expertise above that informs contemporary 
‘feed the world’ strategies; and third, the proliferation of new forms of capital that 
integrate biotechnology with philanthropy to create new sources of market value. 
These shifts are engendered by new laws that entail changed relationships to seed and 
by extension biological life, whereby seed becomes patentable material, with specific 
regimes of access and use. These legal changes support the expansion of the private 
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sector in Ghana by securing an ‘enabling environment’7 that purportedly makes 
investment in agriculture more profitable. Philanthropy and the use of community 
seminars to discuss issues such as the establishment of formalized land titles and 
transgenic seeds alter conceptions of seed and land, and lay the foundation for their 
commodification.  
In the face of this contestation, the promotion of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology in 
Africa has been deployed to reframe biotechnology as a humanitarian enterprise. 
Using the concept of “philanthrocapitalism,” I demonstrated how the “donation” of 
such technology serves to advance new markets in Africa under the pretext of 
providing a philanthropic response to perceived food insecurity. This “donation” 
mechanism produces political effects: the “gift” of a proprietary gene by an 
agribusiness corporation for the development of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology reflects a 
conception of genes and seed as something that can be privately owned first, and then 
given away. Philanthropy normalizes both the seed as a commodity—rendering it 
“biocapital”—and a “genecentric” view of biological life that locates biodiversity in 
the stock of genetic material and divorces the seed from its broader social and 
ecological context.8 
At the center of all of these contestations is the figure of the farmer, who is 
seen as an agent and object of salvation by GM proponents and opponents alike. The 
farmer entrepreneur, in the view of the World Bank and the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa, can save Africans from poverty and can be even capable of 
                                                
7 The language of ‘enabling environment’ is used widely in policy documents, from Ghana’s CAADP 
compact to World Bank reports. It is connected to the concept of good governance and the promotion 
of clear and transparent legal regimes to encourage economic growth and investment. 
8 See Rajan, Biocapital; Escobar, Territories of Difference, 140. 
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‘feeding the world,’ if only s/he were to gain access to scientific knowledge and 
modern agricultural technologies. By contrast, food sovereignty activists see the 
rejection of GM seed as the means to save farmers’ livelihoods endangered by the 
threat of GMOs and corporate domination. My ethnographic findings in Northern 
Ghana—a space that has been identified by both sides of this debate as deficient and 
in need of assistance—indicate that farmers are unlikely to buy into much of this 
hype. Rather, I find that farmers in Northern Ghana are “mixers”: they pragmatically 
use a range of traditional and modern agricultural technologies and do not see 
traditional, organic farming and the use of modern inputs as mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, ethnography allows me to show that these grand plans to transform 
farming from a way of life to a business are constantly challenged by the existing 
complexity of Africans’ multiple, coexisting roles, risk reduction practices, and local 
notions of entrepreneurship. This suggests that efforts to construct new farmer 
identities as part of the new Green Revolution in Africa will be frustrated, and likely 
incomplete.    
 
Implications and Future Research 
What is at stake in the debate over genetically modified crops in Ghana are 
broader issues of economic development, seed sovereignty, and democratic 
participation in food and agricultural policy. The cultivation of genetically modified 
crops is seen as critical for the economic development of countries such as Ghana. 
African countries have been framed as “laggards” in need to “catch up” with the rest 
of the world by embracing biotechnology. Such views are captured by the joint 
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statement by the ‘father of the Green Revolution,’ Norman Borlaug and Jimmy 
Carter: “Africa has already missed the industrial revolution and the tractor and 
fertilizer revolution…there is a risk it will miss the biotechnology revolution as 
well.”9 This anxiety is reproduced in the words of Dr. Florence Wambugu, an 
outspoken and influential proponent of GM seeds and the CEO of Africa Harvest 
Biotech Foundation International:  
We may have missed the green revolution, which helped Asia and Latin 
America achieve self-sufficiency in food production, but we cannot afford to 
be excluded or to miss another major global technological revolution.10 
But “laggards” need encouragement, and biotech proponents have recognized 
Ghana’s developments in biosafety and biotech developments as worthy of 
emulation. Dr. Wambugu recently celebrated Ghana’s biosafety law and biotech 
developments as “an excellent model that other African countries can emulate… 
Countries in the region and other African countries can learn from what Ghana has 
done.”11  
 Anti-GM opponents view the introduction of genetically modified crops as a 
mechanism of indebtedness. Food sovereignty activists have protested on the streets 
of Accra (and beyond) that the introduction of GM seeds impoverishes both farmers 
with debt and the environment with ecological degradation. Seed sovereignty, the 
right of farmers to save, exchange, use, and sell their own seed, is violated by control 
over seed systems through patents and corporate domination of the supply of seeds. 
                                                
9 Norman Borlaug and Jimmy Carter, “Foreword,” in Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is Being 
Kept Out of Africa, by Robert Paarlberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), x. 
10 Florence Wambugu, “Taking the Food Out of Our Mouths,” The Washington Post, August 26, 2001. 
11 Florence Wambugu, “Ghana’s Biosafety Law is Model for Africa—Dr. Wambugu,” Graphic 




Activists argue that these violations are enabling conditions of, rather than exceptions 
to, the global GM seed regime. In contrast, proponents of Green Revolution programs 
want to encourage the adoption of ‘improved’ seed in order to address the problem of 
“genetic erosion”: saving local seed is seen as a bad practice because “genetic 
potency declines” and “seed fertility declines” over time.12 This again reflects a 
genecentric view of biological processes, at odds with the idea of seed sovereignty. 
From the perspective of seed sovereignty, the seed is more than just the store of 
genetic information, but rather a central part of cultural and biological diversity. The 
ability of farmers to manage their own seed systems, to store, share and exchange 
seeds is viewed as the key to resilience.13 Many within the food sovereignty 
movement see genetically modified seed as a vehicle that will destroy these farmer-
managed seed systems. Only a ban on the introduction of GMOs will suffice to 
protect farmers from this threat to their livelihoods.14 
Protests are not the only site where GM seed is framed as a symbol of larger 
issues of corporate private sector encroachment and domination. At a Board of 
Directors interview at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in Accra in March 2013, I 
asked board members about the benefits and concerns regarding GM crops. My 
questions sparked a lively debate. Some board members expressed positions in favor 
of GM crop cultivation: “agriculture is confronted with lots of issues biotic and 
abiotic, we need innovative ways to address them,” with biotechnology it is possible 
to “increase yields,” “address yield gaps,” and “make crops able to deal with the 
                                                
12 Phone interview with Dr. Walter Alhassan, March 6, 2013. 
13 Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa, Comments on the FAO Draft Guide for National Seed 
Policy Implementation (Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), 2014), 7. 




environment.” Others emphasized that it would be more appropriate if biotechnology 
were “home-bred” with “Monsanto and Syngenta [linked] up with our varieties.” Yet 
in that room at the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, much like the activists who 
were criticizing the Ghanaian government, there was a clear concern about the 
appropriateness of GM technology, its impact on seed saving, and the dependency 
GM seed presents, both “financial and material.” When talking about implementation 
of biotechnology and biosafety in Ghana, one particularly influential board member 
stated “we don’t want covert compulsion…for some time we have seen it, and we 
don’t want that. We know that Monsanto and Syngenta funds a lot of research. We 
need to agree to a course of action.”15  
This cross-section of activists and bureaucrats, which may have many points 
of contention regarding the desirability of commercial agriculture, are actually in sync 
in demanding greater democratic participation in food policy —and not “coercion.” 
Yet this idea of democracy may be also taken to mean consideration of the 
introduction of GM crops, if the latter were understood as one way of diversifying the 
options on the table, rather than the major viable possibility. One of the agricultural 
research scientists at SARI characterizes the call to ban GM crops as undemocratic: 
“give [farmers] a choice, is that not what democracy is all about?”16 Farmers should 
be able to choose and decide for themselves, he asserted.17 Food Sovereignty Ghana 
has made claims about the undesirability of GM seeds for all farmers in the country, 
                                                
15 Author interview with members of the National MoFA Board of Directors at a Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture Board of Directors meeting, Accra, March 25, 2013. 
16 Ibid. 
17 As I have shown in the dissertation, the ability of farmers to make such a choice is not a neutral 
technocratic issue, but is rather contingent on access to techno-scientific knowledge and expertise that 
most farmers, and even most politicians and elected officials, in Ghana lack. In this statement farmers 
are conceived of as consumers whose democratic participation is reduced to a vote in the marketplace. 
I thank Anatoli Ignatov for this point. 
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framing the seeds as an “imposition on Ghanaians.”18 Although they have the support 
of a farmers’ organization in Brong-Ahafo, my research indicates that they have not 
consulted with farmers in Northern Ghana.19 If Food Sovereignty Ghana succeeds in 
obtaining an injunction to halt GMO commercialization without the participation of 
farmers in the North, does this suggest not only a ‘rule of experts’ but also a “rule of 
activists” in the debate over GMOs? 
Food Sovereignty Ghana, at least at this stage, appears to be a consumer-based 
social movement organization with little support from the farmers they claim to speak 
for. FSG puts forth an agenda of organic farming for all of Ghana. Organic farming is 
a challenging, labor-intensive (and often cost-intensive20) form of farming, and this is 
unlikely to be well received by all farmers.21 Rather, with the loss of interest of young 
people in farming, the use of agro-chemicals and genetically modified seeds may 
prove more attractive. My ethnographic observations in Northern Ghana indicate that 
most farmers operate outside of this polarized debate, choosing a mix of modern and 
traditional agricultural practices to suit their needs. In the future this may or may not 
include GM seed. Will Food Sovereignty Ghana, like proponents of a new Green 
Revolution in Africa, need to construct a new farmer in order to advance their 
objectives?  
I have argued that the collective construction of emergency in the GMO 
debate has created a political environment in which democratic deliberation, 
                                                
18 “Food Sovereignty Ghana Marks Second Anniversary,” Food Sovereignty Ghana, March 24, 2015, 
accessed May 20, 2015, http://foodsovereigntyghana.org/. 
19 Conversations with members of Food Sovereignty Ghana, May 5 (Accra) and May 12, 2015 
(phone). 
20 Cost here does not refer to the costs externalized onto the environment. 
21 This was affirmed in a conversation with Professor David Millar of the Open University (and 
organic farmer) in Bolgatanga on the difficulties of organic farming, Bolgatanga, May 13, 2015. 
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incremental approaches, and consideration of contingency are not highly valued; 
rather urgent and transformative action is called upon. What, then, does a politics that 
allows for contingency and small steps look like? What kind of scholarship would 
best be suited to analyze such politics? The poles of the GMO debate have received 
sufficient scholarly attention and this reifies these divisions and serves to perpetuate a 
politics of hype. Rather, greater attention to nuance, shared strategies, and openings 
for compromise is called for in order to create a more inclusive space for democratic 
deliberation over food policy. A better understanding of existing and new alternatives 
to emergency and big solutions requires further participatory research on how farmers 
adapt to environmental challenges. The new Green Revolution’s emphasis on techno-
science and innovation obscures and devalues the wealth and diversity of existing 
practices of farmers’ experimentation and innovation on the ground. In the policy 
domain, rather than sensitization seminars in which experts lead on a given issue area 
and farmers can raise questions, a reversal of this relationship—with farmers leading 
and experts questioning—is called for. Food sovereignty activist organizations 
already play an important role in awareness creation about the potential problems GM 
seeds pose. However, they also need to make themselves more cognizant of the 
challenges that farmers face and not romanticize traditional farming. Rather, they 
should seek to understand when and why farmers choose to use technologies that they 
deem harmful. In order to do so, a more sustained dialogue with and inclusion of 
farmers in such struggles becomes crucial. 
The discourse of entrepreneurship within Green Revolution programs is, on 
the one hand, a discourse of empowerment. African farmers can feed the world with 
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the appropriate knowledge, technology, and linkages. On the other hand, it is also a 
discourse that centralizes and produces hierarchies, which ultimately disempowers. 
The relationship of outgrowers to the nucleus farm advanced by USAID, the Ghana 
Commercial Agriculture Project, and the World Bank is a debtor-creditor 
relationship, as the nucleus farmer provides the inputs (the credit) that are paid back 
with their harvest. Not all farmers, not many at all in fact, will be the nucleus farm 
that can have a stake in the design of the farming business. Rather, most farmers will 
be the outgrowers that meet certain specific standards. In my research I heard from 
many outgrowers that they were dissatisfied with the farming practices that they were 
required to adopt in order to participate in outgrower schemes. Future research on the 
new Green Revolution in Africa should consider the degree of participation that 
farmers have in shaping how food is produced and how to strengthen existing forms 
of entrepreneurship that offer an alternative to nucleus-outgrower relationships. Does 
the promotion of public-private partnerships in the agricultural sector promote or 
hinder the inclusion of local producers in food and agriculture policy? Do these kind 
of arrangements succeed in improving food security? Do they empower farmers to 
become more resilient and self-sufficient or do they widen democratic deficits? What 
kind of accountability exists within these public-private partnerships? 
 This dissertation reveals that humanitarianism can serve as a legitimating 
mechanism for shifts in authority—as the private sector plays an increasingly 
important role in setting development priorities—as well as a mechanism of 
commodification. The key role that philanthrocapitalist actors play in development 
projects is legitimated through philanthropic appeals that resonate in a context of 
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shortages of state funding for development projects. The case of donation of genetic 
material facilitated by philanthropists like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
AATF, and the Rockefeller Foundation for the development of ‘pro-poor’ 
biotechnology is a clear example of this. Yet I would argue that this is part of a larger 
trend that enables the expansion of capital into frontier markets. The role of the 
discourse of humanitarianism in legitimating power shifts and economic restructuring 
is a vital area in African development studies in need of further research.  
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Appendix: Philanthocapitalism and Agbiotech Public-Private 
Partnerships in Africa 
 
Philanthrocapitalism and agbiotech public-private partnerships in Africa1 
Project Countries, national agricultural 
research institutes involved, and status 
of biosafety legislation 
 
Partners and roles:  
Bold indicates private sector.  
Underline indicates the arbitrator for 











Ø Ghana: Ghana passed biosafety 
legislation in December 2011 that 
“is considered user friendly as it 
does not contain any labeling 
requirements for biotech or 
genetically engineered food 
products or strict liability 
provisions.”2 The Bt cowpea was 
planted in September 2013 in 
confined field trials (CFTs) 
adjacent to the Savannah 
Agricultural Research Institute 
(SARI) research complex.  
Ø Nigeria: Nigeria has drafted 
biosafety legislation that permits it 
to conduct field trials. Confined 
field trials of cowpea at IAR in 
2013. Anticipated commercial 
release in 2017.3 
Ø Burkina Faso: law in place to allow 
safe commercialization of GM 
products4, passage of approval of 
GM food crops has been much 
slower than with fiber. Has 
commercially produced Bt cotton 
since 2008. In 2013, 150,000 
farmers planted Bt cotton for the 
sixth consecutive year.5 
 
Other countries involved: 
Ø Australia: Genetic modification 
took place at CSIRO 
Ø US: Support through the USAID-
funded Program for Biosafety 
Systems and through USAID’s 
support for making SARI a Center 
of Excellence 
Ø Puerto Rico: Confined field trials 
in 2008 before Burkina Faso, 
Nigeria, and Ghana6  
Initiated by the Network for Genetic 
Improvement of Cowpea for Africa7 
that includes Purdue University, the 
University of Zimbabwe, International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture 
(IITA), University of California-
Riverside, Michigan State University, 
the University of Virginia-
Charlottsville, Kirkhouse Trust, 
Monsanto (US). AATF negotiated a 
royalty-free transfer of the proprietary 
gene used in the development of the 
Bt cowpea, and coordinates and 
manages the project. CSIRO 
(Australia) under the guidance of 
CSIRO researcher T.J. Higgins 
performed the genetic modification 
with the Bt gene from Monsanto. The 
CFTs are being conducted at the 
Savannah Agricultural Research 
Institute (SARI, Ghana), Institute for 
Agricultural Research (IAR, Nigeria), 
and the Institut de l’Environnement et 
de Recherches Agricoles (INERA, 
Burkina Faso).8 The cowpea variety 
used in the transformation event was 
provided by Nigeria ARC. 
 





Ø Kenya: KARI conducted the 
contained laboratory and confined 
field trials. The product was not 
engineered for the common variant 
of the virus and trials were less 
The International Service for 
Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA) developed and 
financed this research partnership 
between Kenya Agriculture Research 
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successful than anticipated.9 
Kenyan scientists have been trained 
in both the US and Kenya in 
genetic modification, the 
establishment of biosafety systems, 
intellectual property rights 
protection, and technology transfer 
mechanisms.10 Kenya has enacted 
biosafety regulation and has an 
approved biosafety policy.11 As of 
2012, there is a ban on GMOs in 
the country.12 
Institute (KARI), Monsanto, 
USAID’s Agricultural Biotechnology 
Support Project (ABSP), Michigan 
State University, and Kenyan 
universities. Monsanto “donated” the 
virus-resistant technology through a 
royalty-free transfer.13 KARI 
conducted the trials and Monsanto 
provided the virus coat protein gene to 
use to develop the GM sweet potato.14 
Water-Efficient 
Maize for Africa 
(WEMA) 
Ø Mozambique: is currently in the 
process to approve its revised 
biosafety regulations. If passed, it 
will allow the first GM plantings in 
the country.15 
Ø South Africa: South Africa has 
enacted a biosafety law and has 
been commercially producing 
biotech crops since 1998. In 2012, 
it planted 2.9 million ha of biotech 
crops.16 
Ø Kenya: Kenya has enacted 
biosafety regulation and has an 
approved biosafety policy.17As of 
2012, there is a ban on GMOs in 
the country.18 
Ø Uganda: Uganda has drafted a 
biosafety bill. 19 
AATF negotiated a royalty-free 
transfer of the proprietary gene used in 
the development of WEMA, and 
coordinates and manages the project. 
Monsanto provided the gene Bacillus 
subtilis to help confer drought 
resistance.20 WEMA is funded by the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Howard G. Buffett Foundation, and 
USAID.21 Other partners include 
KARI, Instituto de Investigação 
Agrária de Moçambique, South 
Africa’s Agricultural Research Center, 
the Commission for Science and 
Technology (COSTECH), Uganda’s 
NARO, Uganda), CIMMYT, African 
Seed Traders Association (AFSTA)22 
Insect-resistant 
maize for Africa 
(IRMA) 
Ø Ethiopia: Ethiopia has enacted 
biosafety regulation.23 
Ø Kenya: Kenya has enacted 
biosafety regulation and has an 
approved biosafety policy.24As of 
2012, there is a ban on GMOs in 
the country.25 
Ø Malawi: Malawi has enacted 
biosafety regulation.26 
Ø Tanzania: Tanzania has enacted 
biosafety regulation.27 
Ø Uganda: Uganda has drafted a 
biosafety bill. 28 
Ø Zambia: Zambia has enacted 
biosafety regulation.29 
Ø Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe has enacted 
biosafety regulation.30 
Syngenta Foundation31 is the funding 
agency, partners include32 the 
CIMMYT, CGIAR, Bako National 
Maize Research Project (Ethiopia), 
Hawassa National Maize Research 
Project, national agricultural research 
institutes of Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe, Bunda College, Chitedze 
Agricultural Research Station, Selian 
Agricultural Research Institute, 










Ø Kenya: Kenya has enacted 
biosafety regulation and has an 
approved biosafety policy.33As of 
2012, there is a ban on GMOs in 
the country.34 
Ø Uganda: Uganda has drafted a 
biosafety bill. 35 
Donald Danforth Plant Science 
Center, Monsanto Fund36, USAID, 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Cornell University, ISAAA, Kenyan 
universities, IITA, Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, and Howard G. 
Buffet Foundation. 37 Trials are 
conducted at KARI and the National 








and salt tolerant 
(ST) African 
(NEWEST) rice 
Ø Ghana (CSIR-Kumasi): Ghana 
passed biosafety legislation in 
December 2011 that “is considered 
user friendly as it does not contain 
any labeling requirements for 
biotech or genetically engineered 
food products or strict liability 
provisions.”38NEWEST rice was 
planted was planted at the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) Kumasi in March 
2013. 
Ø Nigeria (National Cereal Research 
Institute): Nigeria has drafted 
biosafety legislation that permits it 
to conduct field trials.39 
Ø Uganda (National Agricultural 
Research Organization): Uganda 
has drafted a biosafety bill. 40 
AATF “is contributing its leadership 
experience in public private 
partnership management, technology 
stewardship and project management  
expertise.”41 Arcadia Biosciences 
“donated” the NUE, WUE, and ST 
traits for the development of 
NEWEST rice and the Public 
Intellectual Property Resource for 
Africa (PIPRA) is “donating the 
enabling technologies for plant 
transformation.”42The International 
Centre for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT) is carrying out the preliminary 
agronomic trials, seed propagation, 
and field trials for trait gain, whereas 
the CSIR-Kumasi (Ghana), National 
Cereal Research Institute (Nigeria), 
and Uganda (National Agricultural 
Research Organization) are 
conducting the field trials for trait 
gain. Project activities are funded by 
USAID and initial funding was 
provided by the UK Department for 






Ø South Africa: Agricultural Research 
Center (ARC), Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR) are conducting confined 
field trials. 
Ø Kenya: KARI: confined field trials 
Ø Burkina Faso: INERA is 
conducting confined field trials. 
Ø Nigeria: Nigeria has drafted 
biosafety legislation that permits it 
to conduct field trials. Institute of 
Agricultural Research at Ahmadu 
Bello University in Nigeria is not 
yet involved in field trials. 44 
 
The Africa Harvest Consortium led by 
Florence Wambugu, is the primary 
grantee to the program. Pioneer Hi-
Bred “is partnering with Africa 
Harvest as the scientific lead 
institution,” donating the initial 
technologies valued at US$4.8 million 
“to help with the project aimed at 
improving the nutritional value of 
sorghum, a staple crop in Africa.”45 
The project is led by the AATF “The 
team enforces core IP [intellectual 
property] values within the project 
such as the Charitable Objective that 
seeks to provide access to the 
knowledge created by the project and 
to supply the final ABS product 
through affordable and accessible 
means free from royalties and at not at 
a profit basis.”46 Other partners 
include Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, ICRISAT, University of 
Pretoria, University of California-
Berkeley, West and Central African 
Council for Agricultural Research and 
Development (CORAF). KARI, the 
Institute of Agricultural Research  
(Nigeria), INERA (Burkina Faso), and 
ARC and Council for Scientific and 
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Industrial Research (South Africa) 
conduct field trials. 
 
                                                
1 The agricultural biotechnology (agbiotech) public-private partnerships included in this table 
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supportive of the idea of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology. That is, the technology is intended to be 
developed to address the needs of small farmers and local food security issues, and research is 
field trials are based in a national agricultural research institute. 
2 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, “Ghana Agricultural Biotechnology Annual,” Global 
Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) Report, September 3, 2013. 
3 “Researchers Inventing Pod Borer Resistant Cowpea for Africa,” AATF, accessed July 5, 2015, 
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